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N times past one who proclaimed "Vive la difference!" would have
been viewed as, at worst, a bon vivant. Times have changed, and one
who makes such an utterance today is likely to be viewed as, at best, a
sexist pig. Even to recognize "la difference," let alone to celebrate it, may
be sufficient to bring one into disrepute.
A rather strong and popular movement, whose members believe that a
person's sex should be legally irrelevant because they believe it is logically
irrelevant, is underway. The followers view men and women as inherently
identical, except in reproductive function and surface anatomy. Any other
observable differences are considered results of social conditioning. For
example, most of the commentary in support of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment proceeds from the assumption that there are no differences between
the sexes that should have any recognition in the law. This assumption
may be faulty, however, because many attitudes commonly ascribed to
stereotypic thinking about the proper role of the sexes may actually be
reflections of reality.
A large and growing. body of psychological, biological, and anthropolog-
ical literature suggests that differences between men and women exist in
temperament and cognitive functioning. The psychological literature
shows that men tend to be more aggressive and to perform better on math-
ematical and visual-spatial tests, and women tend to be more nurturant
and to perform better on tests of verbal fluency.' Many of these differ-
ences appear early in childhood; others tend to appear at about puberty.
The early appearance of many of these traits supports the conclusion that
1. See infra notes 6-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38
BIOLOGY, EQUALITY, AND THE LAW
these differences are at least in part products of biological differences. The
biological literature reveals that sex differences are, to some extent, a result
of exposure both of male fetuses to androgens 2 in utero and of adolescent
and adult males to high levels of circulating androgens. 3 The anthropolog-
ical literature indicates that many traits perceived as artifacts of our own
culture, such as male dominance and aggressiveness, appear in virtually
every known society.4 One could argue, of course, that the reason for the
overwhelming prevalence of male dominance throughout the world and
throughout history is cultural. Such an explanation, however, does noth-
ing to elucidate the reasons for the phenomenon. If human societies need
to elevate one sex to a higher status relative to the other for some func-
tional reason, and if there are no differences between men and women, an
approximately equal distribution of male-dominated and female-domi-
nated societies would be expected. The explanation that men have at-
tained higher status by subordinating women only serves to support the
position that it was male aggressiveness that allowed such a situation to
develop in the first instance.
The existence of sex differences in temperament suggests that the policy
of attempting to achieve an androgynous society through anti-
discrimination laws, affirmative action programs, and constitutional inter-
pretation may be misguided. Disparate effect may not be the only
appropriate factor to consider in determining whether some form of im-
proper discrimination has occurred. If men, on the average, are inherently
more aggressive than women and, because of biological predisposition,
tend to have different interests and abilities than women, then discrimina-
tory motives on the part of those who run male-dominated institutions are
not the only reason for disparities in status between men and women.
Moreover, these differences suggest that certain forms of discrimination
should be permissible because they are based on natural differences be-
tween the sexes.
A recognition of sex differences does not compel an acceptance of all
forms of sex discrimination. Much discrimination has nothing to do with
genuine sex differences, and this Article does not defend such discrimina-
tion. A recognition of differences does mean, however, that not all dis-
crimination is invidious, and thus an inquiry must be made into the
particulars of each case.
An understanding of human nature is crucial to our understanding of
the consequences of certain policies we adopt. Social policies are most
successful when they are based upon realistic assumptions and formulated
with a view toward their consequences. Policies based upon a utopian
egalitarian vision and developed in ignorance of reality pose significant
dangers to a free society. This Article explores the question of sexual
2. Androgens are male hormones that stimulate activity of the male sex organs.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 66 (24th ed. 1982).
3. See infra notes 150-270 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
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equality from a biological perspective and argues that attempts to impose a
sex-blind legal order on a two-sexed species may not be successful without
considerable coercion by the state. Although some may be willing to ac-
cept the tradeoff of a certain amount of individual liberty for greater sex-
ual equality, it is far from clear whether there is a general understanding
that such a tradeoff is necessary. A rational policy, whose goal is to treat
the sexes fairly, must take into account the actual differences between the
sexes. In the words of William Blake, "One Law for the Lion & Ox is
Oppression." 5
I. BIOLOGICAL SEX DIFFERENCES
A. Temperament and Cognitive Function
The sex differences that are most relevant to this study are differences in
behavior, rather than in physiological traits such as reproductive function
and body strength. The specific areas that will be dealt with are aggres-
siveness, nurturance, and cognitive function. Differences in these traits
will be discussed only briefly because there is little controversy concerning
their existence. The major controversy concerns the origin and signifi-
cance of these traits.
1. Aggressiveness
Sex differences in aggressiveness are well documented. 6 Boys are more
aggressive both physically and verbally from the time social play begins at
age two or two-and-a-half. In a trait that may be related to aggressive-
ness-competitiveness-many studies have found no difference between
the sexes, but in studies that find a difference the boys are the more com-
petitive sex. 7 Maccoby and Jacklin concluded that overall boys tend to be
more competitive than are girls.8 Eleanor Maccoby had previously con-
cluded that aggression, defined broadly to include dominance and initia-
tive, is a trait associated with males, and she suggested that aggressiveness
may underlie the growth of analytic thinking. 9 Aggression can be mani-
fested in many ways. Participation in violent crime constitutes one such
5. W. BLAKE, THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN AND HELL Plate 24 (1790).
6. See, e.g., E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES
(1974); Maccoby & Jacklin, Sex Diferences in Aggression." A Rejoinder and Reprise, 51
CHILD DEV. 964 (1980). But see Tieger, On the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in Aggres-
sion, 51 CHILD DEV. 943 (1980).
Aggression is not a unitary concept. E.O. Wilson has described seven different categories
of what might be called aggression: (1) defense and conquest of territory; (2) the assertion of
dominance within well-organized groups; (3) sexual aggression; (4) acts of hostility by which
weaning is terminated; (5) aggression against prey; (6) defensive counterattacks against
predators; and (7) moralistic and disciplinary aggression used to enforce the rules of society.
E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 101 (1978). Some would not define aggression so broadly,
but would limit it to interactions between conspecifics. See K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 11
(1963).
7. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 249.
8. Id. at 254.
9. Maccoby, Woman's Intellect, in THE POTENTIAL OF WOMEN 37 (S. Farber & R.
Wilson eds. 1963).
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manifestation. In 1981, for example, the rate of male arrests for armed
robbery was almost thirteen times as high as the female rate. The rate of
arrest for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter was almost seven times
as high for males as that for females.' 0
In anthropologist Ashley Montagu's book entitled The Natural Superior-
ity of Women the author puts forth the proposition that women are supe-
rior to men. I In support of his thesis Montagu acknowledges that men are
more aggressive than women, but argues that the nonaggressiveness of wo-
men is a virtue because it is a reflection of women's greater emotional con-
trol. 12 The purpose of this Article is not to argue whether differences in
particular traits show the superiority or inferiority of either sex, but to note
the empirical observation that differences do exist. Debate over whether
the temperamental characteristics of one sex are superior to those of the
other, even when differences are found to exist, is frivolous.1' For exam-
ple, it could be said that men are superior to women in aggressiveness, and
women are superior to men in nonaggressiveness. The worth of the traits
depends upon the values of the observer and the context in which the traits
appear. A value-neutral statement that males exhibit greater aggressive-
ness than females would be more accurate.
Very little controversy actually exists over whether men exhibit more
aggressive behavior than do women. The major point of contention cen-
ters on the extent to which differences in aggression are a result of biologi-
cal predisposition and the extent to which differences are a product of
socialization.
2. Cognitive Function
The proposition that there are no significant differences between the IQ
scores of the sexes is generally accepted, but the reason for this lack of
difference is not commonly known. The best-known tests of intelligence,
the Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS),
have been standardized to eliminate sex differences by either deleting
items indicating large differences or by balancing the tests to give equal
weight to items favoring each sex. 14 Thus it makes little sense to compare
the IQs of the two sexes. Even if the tests were not standardized to elimi-
nate sex differences, the results of the comparison would depend solely
upon the value assigned to the individual items. For example, if a test is
heavily weighted in favor of quantitative analysis, at which males tend to
excel, males may appear to have a higher IQ than females. If the test em-
10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 182
(103d ed. 1982-1983) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
I1. A. MONTAGU, THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF WOMEN 19 (1953).
12. (d at 88-89.
13. In sorme contexts, however, it is easier to assess superiority and inferiority because of
an absence of dispute about the value of the characteristics involved. For example, females
have a consistently higher life expectancy and are less susceptible than males to scores of
infectious, degenerative, and genetic diseases. ld. at 75-90.




phasizes verbal ability, at which females excel, females will appear to have
higher IQs than males.
Sex differences can be demonstrated in a number of cognitive abilities.
Females consistently outperform males on tests of verbal fluency. 5 Girls
tend to say their first words earlier, speak more clearly, combine words
into sentences earlier, and use longer sentences than do boys.' 6 This fe-
male superiority lasts throughout their school careers.17 No consistent dif-
ferences have been observed, however, with respect to verbal reasoning. 18
Consistent sex differences also appear in quantitative ability, but males
have the edge in this area. Male superiority in quantitative skills appears
at a much later age than the appearance of the verbal superiority of the
female. Only slight differences are observed until around puberty, but the
male advantage after puberty is quite strong. 19 The difference is com-
monly attributed to differential reinforcement of mathematical perform-
ance in boys and girls and differential course-taking in school,20 but that
does not appear to be a complete answer. In the kibbutzim of Israel, which
have a sexually egalitarian philosophy, these same sex differences in cogni-
tive performance appear even when boys and girls all take the same
courses and there is no social expectation that the boys will outperform the
girls. 21
Another trait in which males show consistent superiority is visual-spatial
relations.2 2 Males outperform females on tests such as the embedded-fig-
ure test 23 and the rod-and-frame test.24 Results of these tests are some-
15. Kipnis, Intelligence, Occupational Status and Achievement Orientation, in EXPLOR-
ING SEX DIFFERENCES 104 (B. Lloyd & J. Archer eds. 1976); Buffery & Gray, Sex Differ-
ences in the Development of Spatial and Linguistic Skills, in GENDER DIFFERENCES: THEIR
ONTOGENY AND SIGNIFICANCE 123 (C. Ounsted & D. Taylor eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
GENDER DIFFERENCES].
16. Kipnis, supra note 15, at 104.
17. Id.
18. Kellaghan & MacNamara, Family Correlates of Verbal Reasoning Ability, 7 DEV.
PSYCHOLOGY 49, 51-52 (1972); Oetzel, Annotated Bibliography, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SEX DIFFERENCES 223 (E. Maccoby ed. 1966).
19. L. WILLERMAN, supra note 14, at 391; E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at
85-9 1; Kipnis, supra note 15, at 106.
20. See Fennema, Sex-related Differences in Mathematics Achievement.- Where and
Why, in WOMEN AND THE MATHEMATICAL MYSTIQUE 76 (L. Fox, L. Brody & D. Tobin
eds. 1980).
21. L. TIGER & J. SHEPHER, WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ (1975). For a discussion of the
status of women in the kibbutz, see infra text accompanying notes 96-126.
22. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 91-98.
23. In the embedded-figure test, subjects are asked to find a figure hidden in a
camouflaging background. People not as affected by context can separate the figure from
the background and are described as "field-independent," while those who cannot distin-
guish the figure from the background are called "field-dependent." E. MACCOBY & C.
JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 91-93.
24. See Witkin & Goodenough, Field Dependence and Interpersonal Behavior, 84 Psy-
CHOLOGICAL BULL. 661, 662 (1977). The rod-and-frame test is a test of field independence
in which subjects are placed in a darkened room and can see only an illuminated frame with
an illuminated rod in the center. The rod and frame are tilted off-center independently of
one another and the subject is requested to indicate when the rod is perpendicular to the
ground and not the frame. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 27.
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times used to show that males are more analytical than females, but it is
important to remember that the results demonstrate analytic ability only in
the visual-spatial mode where males excel. Psychologist Corinne Hutt has
concluded that "[tihe masculine faculty for reasoning seems to be evident
at most ages. . . , and the facility for envisaging the unusual, the unortho-
dox relations between images or ideas-the originality inherent in creativ-
ity-seems similarly to be a function of sex rather than of social and
domestic circumstance. 25
The sexes also differ a great deal in their favored sensory modality. In
one experiment men and women were asked to perform a purely verbal
task and a purely visual task.26 The verbal task consisted of running
through the alphabet mentally and counting the number of letters contain-
ing the sound "ee." The visual task entailed going through the alphabet
mentally and counting the number of letters containing a curve in their
upper-case form. Males excelled on the visual task and females excelled
on the verbal task.27
Some of the sex differences in cognitive function appear related to differ-
ences in the way that function is lateralized in the brain. The left hemi-
sphere of the brain generally controls verbal abilities, in which females
excel, and the right hemisphere controls spatial perception, in which males
excel. 28 Males show a greater lateralization of function than females.29
Thus when the left hemisphere of males is damaged, performance on ver-
bal tests decreases; when the right hemisphere is damaged, nonverbal per-
formance declines. Females tend not to show such selective deficits after
comparable brain damage. 30 Researchers have recently suggested that
structural sex differences that have been observed in the corpus callosum
may be related to sex differences in hemispheric specialization for visual-
spatial functions. 31
3. Maternal Behavior and Nurturance
Just as there is little dispute over whether males exhibit more aggressive
behavior than do women, there is little dispute over whether females ex-
hibit more nurturant behavior toward infants and children than do males.
As Maccoby and Jacklin have observed, "women throughout the world
25. Hutt, Neuroendocrinological, Behavioural, and Intellectual Aspects of Sexual Differ-
entiation in Human Development, in GENDER DIFFERENCES, supra note 15, at 73, 113.
26. Coltheart, Hull & Slater, Sex Differences in Imagery and Reading, 253 NATURE 438,
438-39 (1975).
27. Id
28. McGlone &t Davidson, The Relation Between Cerebral Speech Laterality and Spatial
Ability with Special Reference to Sex and Hand Preference, 11 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 105, 111
(1973).
29. Id.
30. Inglis & Lawson, Sex Differences in the Effects of Unilateral Brain Damage on Intelli-
gence, 212 SCIENCE 693, 693-94 (1981). For a general treatment of the subject of functional
cerebral asymmetry, see S. SPRINGER & G. DEUTSCH, LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN (1981).
31. The corpus callosum is the structure that connects the two hemispheres of the brain.
Lacoste-Utamsing & Halloway, Sexual Dimorphism in the Human Corpus Callosum, 216
SCIENCE 1431, 1431 (1982).
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and throughout human history are perceived as the more nurturant sex,
and are far more likely than men to perform the tasks that involve intimate
care-taking of the young, the sick, and the infirm."' 32 The question of the
existence of the phenomenon requires little discussion, because the contro-
versial question is whether female nurturance is a result of inherent biolog-
ical qualities of the female or a result of social conditioning.33
B. Sex Differences in Infants and Young Children
Behavioral sex differences have been observed even in infants and
young children. 34 Numerous studies have shown a propensity for male
children to range farther in their play,35 engage in more outdoor play,36
and display greater aggression than do female children.37 Even newborns
exhibit sex differences in behavior, but because of the nature of newborn
behavior any conclusions must be considered tentative. 38 For example,
evidence indicates that females are more sensitive to tactile stimulation 39
and more responsive to taste.40 Some of these differences, however, may
be merely a reflection of the more advanced neurological development of
females.4 ' Males, on the other hand, tend to lift their heads higher.42 In a
study of two-day-old and three-day-old babies, girls were found to smile
32. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 215; see also D. BARASH, THE WHIS-
PERINGS WITHIN: EVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN NATURE 108 (1979) (world-
wide, women largely bear responsibility for child care).
33. See infra notes 173-92, 246-70 and accompanying text.
34. Singer, Westphal & Niswander, Sex Differences in the Incidence of Neonatal Abnor-
malities and Abnormal Performance in Early Childhood, 39 CHILD DEV. 103, 105-10 (1968).
35. The superior performance of males on visual-spatial tasks is thought by some to be
related to the exploratory tendency of males. See Buffery & Gray, supra note 15, at 123,
124-25.
36. Harper & Sanders, Preschool Children's Use of Space.- Sex Differences in Outdoor
Play, II DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 119, 119 (1975).
37. Serbin, O'Leary, Kent & Tonick, A Comparison of Teacher Response to the Prea-
cademic and Problem Behavior of Boys and Girls, 44 CHILD DEV. 796, 799 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Teacher Response]; see Pedersen & Bell, Sex Differences in Preschool Children With-
out Histories of Complications of Pregnancy and Delivery, 3 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 10, 12-14
(1970).
Even if no sex differences were found in childhood, that would not mean that behavioral
differences observed in adults were not biological, any more than it would mean that female
breasts and male beards do not have a biological foundation.
38. See Korner, Methodological Considerations in Studying Sex Differences in the Behav-
ioral Functioning of Newborns, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR 197, 200-04 (R. Friedman,
R. Richart & R. Vande Wiele eds. 1974).
39. Bell & Costello, Three Testsfor Sex Differences in Tactile Sensitivity in the Newborn,
7 BIOLOGIA NEONATORUM 335, 335 (1964).
40. Nisbett & Gurwitz, Weight, Sex, and the Eating Behavior of Human Newborns, 73 J.
COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 245, 248 (1970).
41. See E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 18. Female newborns are approxi-
mately one month to six weeks more developed than males. Garai & Scheinfeld, Sex Differ-
ences in Mental and Behavioral Traits, 77 GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS 169, 183
(1968).
42. Bell, Weller & Waldrop, Newborn and Preschooler." Organization of Behavior and
Relations Between Periods, 36 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD
DEV., serial no. 142 (1971).
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more, whereas boys were found to startle more. 43 Such early differences
are difficult to attribute to the influence of social learning.
A study of one-year-old infants found clear behavioral differences be-
tween the sexes.44 When attempts were made to remove children from
their mothers' laps girls were more reluctant to leave. When the mothers
placed their babies on the floor, girls tended to return to their mothers
immediately, while male infants spent more time away from their mothers.
After fifteen minutes of free play, a wooden barrier was placed between
the infants and their mothers. The females cried and motioned for help
much more frequently than the boys, and the boys made much more active
attempts to circumvent the barrier. In terms of overall activity, boys were
much more active than girls; the girls tended to sit and play with toys and
the boys banged their toys on the floor. 45 The authors concluded that girls
were more dependent, showed less exploratory behavior, and exhibited a
much quieter style of behavior. Boys were more independent, showed
more exploratory behavior, were more vigorous, and played more
actively.46
A study involving children ages two to five also showed that males have
a higher activity level than females.47 Studies have also shown that nursery
school boys engage in more gross motor activities, change focus more
often, and are more aggressive. 48 A number of other writers have also
reported that male children are more aggressive than females. 49 By age
two or three, evidence indicates that boys are exploring the space around
them and manipulating their environment more than are girls. 50
A study conducted with twenty-month-old children revealed that their
toy preferences matched adult stereotypes. 51 Each child was allowed to
play with six toys. The three traditional male toys were a hammer, a truck,
and a gun, and the three traditional female toys were a bead bracelet, a
doll, and an iron. Boys played with male toys more than girls did, and
girls played with female toys more than boys did. 52
Whether the differences seen in children are due to innate biological
43. Korner, Neonatal Startles, Smiles, Erections, and Reflex Sucks as Related to State,
Sex, and ndividuality, 40 CHILD DEV. 1039, 1048 (1969).
44. Goldberg & Lewis, Play Behavior in the Year-Old Infant: Early Sex Diferences, 40
CHILD DEV. 21, 21 (1969). These results have been replicated in a sample of children from a
lower socio-economic status background. Messer & Lewis, Social Class and Sex Differences
in the Attachment and Play Behavior of the Year-Old Infant, 18 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 295,
298-302 (1972).
45. Goldberg & Lewis, supra note 44, at 24.
46. Id. at 24-26.
47. Teacher Response, supra note 37, at 799.
48. Pedersen & Bell, supra note 37, at 13.
49. See, e.g., Hatfield, Ferguson & Alpert, Mother-Child Interactions and The Socializa-
tion Process, 38 CHILD DEV. 365, 376-77 (1967); Hutt, supra note 25, at 88-92; McIntyre, Sex
Differences in Children's Aggression, 7 PROC. EIGHTIETH ANN. CONY. OF APA 93, 93 (1972).
50. Birns, The Emergence and Socialization of Sex Differences in the Earliest Years, 22
MERRILL-PALMER Q. 229, 238-42 (1976).
51. Fein, Johnson, Kosson, Stork & Wasserman, Sex Stereotypes and Preferences in the




differences, socialization differences, or both is, of course, difficult to deter-
mine. Maccoby and Jacklin have concluded that the sex differences in
child behavior are not primarily the product of differential parental treat-
ment based upon sex. They stated that "[p]arents seem to treat a child in
accordance with their knowledge of his individual temperament, interests,
and abilities, rather than in terms of sex-role stereotypes. ' ' 53 Harper and
Sanders, in a study of three- to five-year-old children, reported that boys
wandered farther than girls, but found no evidence that girls were receiv-
ing more reinforcement for maintaining proximity.5 4 The researchers con-
cluded that, if anything, the independent exploratory behavior of boys
received more restrictive responses than did that of girls.55
Militating in favor of a conclusion that at least a partial biological com-
ponent exists for differences in exploratory behavior and rough-and-
tumble play is the observation that the same differences have been ob-
served in nonhuman primates such as the rhesus monkey.56 These differ-
ences appear even when the monkey infant is separated from its real
mother and given a surrogate mother of wire and terry cloth. 57 In such a
case no one can argue that the surrogate mother reinforces different behav-
iors in male and female monkey infants.
The fact that differences appear cross-culturally also supports the posi-
tion that some behavioral sex differences are innate. Whiting and Ed-
wards studied children in six cultures and found consistent sex
differences.58 In only one culture, a small New England town, were boys
aged three to six not more aggressive than girls, using the measure of as-
saults.59 In the other five cultures, all in developing nations, boys were
more aggressive, both verbally and physically. 60 Girls, however, were as
likely to exhibit counteraggression, by defending themselves, as the boys
were.61 A study conducted with American, Swiss, and Ethiopian school
children showed boys in all three cultures to be more aggressive.62
The worldwide sex differences in aggression do not appear to be solely a
result of males' experiencing greater socialization pressures for aggres-
sion. 63 Even in societies described as egalitarian, in which there are no
observable socialization pressures for behavioral differentiation along sex
lines, stereotypically masculine and feminine behavioral patterns occur.
53. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 6, at 362.
54. Harper & Sanders, supra note 36, at 119.
55. Id
56. Harlow & Suomi, Social Recovery by Isolation-Reared Monkeys, 68 PROC. OF NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCI. 1534, 1538 (1971).
57. Id at 1535.
58. Whiting & Edwards, A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Sex Differences in the Behavior of
Children Aged Three Through 11, 91 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 171. 176-80 (1973).
59. Id at 176-77.
60. Id
61. Id at 176.
62. Omark, Omark & Edelman, Formation of Dominance Hierarchies in Young Chil-
dren, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 289, 299-300 (T. Williams ed. 1975).
63. Rohner, Sex Differences in Aggression: Phylogenetic and Enculturation Perspectives,
4 ETHOS 57, 64 (1976).
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For example, in reporting on her work among the !Kung Bushmen, Patri-
cia Draper observed that children exhibit sex-differentiated behavior pat-
terns despite an absence of socialization pressures in that direction. 64 She
found the boys to be exploratory, mobile, peer-oriented, and rough, while
the girls showed less of these behaviors and voluntarily spent more time
with adults. 65
A similar example of differentiation can be found in the kibbutzim of
Israel, which were built upon a foundation of extreme sexual egalitarian-
ism. Despite conscious attempts to discourage the development of sex dif-
ferences, the typical pattern emerged. 66 Boys exceeded girls in the
frequency of locomotor play, and girls exceeded boys in verbal, visual, and
fantasy play. 67 Girls exhibited more integrative behavior, such as sharing
and cooperation, and boys exhibited more conflict and aggression. 68 Thus,
even in a society where there is little, if any, socialization pressure for a
divergence of male and female behaviors, the stereotypic patterns still
emerge, which calls into question the belief that behavioral differentiation
is purely a result of socialization pressures.
Empirical evidence does not support the notion that sex-role stereotypes
are perpetuated by young boys' choosing adult male role models and
young girls' choosing adult female role models. The selection of role mod-
els seems to be random in young children. 69 Moreover, children's play
behavior is sex-typed long before the adoption of same-sex role models
occurs. 70 Furthermore, the sex-typed behavior of a child does not closely
resemble the behavior of the child's adult models .7 Although boys may
tend to choose all-male play groups, the fathers of the boys tend not to
choose all-male social groups. 72 In addition, although boys may have seen
their mothers driving the family car more often than they have seen their
fathers driving it, boys still choose to play with cars and trucks.73 In the
same vein, few girls have probably observed their mothers playing hop-
scotch and jacks.7 4
Consistent cross-cultural differences in child behavior exist. These be-
haviors appear early in life even in the absence of observable cultural pres-
sures. This result supports the thesis that certain sex differences in
behavior have their origins, at least in part, in biology.
64. Draper, Cultural Pressure on Sex Differences, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 602, 602 (1975).
65. A colleague who reviewed this manuscript prior to publication suggested that this
sentence could be rewritten to provide: "She found the boys to be more nosy, squirming,
content with juvenile friends, and rough, while the girls showed less of this rowdy behavior
and voluntarily spent more time with rational adults."
66. M. SPIRO, GENDER AND CULTURE: KIBBUTZ WOMEN REVISITED 74-92 (1979).
67. Id. at 75.
68. Id.





74. See id. at 363.
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C The Universality of Male Dominance
Even most opponents of the position that biologically influenced tem-
peramental differences exist will acknowledge that male dominance exists
in virtually all human societies, if dominance is defined as preferential ac-
cess to activities and resources. 75 Men tend to occupy higher-status posi-
tions, play roles more highly valued by society, be more active in the
exercise of political and decisionmaking power, and generally dominate
more at the interpersonal level than females do.76 Occupations that en-
gage large numbers of females tend to carry a lower status than the occu-
pations that men dominate. 77 In the United States, for example, medicine
is a predominantly male, high-status position, but in the Soviet Union
medicine is largely a female occupation that carries a much lower status. 78
Conversely, elementary and secondary school teaching is a low-prestige,
largely female profession in the United States, but in some European
countries it is a prestigious male occupation. 79
Even where women contribute the major portion of the food supply,
their efforts will be assigned a lower status by the society. In many hunting
and gathering groups, for example, hunting may contribute only about
twenty percent of the total caloric intake, yet hunting, universally a male
activity, is always regarded as a higher status endeavor than gathering is
and meat is always the favored food.80 Kathleen Gough has stated that
"[e]ven in hunting societies [which she describes as having an egalitarian
social life] it seems that women are always in some sense the 'second sex,'
with greater or less subordination to men." 81
A division of labor by sex exists in virtually every society: Men tend to
perform particular kinds of activities, and women tend to perform others.8 2
A certain consistency in the way different cultures execute the division of
labor exists. Male activities tend to be more strenuous and involve exten-
sive travel and cooperation. 83 Female activities, however, tend to be more
solitary and less mobile. 84
The majority of societies organize their social institutions around males,
rather than around females. In Murdock's World Ethnographic Sample,
75. There are a few societies about which anthropologists disagree. Because the author
does not here argue that male dominance is inevitable, cf S. GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABIL-
ITY OF PATRIARCHY (1977), only that it is the path of least resistance, joining that battle is
unnecessary.
76. 1. FRIEZE, J. PARSONS, P. JOHNSON, D. RUBLE & G. ZELLMAN, WOMEN AND SEX
ROLES 80-81 (1978).
77. Id.
78. Kipnis, supra note 15, at 95.
79. Id.
80. E. FRIEDL, WOMEN AND MEN 13 (1975).
81. Gough, The Origin of the Family, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 51,
69 (R. Reiter ed. 1975).
82. D'Andrade, Sex Dfferences and Cultural Institutions, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX
DIFFERENCES, supra note 18, at 174.
83. Id at 176.
84. Id
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376 societies were described as patrilocal,85 while only eighty-four were
labelled matrilocal. 86 Four hundred and twenty-seven of the 431 societies
that permitted polygamous marriage allowed multiple wives, while only
four societies permitted multiple husbands. 87 In the tracing of descent the
ratio is approximately four-to-one favoring patrilineality over
matrilineality. 88
Another sphere of social sex differences described by D'Andrade is au-
thority and deference. In two-thirds of the societies surveyed by
D'Andrade the husband exercises considerable authority over his wife; in
one-fifth of the societies the husband is mildly dominant; and in the re-
mainder a fairly equal sharing of authority exists.8 9 D'Andrade stated that
it appears that women may actually have more de facto authority in the
family in four societies: the people of Modjokuta, Java; the Tchambuli of
New Guinea; the Jivaro of South America; and the Berbers of North Af-
rica.90 He concluded, however, that with respect to power in groups larger
than the family, "it is very likely all societies would be found to be male
controlled." 9 1 Although noting that the extent of differences varies by cul-
ture and that occasionally the trend is reversed, D'Andrade also concluded
that "[tihe cross-cultural mode is that males are more sexually active, more
dominant, more deferred to, more aggressive, less responsible, less nur-
turant, and less emotionally expressive than females. '92
When a conceivable cultural pattern has never arisen in any society, an
appropriate consideration is the reason for its absence. A matriarchy, or
female-dominated society, and societies without incest taboos or religion
are examples of cultural patterns that are unknown. 93 The conclusion that
cultural universals may have their roots in what might be called human
nature is not unreasonable.
Many argue that the reason for the universality of male dominance is
that the demands on the female of bearing and caring for children pre-
clude her participation in the more "important" aspects of social life. 94
Consequently, a key to the agenda of many feminists for creating a sexu-
ally egalitarian society is freeing women from these demands by requiring
85. Webster's International Dictionary defines "patrilocal" as a marriage in which the
wife resides with the husband's family. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1793 (2d
ed. 1950).
86. D'Andrade, supra note 82, at 181. A matrilocal marriage is one in which the hus-
band resides with the wife's family. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1515 (2d ed.
1950).




91. 1d. at 189.
92. Id. at 201.
93. See Parker & Parker, The Myth of Male Superiority: Rise and Demise, 81 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIST 289, 294 (1979) (cross-cultural uniformities "indicate the likelihood of orga-
nismic foundations and minimize the possibility of cultural coincidence, diffusion, or
conspiracy").
94. See, e.g., Rosaldo, Woman, Culture, and Society. A Theoretical Overview, in Wo-
MAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 17 (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds. 1974).
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universal day care and greater participation of men in the rearing of chil-
dren.95 As discussed in the next section, the consequences of such changes
may not be as predicted.
D. Case Stud--The Kibbutz
The idea that the result of freeing women from the yoke of domestic
service would be a society in which all social distinctions between men and
women would disappear is not new. Yet when the idea was tried it yielded
results far different from those expected by its proponents. Melford Spiro
reported that one of the principal goals of the kibbutz movement of Israel,
which began in 1910, was the emancipation of women, to be achieved by a
complete transformation of sex roles and the institutions of marriage and
the family.96 Kibbutz ideology attributed sexual inequality to the "biolog-
ical tragedy of women," which arose from the social and cultural restraints
imposed upon women by their reproductive systems. 97 These restraints
shackled women to the domestic domain, while men were free to partici-
pate in high-status, extra-domestic occupations. Consequently, women
were economically dependent upon men, and, because of the demands of
their domestic responsibilities, they lacked the motivation to engage in
political leadership. This explanation of sexual inequality led the leaders
of the kibbutz movement to conclude that sexual inequality could be elimi-
nated if women were relieved of the burden of child-rearing. 98
To implement these ideals radical restructuring of the institutions of
95. See Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes. An Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALUS 607
(1964). Alice Rossi wrote:
It will be the major thesis of this essay that we need to reassert the claim to
sex equality and to search for the means by which it can be achieved. By sex
equality I mean a socially androgynous conception of the roles of men and
women, in which they are equal and similar in such spheres as intellectual,
artistic, political and occupational interests and participation, complementary
only in those spheres dictated by physiological differences between the sexes.
This assumes the traditional conceptions of masculine and feminine are inap-
propriate to the kind of world we can live in in the second half of the twentieth
century.
Id at 608.
Fourteen years later she wrote:
[T]he particular version of egalitarianism underlying current sociological re-
search on, and advocacy of, "variant" marriage and family forms is inade-
quate and misleading because it neglects some fundamental human
characteristics rooted in our biological heritage. Unless these biosocial factors
are confronted, allowed for, and, if desired, compensated for, the current press
toward sexual equality in marriage and the workplace and shared child-rear-
ing may show the same episodic history that so many social experiments have
demonstrated in the past.
These are serious charges, and they are not lightly made. In fact, they were
arrived at only after a long period of personal and intellectual concern that
involved confronting my own previous analysis of sexual equality in the pages
of Daedalus and finding it wanting.
Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, in THE FAMILY I (A. Rossi, J. Kagan & T.
Hareven eds. 1978).
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marriage and the family was necessary. 99 A system of collective socializa-
tion was implemented to relieve mothers of the responsibility of caring for
their children. i00 Children no longer lived with their parents; instead, they
lived in age-graded children's houses. In addition to relieving women of
child-care duties, it was also necessary to relieve them of housekeeping
responsibilities, which led to the creation of communal kitchens, laundries,
and dining rooms.' 0 '
Contrary to the expectations of the kibbutz pioneers, however, the sex-
ual division of labor did not disappear for long. Because women lacked
the physical stamina and strength for much of the farm work, the highest
status occupation in the kibbutz, the service branches such as nursing and
teaching evolved into female specialties by decision of both the males and
females.' 0 2 By 1950 a sexual division of labor along traditional lines had
reappeared in all established kibbutzim.103 From 1950 to 1975 the division
of labor became accentuated, with the percentage of women in the farming
branches of the kibbutz economy declining even further. 0 4
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the reappearance of the sexual
division of labor was the contrast between the attitudes of the pioneer wo-
men, who participated in the establishment of the kibbutzim, and the atti-
tudes of the sabra women, the pioneers' daughters and granddaughters
who were born and raised in the kibbutzim. Although the pioneer women
felt the need to demonstrate their equality with men by participation in
farm labor, the sabra women did not. 10 5 The sabra women were taught
and believed that men and women are equal, but they rejected the proposi-
tion that equality means identity. 10 6 By 1975 most sabra men and women
adopted the view that the kibbutz division of labor was based upon innate
differences between the sexes. 10 7 Spiro concluded that "[h]aving rejected
the assumption that equality with males means becoming like males, [sa-
bra women] have also rejected its corollary (held by their grandmothers)
that sexual dimorphism must be minimized as much as possible." 0 8 This
change in attitude has resulted in a renewed interest on the part of kibbutz
women in feminine fashion, jewelry, cosmetics, and hairstyle. 0 9 The atti-
tude change also resulted in changes in the educational systems of the kib-
butz. In 1950 the kibbutz movement opposed any sexual differentiation in
education."10 Today, in addition to the coeducational academic courses,
manual arts courses are offered for male students, and domestic science is
99. Id at 11.
100. Id
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id. at 15-16.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 15-18.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. at 20-21.
107. Id at 18-19.
108. Id at 42.
109. Id. at 42-43.




The expectation that emancipation from domestic work would lead to
equal participation of men and women in the political realm also never
came to fruition. From the very beginning most positions of authority
were filled by men. 112 Spiro reported that one of the federations was so
concerned about the low rate of participation of women in kibbutz govern-
ance that it required that women constitute at least one-third of the mem-
bership of governing bodies. 1 3 Because so few women were willing to
serve, however, the one-third quota was seldom met."14
Spiro also reported that a return to a more traditional configuration of
the family had occurred. In the early years of kibbutz history, work super-
seded the family as the focus of women's lives to an extent approaching
that of men. 115 The family has by now reacquired a position of affective
centrality for women." 16 Many women now view caring for their children
as an important source of fulfillment that has a biological basis. By con-
trast, for the majority of men work continues to be the dominantinterest. 117
A movement is underway to change sleeping arrangements so that chil-
dren can sleep with their parents instead of in the children's houses., 18 In
Spiro's six-kibbutz sample the majority of sabra women favored the
change, but a plurality of men continued to favor collective sleeping for
the children.' 19 Spiro reported that more than three-fourths of the kibbut-
zim of one federation have instituted a change from collective to family
11. Id.
112. Id. at 21-25; see L. TIGER & J. SHEPHER, supra note 21, at 91 (finding that males
constituted 84% of the participants in economic public service, 71% of the federation leader-
ship, and 78% of the political activists in the Kibbutz Artzi, one of the most liberal
kibbutzim).
113. M. SPIRO, supra note 66, at 23.
114. Id. at 24-25. Spiro summarized as follows:
It is clear, then, that neither a culture that has stressed the importance of polit-
ical leadership and participation on the part of women, nor a social system
that has encouraged and facilitated this end, has had its intended conse-
quences. It should be emphasized, moreover, that the attitudes of the sabra
men-those at least who comprised our six-kibbutz sample-are highly
favorable to the notion of female leadership . ...
In short, if kibbutz governance has become predominantly male, it is not
because of lack of opportunity for, or encouragement of women, but because
most of them-there are, of course, many exceptions-are not interested in
acquiring positions of authority and leadership. Their lack of interest is mark-
edly discrepant from both the conception of female emancipation held by the
feminist ideology of the kibbutz and its analysis of the means by which this
goal might be achieved. This ideology, it will be recalled, viewed the political
activization of women as one of the goals of female emancipation, for sexual
equality required the abolition of sex-role differentiation in the polity no less
than in the economy.
Id
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 34-35.
119. Id. at 35.
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sleeping. 120 Most kibbutzim, however, including those in which a majority
favor the change, have not followed this lead for at least two reasons. One
reason is based upon ideology and the other upon pragmatism.' 2 1 First,
the kibbutz establishment is opposed to the change because it strikes at the
heart of a fundamental element of kibbutz ideology. 122 Second, because of
the large investment in children's houses and adult apartments, implemen-
tation of the sleeping changes would be tremendously expensive.1 23
Despite these radical changes from the early kibbutz, the great majority
of both male and female sabras believe that sexual equality remains a pri-
mary characteristic of the kibbutz in theory and in practice. In interviews
with Spiro, only fourteen percent of each sex disagreed with this posi-
tion. 124 Tiger and Shepher have reached similar conclusions,125 which call
into serious question the feminist position that complete sexual equality
could be achieved if there were more day-care centers and if husbands
would be willing to accept an equal share of domestic responsibility.' 26
The kibbutz study demonstrates that sex roles have an origin deeper than
many feminists assume.
E The Evolution of Sex Diferences in Behavior
The mere observation of phenomena such as male dominance and fe-
male nurturance does not explain their existence. Before a determination
of how society might best respond to sex differences can be made, an un-
derstanding of the origin of sex differences is necessary. We proceed from
the assumption that the fundamental underlying explanation of the sexual
division of labor and the concomitant "supremacy" of males lies in the
differential participation of the sexes in reproduction and in nursing the
young. 127 Understanding how it came to pass that a "woman's place"
would be in the home is not difficult, in light of the demands of gestation
and lactation. No temperamental differences are required to explain the
origins of this phenomenon.
The mobility of women is obviously reduced by pregnancy. Moreover,
the adaptation of the female pelvis for childbirth makes even nonpregnant
women less efficient at locomotion than males. 128 As the pressures of natu-
ral selection acted to increase the size of the human brain, the size of the





125. L. TIGER & J. SHEPHER, supra note 21, at 272.
126. See Rossi, supra note 95, at 628-47.
127. Butsee S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 17(1975)
("It seems eminently sensible to hypothesize that man's violent capture and rape of the fe-
male led first to the establishment of a rudimentary mate-protectorate and then sometime
later to the full-blown male solidification of power, the patriarchy."); Handwerker & Cros-
bie, Sex and Dominance, 84 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 97, 98-99 (1982) (men are dominant
because they are taller).
128. J. PFEIFFER, THE EMERGENCE OF MAN 154 (1972).
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newborn skull also increased, which necessitated a broadening of the fe-
male pelvis. 129 Consequently, a far greater pelvic sexual dimorphism ex-
ists in humans than in nonhuman primates. 130 Moreover, once a child is
born, the requirements of nursing dictate that it stay close to its mother, at
least until weaned. The female pelvis is therefore an accommodation of
the competing demands of locomotion and childbirth, while the male pel-
vis is specialized for locomotion. Because of the combination of the large
size of the adult human brain and the limitations on newborn brain size
imposed by pelvic morphology, human babies are less mature at birth than
are other primates. 131 Human children, therefore, have a longer period of
development, which results in a period of dependency on the mother that
extends well beyond weaning. 132 With this increased dependence of in-
fants comes an increase in female dependence on males. 133
Virtually all partisans in the debate concerning sex differences-marxist
feminists, liberal feminists, extreme environmental determinists, extreme
biological determinists, and those in between-accept the proposition that
status differences between the two sexes are, at least in large part, a prod-
uct of differences in reproduction and child-rearing responsibilities. 34
The views of the proponents of the various explanations of male domi-
nance differ chiefly in whether they see it as having any roots in biological
adaptation apart from the exigencies of reproduction. 135 The distinction
distills down to the question of whether there are temperamental differ-
ences with at least partial origins in biological differences.
A well-accepted maxim of evolutionary biology is that behavioral
changes precede genetic changes. 36 For example, the giraffe did not first
evolve a long neck and then begin to eat leaves from high branches; in-
stead, it was probably in an environment where a need existed to exploit
these branches for food. Since the individual giraffes with longer necks
had superior access to these branches, and thus to more food, they were
probably stronger, healthier, and lived longer than the shorter-necked
giraffes. These advantages allowed them to produce greater numbers of
healthy offspring who would also have longer necks. Over time, therefore,
the average neck length of giraffes increased. This assumes, of course, that
neck length in giraffes is a genetically influenced trait.
The same kind of mechanism may have been operating among the an-
cestors of man. The exigencies of childbirth and nursing led child care to
129. Id.
130. Id at 155.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 157.
134. Dunbar, Female Liberation as the Basis for Social Revolution, in SISTERHOOD IS
POWERFUL 477, 488 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
135. Id.; see also Rogers & Walsh, Shortcomings of the Psychomedical Research of John
Money and Co-workers into Sex Differences in Behavior. Social and Political Implications, 8
SEX ROLES 269, 272 (1982) (patterns of male and female behavior are the result of social
construction).
136. E. MAYR, ANIMAL SPECIES AND EvOLUTION 603 (1963).
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become a female occupation. The males were free of these burdens and
were able to wander farther in search of animals. At this stage it is unnec-
essary to invoke temperamental differences to explain the sexual division
of labor, although such differences certainly already existed. 37 Once the
division existed, however, any biological differences that enabled the sexes
to perform their roles better were likely to increase. For example, men's
aggressiveness, assertiveness, and willingness to explore new territory in
search of prey may have been adaptive traits that increased in frequency.
Women's nurturant behavior toward children would also have been ad-
vantageous. Thus a division of labor that may have begun as a cultural
convenience could be transformed into a genetically influenced pattern.
What probably happened was that some sexually dimorphic behavior al-
ready existed in man by virtue of his primate heritage, and others devel-
oped through the exploitation by "Man the Hunter" of a new cultural
niche. 138 Because humans have a much longer period of immaturity and
dependence, powerful selective pressures would have encouraged the de-
velopment of maternal and child behaviors that resulted in a strong mater-
nal-infant attachment. 39 One explanation for differences in the strength
of parental attachment may be that the male's genetic best interest does not
include devoting a great deal of energy caring for offspring that he can
never know with certainty belong to him.140
An evolutionary explanation for the sexual division of labor is but-
tressed by the observation of such a division among chimpanzees, who are
our closest primate relatives and with whom we share ninety-nine percent
of our DNA. 141 Numerous instances of chimpanzee hunting behavior
have been observed, and participation is limited almost exclusively to
males. 142 The male chimpanzees cooperate in the chase and share their
prey, which includes bushpigs, bushbucks, and many different monkey
species. 143 Females, on the other hand, specialize in gathering social in-
137. This description is somewhat metaphorical because temperamental sex differences
arose much earlier in our evolutionary history. Such differences are found in virtually all
mammalian species. A more precise description would reflect the interaction of these two
phenomena rather than a strictly linear causal sequence.
138. Hamburg, The Psychobiology of Sex Differences: An Evolutionary Perspective, in
SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR, supra note 38, at 373, 379.
139. Id. at 379-80.
140. Cf D. BARASH, supra note 32, at 53 (stating that human male typically spends much
time and energy preventing his female partner from bearing another man's child).
141. Jones, Comparative Aspects of DNA in Higher Primates, in MOLECULAR ANTHRO-
POLOGY: GENES AND PROTEINS IN THE EVOLUTIONARY ASCENT OF THE PRIMATES 357, 358
(M. Goodman & R. Tashian eds. 1976); see also Goodall & Hamburg, Chimpanzee Behavior
as a Model for the Behavior of Early Man.- New Evidence on Possible Origins of Human Be-
havior, in 6 AM. HANDBOOK PSYCHIATRY 14, 15 (S. Arieti 2d ed. 1975) ("in some ways
chimpanzees . . . are biologically closer to man than they are to the orangutan--certainly
closer than to the baboon."); King & Wilson, Evolution at Two Levels in Humans and Chim-
panzees, 188 SCIENCE 107, 113 (1975) ("the genetic distance between humans and chimpan-
zees is well within the range found for sibling species of other organisms.").
142. Teleki, The Omnivorous Chimpanzee, 228 SCI. AM., Jan. 1973, at 33, 35.
143. Id. at 34.
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sects by inserting sticks into the insects' nests. 144 This activity can be en-
gaged in at the same time the females are tending their young. The sex
differences in chimpanzees parallel sex differences in humans in that fe-
males show less ranging behavior than do males. 145 The proposition that
humans and apes, although closely related, exhibit similar forms of behav-
ior for entirely different reasons is difficult to accept.
Harper and Sanders explain sex differences in play behavior using an
evolutionary framework. 46 The play behavior of mammalian young gen-
erally involves patterns that are basic to the survival of the species. Selec-
tion would favor the forays of the young males away from the camp so
they might become more familiar with the home range. 147 Similarly, the
more centripetal and nurturant behavior of young females is in anticipa-
tion of their later social roles.' 48
Although our cultural environment has changed a great deal since the
early days of human evolution, for the most part we almost certainly retain
a genetic structure similar to our culturally primitive ancestors. 49 Even
though we have experienced a tremendous amount of cultural evolution in
the past few centuries, which may render some of our behavioral traits
maladaptive, biologically we remain very similar to our hunter-gatherer
ancestors. An extreme environmentalist position would deny the biologi-
cal stage of the above explanation and lead to the conclusion reached by
the founders of the kibbutz that freeing women from domestic responsibil-
ities will result in sexual equality. The two sexes will be identical except
for surface anatomy and biological function directly related to
reproduction.
To this point this Article has merely reviewed some sex differences in
behavior and discussed, in general terms, their possible evolutionary his-
tory. The focus now shifts to an explanation of the biological mechanism
that may underlie these behavioral differences.
II. SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF HORMONES
A. Morphological Dfferentiation
The fundamental biological difference between males and females de-
rives from the different chromosomal complements of the sexes. 150 Mem-
144. McGrew, Evolutionary Implications of Sex DifJerences in Chimpanzee Predation and
Tool Use, in THE GREAT APES 440, 446 (D. Hamburg & E. McCown eds. 1979).
145. Wrangham, On the Evolution of,4pe Social Systems, 18 Soc. SCI. INFO. 335, 336-37
(1979).
146. Harper & Sanders, Sex Di/ferences in Preschool Children's Social Interactions and
Use of Space. An Evolutionary Perspective, in SEX AND BEHAVIOR 61 (T. McGill, D. Dews-
bury & B. Sachs eds. 1978).
147. Id. at 67.
148. Id at 69.
149. There is, of course, no direct evidence of the genetic composition of our hominid
ancestors, but given the genetic congruity between humans and apes, the conclusion is com-
pelled. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150. Wilson, George & Griffin, The Hormonal Control of Sexual Development, 211 Sci-
ENCE 1278, 1278 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hormonal Control].
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bers of both sexes have twenty-two pairs of autosomes and one pair of sex
chromosomes. 15 1 The sex chromosomes of females are both "X" chromo-
somes, while males have one "X" and one "Y." In the normal course of
events, an XX embryo will develop into a female, and an XY embryo will
develop into a male. 152
For approximately the first two months after conception embryos of
both sexes develop in an identical fashion. After two months, anatomical
and physiological differences emerge between the two classes of embryo,
and the distinctive phenotypes, or outward appearances, of the sexes begin
to appear. 153 Chromosomal sex, which is fixed at conception, determines
whether ovaries or testes appear in the developing embryo. 154 The Y chro-
mosome plays a pivotal role in the mechanism by causing the previously
undifferentiated gonad to develop into testes. The triggering mechanism
for this gonadal differentiation is imperfectly understood, although it has
been postulated that the Y chromosome produces a substance known as
the H-Y antigen, which stimulates testicular development. 155
If testes develop, their hormonal secretions result in the development of
the male phenotype. 156 If an ovary develops, or if no gonad at all develops,
a female phenotype results. The fact that a female phenotype is produced
even in the complete absence of gonads is the basis for the observation that
the female form is the basic human form and the male form is merely a
variant. Consequently, it is often stated that female hormones are unnec-
essary to the development of the female form. 157 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the fetus is in an estrogen-rich' 58 maternal environment, so that
even if the fetus itself does not produce estrogen, it is still exposed to
estrogen. 159
The primordial genital tract of each sex has the following three compo-
nents: (1) the gonads (ovaries or testes); (2) two genital duct systems (the
Wolffian system and the MUllerian system); and (3) a common opening for
the genital ducts and the urinary tract to the outside. 160 The male internal
genital tract results from a persistence of the Wolffian ducts and a regres-
sion of the Mullerian ducts, while in females the situation is precisely the
151. An autosome is any chromosome other than a sex chromosome. STEDMAN'S MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 145 (1982).
152. Hutt, Biological Bases of Psychological Sex Differences, 132 AM. J. Dis. CHILDREN
170, 170 (1978).
153. Hormonal Control, supra note 150, at 1279.
154. Gadpaille, Research into the Physiology of Maleness and Femaleness, 26 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 193, 195 (1972).
155. Ohno, The Role of H-Y Antigen in Primary Sex Determination, 239 J. A.M.A. 217,
217 (1978).
156. Hormonal Control, supra note 150, at 1278.
157. See MacKinnon, Sexual Diferentiation ofthe Brain, in 3 HUMAN GROWTH 183, 184
(F. Falkner & J. Tanner eds. 1979).
158. An estrogenic hormone is a hormone that "stimulates the accessory sex structures
and the secondary sex characteristics in the female." GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 531 (3d
ed. 1972).
159. DOhler & Hancke, Thoughts on the Mechanism of Sexual Brain Differentiation, in
HORMONES AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 153, 153 (G. Dorner & M. Kawakami eds. 1978).
160. Hormonal Control, supra note 150, at 1279.
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opposite. 161 Two testicular hormone secretions are essential for male de-
velopment. The Mtillerian-inhibiting substance, which, as its name sug-
gests, causes regression of the Miillerian ducts, and androgens, which play
a critical role in the development of the male genital tract.1 62
B. Sexual Dfferentiation of the Central Nervous System
In the past few decades a considerable amount of information has accu-
mulated to show that prenatal exposure to androgens circulating in the
blood of the fetus has an irreversible effect on the fetal brain. 63 Subtle
differences in brain structure are thought to result from exposure to such
hormones. 164 Just as the basic pattern of morphological differentiation is
assumed to be female, the intrinsic pattern of central nervous system de-
velopment is likewise assumed to be female. Changes from the basic pat-
tern result from gonadal androgens. 65
A critical period of development appears to exist during which exposure
to androgens results in psychosexual differentiation. 166 In humans this pe-
riod is somewhere between the fourth and seventh months of gestation.167
Although the effect of circulating androgens on psychosexual development
has been repeatedly demonstrated experimentally in nonhuman mammals,
ethical considerations preclude similar experimentation with humans.
Consequently, the bulk of the information on humans comes from "experi-
ments of nature" in which fetuses have experienced aberrant hormone
exposures.
1. Animal Studies
One major source of data that has contributed to our understanding of
the influences of hormones on behavior is the study of hormonal manipu-
lation of nonhuman mammals. Although one ought not to extrapolate un-
critically from animal behavior to human behavior, indications are that
the same kinds of physiological processes are at work. These studies will
be highlighted to provide a basis for comparison in the later discussion of
the influence of hormones on human behavior.
When androgens are administered to a pregnant female guinea pig, fe-
161. Id
162. The two androgens that are most important in sexual differentiation are testoster-
one, which virilizes the Wolffian system, and dihydrotestosterone, which virilizes the exter-
nal genitalia. Id at 1282.
163. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 157; Meyer-Bahlburg & Ehrhardt, Prenatal Sex
Hormones and Human Aggression: A Review, and New Data on Progestogen Effects, 8 AG-
GRESSIVE BEHAV. 39 (1982); Reinisch, Fetal Hormones, the Brain, and Human Sex Differ-
ences: A Heuristic, Integrative Review of the Recent Literature, 3 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
51 (1974); Ward, Sexual Behavior Differentiation: Prenatal Hormonal and Environmental
Control, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR, supra note 38, at 3.
164. McEwen, Gonadal Steroids and Brain Development, 22 BIOL. REPROD. 43, 43 (1980).
165. MacLusky & Naftolin, Sexual Dfferentiation of the Central Nervous System, 211
SCIENCE 1294, 1294 (1981).
166. Reinisch & Karow, Prenatal Exposure to Synthetic Progestins and Estrogens.- Effects
on Human Development, 6 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 257, 258 (1977).
167. G. DbRNER, HORMONES AND BRAIN DIFFERENTIATION 197-98 (1976).
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male fetuses are masculinized and subsequently exhibit behaviors compa-
rable to those of normal genetic males.168 Conversely, the administration
of antiandrogens, which inhibit the action of androgens, has a feminizing
effect on the behavior of male offspring by reducing aggression and physi-
cal activity. 169 Antiandrogens have a feminizing effect upon morphology
as well. None of the same major effects could be produced in females
treated in adulthood with testosterone.170 The study, therefore, concluded
that the prenatal secretion of gonadal hormones affects the developing
brain and causes the individual to behave predominantly as a male or a
female in adulthood. 17 1
Similar experiments have been performed on rats.' 72 Rats differ from
guinea pigs in that the critical period for brain differentiation in rats is
from postnatal days one to five, instead of the prenatal period. 173 Conse-
quently, experiments may be performed on newborn rats, which obviates
the need for complicated fetal surgery. Male newborn rats have been cas-
trated to discover whether they would differentiate along female lines if
they were deprived of testicular androgens during the critical period.
Males castrated at days one to five develop behavioral characteristics nor-
mally present only in genotypic females, while males castrated later do
not. 174 Similar results have been obtained when the rats are chemically
castrated with antiandrogens. 175 From experiments of this nature scien-
tists concluded that rats of both sexes are born with an undifferentiated
central nervous system of the female pattern. In addition, they concluded
that during the first few days of postnatal life the internal secretions of the
immature testes of the male rat organize the neural mechanism underlying
future patterns of normal male sexual behavior. 176 Conversely, when fe-
male rats are treated with androgens during their critical period, their be-
168. Diamond & Young, Differential Responsiveness ofPregnant and Nonpregnant Guinea
Pigs to the Masculinizing Action of Testosterone Proprionate, 72 ENDOCRINOLOGY 429, 429
(1963); Phoenix, Goy, Gerall & Young, Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testos-
terone Proprionate on the Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Female Guinea Pig, 65
ENDOCRINOLOGY 369, 369 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Organizing Action].
169. Organizing Action, supra note 168, at 369.
170. Id. at 377.
171. Goy, Organizing Effects ofAndrogen on the Behaviour ofRhesus Monkeys, in ENDO-
CRINOLOGY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 12, 12 (R. Michael ed. 1968); see also Young, Goy &
Phoenix, Hormones and Sexual Behavior, 143 SCIENCE 212, 214 (1964) (female rats exhibited
male mounting behavior; male rats responded receptively to mounting by other rats).
172. See, e.g., Whalen & Edwards, Hormonal Determinants of the Development of Mascu-
line and Feminine Behavior in Male and Female Rats, 157 ANATOMICAL REC. 173 (1967).
173. Grady, Phoenix & Young, Role ofthe Developing Rat Testis in Diferentiation ofthe
Neural Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior, 59 J. COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
176, 176 (1965).
174. Goy, Early Hormonal Influences on the Development of Sexual and Sex-related Be-
havior, in THE NEUROSCIENCES: SECOND STUDY PROGRAM 196, 198 (F. Schmitt ed. 1970);
Grady, Phoenix & Young, supra note 173, at 176.
175. Nadler, Differentiation ofthe Capacityfor Male Sexual Behavior in the Rat, I HOR-
MONES & BEHAV. 53, 53 (1969); Ward, Female Sexual Behavior in Male Rats Treated
Prenatally with an Anti-androgen, 8 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 53, 53 (1972).
176. Harris & Levine, Sexual Diferentiation of the Brain and its Experimental Control,
181 J. PHYSIOLOGY 379, 379 (1965).
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havior is masculinized. 77 The critical period in female rats, however,
seems to begin in prenatal life and run into postnatal life. 178
Studies conducted on closer relatives of man are, of course, more rele-
vant to the study of human behavior. A number of studies have been con-
ducted on the rhesus monkey with results quite similar to those in the
rodent experiments. Female monkeys injected with androgens during the
prenatal critical period later display both sexual and nonsexual stereotypic
male behavior. 179 They engaged in higher frequencies of threat behavior,
play initiation, rough-and-tumble play, and chasing play. Genetic males
castrated at birth showed normal stereotypic male behavior, which demon-
strates the importance of exposure during the critical period.18 0
2. Human Studies
a. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. One of the experiments of nature
that is analogous to experimental androgenization of female animal fetuses
is a condition known as congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), or adre-
nogenital syndrome. This condition results from excessive production of
androgens by the fetal adrenal gland, which is a consequence of an enzy-
matic defect in the synthesis of the adrenal hormone cortisol. 181 In CAH
the androgen enters the circulation of the fetus too late to induce mascu-
linization of the internal reproductive system, but early enough to mascu-
linize the external genitalia. This means that the critical period for the
differentiation of the internal reproductive system is earlier than that for
the external genitalia. The result may be complete external masculiniza-
tion, with the fetus having a penis and empty scrotum, or the masculiniza-
tion may be less extreme, with the fetus exhibiting an enlarged clitoris with
partial fusion of the labia majora. In either event the internal female re-
productive tract will have developed. 182
The CAH females of particular interest to this inquiry are those whose
condition is diagnosed at birth. Their genitalia are generally surgically
corrected, and their cortisol deficiency is corrected through supplementa-
tion. When they are properly treated the affected girls will develop physi-
cally as normal females, although the onset of their menstruation may be
late. 183
Excessive fetal androgen production also appears to cause behavioral
177. Dorner & Staudt, Perinatal Structural Sex Dierentiation of the Hypothalamus in
Rats, 5 NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 103, 103 (1969-1970). Goy, supra note 174, at 200; Whalen
& Edwards, supra note 172, at 175-76.
178. Dorner & Staudt, supra note 177, at 103-06.
179. Goy, supra note 171, at 24-26; see also Phoenix, Prenatal Testosterone in the Nonhu-
man Primate and its Consequences for Behavior, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR, supra
note 38, at 23 (female monkeys injected with testosterone exhibited typically male character-
istics in play).
180. Goy, supra note 171, at 21.
181. See generally J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN: BoY & GIRL 96-105
(1972).
182. Id. at 96.
183. Id at 97.
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virilization. 84 Some of the leading work on these behavioral effects has
been done by John Money, Anke Ehrhardt, and their colleagues. They
compared the behavior of the fetally androgenized girls with that of a con-
trol group matched for age, IQ, socioeconomic status, and race.' 85 The
girls and their mothers were then interviewed on a number of subjects.
The results showed that the CAH girls demonstrated far less of what might
be considered stereotypic female behavior than the control group girls.
For example, the CAH girls considered themselves tomboys at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than did the non-CAH girls.' 86 Eleven of the fifteen
CAH girls regarded themselves as tomboys throughout their childhood,
and this status was confirmed by their mothers. In contrast, none of the
control girls were identified as tomboys throughout their childhood.
Moreover, only four of the normal girls experienced any episodes of
tomboyism and these were brief; for the CAH girls, however, tomboyism
was a way of life.' 87 Although differences in tomboyish play were ob-
served, no difference was found in the frequency with which the children
initiated fights.
The CAH girls, consistent with their energetic outdoor activities, chose
utilitarian and functional clothing over feminine fashions. 88 The CAH
girls also preferred male toys, such as cars, trucks, and guns, to female toys
such as dolls. The lack of interest in dolls corresponded to a lack of inter-
est exhibited toward infants. 89 All of the control girls wanted to have
babies when they grew up, but one-third of the CAH girls said that they
preferred not to have children. 90 The two groups also differed in the pri-
ority assigned to careers. The majority of the androgenized girls
subordinated marriage to career, or desired a career in addition to mar-
riage, while the control girls chose marriage as the most important goal.191
Money and Ehrhardt concluded:
The most likely hypothesis to explain the various features of tomboy-
ism in fetally masculinized genetic females is that their tomboyism is
a sequel to a masculinizing effect on the fetal brain. This masculiniza-
tion may apply specifically to [neural] pathways, most probably in the
limbic system or paleocortex, that mediate dominance assertion (pos-
sibly in association with assertion of exploratory and territorial rights)
and, therefore, manifests itself in competitive energy expenditure.
184. Id. at 98-105.
185. Ehrhardt, Epstein & Money, Fetal Androgens and Female Gender Identity in the
Early-Treated Adrenogenital Syndrome, 122 JOHNs HOPKINS MED. J. 160 (1968).
186. All of the differences reported between the groups are statistically significant at least
at the p=.05 level, unless from the context it appears otherwise. That is, there is no more
than a 5% chance that the differences observed are merely a result of chance variation. Id at
164.
187. Id at 164. The study defined tomboyism as activities involving rough-and-tumble
play and characterized by a high level of physical energy, especially in vigorous outdoor
play, games, and sports. Id. at 165.
188. Id. at 164.
189. Id. at 165. The difference between the diagnostic and control groups with respect to
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Fighting and aggression are not primarily implicated. 192
A later study by Ehrhardt and Baker attempted to duplicate the results
of the Ehrhardt and Money study. 93 This time, however, the study com-
pared the fetally androgenized girls to their unaffected sisters and mothers
instead of using matched controls from the general population. For the
most part, the results of this study confirmed the earlier study. 194 Fifty
percent of the girls with CAH clearly preferred the company of boys to
that of girls when they had a choice, while the unaffected sisters showed a
clear preference for members of their own sex. 195 The girls with CAH
were also far more likely than their sisters to be tomboys, prefer functional
clothing, and have no interest in jewelry, make-up, and hairstyle. 96 The
CAH girls were significantly less likely to show interest in dolls, infants,
weddings, marriage, pregnancy, and motherhood than were their sisters. 197
In contrast to the earlier study, however, no significant difference in the
frequency of desire for a career was noted. 198 Although the CAH girls
instigated fights twice as often as their unaffected sisters, this difference
was not statistically significant because of the small sample size. 199
Ehrhardt and Baker concluded that since androgens modify behavior in
genetic females, similar factors may contribute to the development of
tempermental sex differences in general and may even influence behav-
ioral differences between individuals of the same sex.200 Despite Ehrhardt
and Baker's belief that clear evidence of a hormonal influence on behavior
exists, they stated that they were not suggesting that toy preference, play
behavior, and the other factors examined were solely determined by hor-
mone levels. Instead, they concluded that hormones are only one of the
factors contributing to the development of temperamental differences be-
tween the sexes. 20 1
b. Testicular Feminization. Testicular feminization (Tfm, or androgen
insensitivity) is, in a sense, the converse of congenital adrenal hyperplasia.
CAH girls are genetic females who are masculinized by exposure to andro-
gens, while Tfm boys are genetic males who are feminized because their
tissues are insensitive to androgens.20 2 Although such boys do produce
androgens, their bodies respond as though they did not.
As discussed previously, a genetically female or male fetus will develop
192. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, supra note 181, at 103.
193. Ehrhardt & Baker, FetaliAndrogens, Human Central Nervous System Differentiation,
and Behavior Sex Differences, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR, supra note 38, at 33.
194. Id. at 49.
195. Id. at 41.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id at 42.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 41.
200. Id at 49-50.
201. Id.
202. Money, Ehrhardt & Masica, Fetal Feminization Induced by Androgen Insensitivity in
the Testicular Feminizing Syndrome: Effect on Marriage and Maternalism, 123 JOHNS HOP-
KINS MED. J. 105, 105 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fetal Feminization].
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as a female in the absence of androgens. 20 3 The same is true when andro-
gens are present but the tissues are unreceptive to, and thus unaffected by,
the androgens. This syndrome is clearly genetically transmitted, but the
exact mode of inheritance is unknown. 2°4 The effect of androgen insensi-
tivity is the suppression of the differentiation of the Wolffian ducts and the
external genitalia.20 5 As a result, many of the affected babies appear mor-
phologically to be normal females. At puberty enough estrogen is pro-
duced by the testes for female secondary sexual characteristics, such as
breasts and pubic hair, to develop. The syndrome often is not diagnosed
until adolescence, when the "girl" fails to menstruate, or adulthood, when
the "woman" has fertility problems. The vagina is then typically discov-
ered to be a blind pouch and the internal reproductive tract is usually in-
complete; it is neither fully male nor fully female. 206
Money and his colleagues studied a number of patients with this syn-
drome and found that the girls and women showed a high preference for
being a wife with no outside job.20 7 The patients also enjoyed homecraft,
had dreams and fantasies of raising a family, played primarily with dolls
and other female toys, and had a positive interest in infant care. 208 Ninety
percent of the females rated themselves as completely content with the fe-
male role. 209 The investigators concluded that the genetic sex of these peo-
ple was irrelevant to their psychosexual sex and that mediation between
genetics and psychological behavior is hormonal. 210 One confounding fac-
tor, of course, is that the pattern of prenatal hormonal exposure and the
sex of rearing are congruent, which makes it difficult to determine why
these children grow up with typical female behavior. The reason could be
either a lack of effective prenatal androgen exposure, their rearing as girls,
or both. Congruence is not present in the case of CAH because the prena-
tal hormonal exposure is of the male pattern and the sex of rearing is
female.
c. Exogenous Hormones. A class of cases also exists in which fetuses
are exposed to exogenous opposite-sex hormones in utero.21 1 This typi-
cally occurs as a result of the administration of hormones to pregnant wo-
men. 21 2 The condition of progestin-induced hermaphroditism resembles
the animal experiments even more closely than do the hormonal abnor-
malities discussed above.213 This condition is not a natural one, but is
iatrogenic. The condition results from the administration of synthetic
203. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
204. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, supra note 181, at 109.
205. Id at 110.
206. Id. at 109-10.
207. Fetal Feminization, supra note 202, at 109-10.
208. Id. at Il0-11.
209. Id.
210. Id at 113.
211. Reinisch & Karow, supra note 166, at 264.
212. Id at 257.
213. Id at 258.
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progestins214 to the mother to prevent a threatened miscarriage. 215 These
progestins seem to act in the same way that testosterone does in lower
mammals. The genetic female offspring of these women exhibit viriliza-
tion of the external genitalia similar to, but to a lesser degree than, that of
CAH girls.216 A study of ten girls suffering from progestin-induced her-
maphroditism revealed that nine labelled themselves "tomboys.
12 17
Another group of investigators studied six-year-old and sixteen-year-old
males whose diabetic mothers had been given a variety of female sex hor-
mones during pregnancy. 218 The sixteen-year-olds, when compared with a
control group, were less aggressive, less assertive, had less athletic skill,
and did not perform as well on the embedded-figure task.219 The six-year-
old subjects were rated as less assertive and poorer athletically than were
the members of the control group.220
C Circulating Hormones and Behavior
The apparent influence that androgens in fetal life have on later temper-
ament and personality has already been discussed. 221 This effect has been
described as the "organizing effect" because of the belief that fetal hor-
mones exert an influence on the organization of the fetal brain. 222 Another
kind of hormonal effect has been called the "activational effect," which is
the result of the immediate influence of hormone levels on behavior.
223
Three examples of the hormonal influence on behavior are discussed
below.
1. Testosterone and Aggression
Circulating testosterone is thought to have an activating effect on human
aggressive behavior. 224 In younger men the rate of testosterone production
214. A progestin is a synthetic sex-hormonal steroid that has a physiological action simi-
lar to progesterone. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, supra note 181, at 290.
215. Gadpaille, supra note 154, at 195.
216. Id at 199.
217. Ehrhardt & Money, Progestin-Induced Hermaphroditism: L Q. and Psychosexual
Identity in a Study of Ten Girls, 3 J. SEX RESEARCH 83 (1967).
218. Yalom, Green & Fisk, Prenatal Exposure to Female Hormones.- Effect on Psychosex-
ual Development in Boys, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 554 (1973). The hormones in-
cluded diethylstilbesterol (DES), estrogen, estradiol, and progesterone. Id at 555.
219. Id at 559.
220. Id
221. See supra notes 181-220 and accompanying text.
222. See Young, Goy & Phoenix, supra note 171, at 214.
223. Id
224. Moyer, Sex Differences in Aggression, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR, supra
note 38, at 335 (historically males have greater propensity for violence); Olweus, Mattson,
Schalling & Low, Testosterone, Aggression, Physical, and Personality Dimensions in Normal
Adolescent Males, 42 PSYCHOSOM. MED. 253 (1980) (circulation of testosterone causes ag-
gression in adolescent males); Rubin, Reinisch & Haskett, Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects
on Human Behavior, 211 SCIENCE 1318 (1981) (some evidence that plasma testosterone
causes aggressive behavior in humans). But see Meyer-Bahlburg, Boon, Sharma & Ed-
wards, Aggressiveness and Testosterone Measures in Man, 36 PSYCHOSOM. MED. 269 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Aggressiveness and Testosterone] (no conclusive evidence that high
plasma testosterone causes aggression).
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is highly correlated with aggression. 225 As men get older their testosterone
levels decline. At the same time, their rate of participation in violent crime
decreases, 226 although, of course, other factors such as increased maturity
play a large part in this decrease. Castration has also been observed to
result in decreased aggressive behavior, particularly in sex-related aggres-
sion. 2 2 7 Administration of antiandrogenic agents also reduces aberrant
sexual behavior in men.228 Such administrations, however, are not partic-
ularly effective in reducing nonsexual violence.229 Although effects of cir-
culating androgens on aggressive behavior in men have been clearly
shown, such differences appear only when androgen levels are altered
greatly.230 Prenatal exposure to androgens appears, therefore, to have a
more pervasive effect on behavior than do circulating hormones, and pre-
natal androgen exposure "primes" the individual to respond at puberty to
the circulating hormones. 23'
A great deal of study has been directed at the effect of sex hormones on
the behavior of nonhuman mammals. W.D. Joslyn conducted a fairly rep-
resentative study on rhesus monkeys. 232 Three male and three female
monkeys were separated from their mothers when they were three to four
months old. The females were given regular injections of testosterone for
about eight months, and the males were untreated. Before the testosterone
treatment started, the males were dominant and showed greater aggres-
siveness than did the females. After the testosterone treatment began, the
frequency of aggression by females increased. 233 Two of the females at-
tacked and subdued the two most dominant males and remained dominant
over them for at least a year after the end of the hormone treatment.
One must bear in mind, however, that the relationship of hormone levels
and behavior involves a complex interaction. For example, one study has
shown that if male monkeys low in the male dominance hierarchy are
placed with females whom they can dominate and with whom they can
engage in sexual intercourse, the males' testosterone levels rise dramati-
cally.23 4 On the other hand, after an animal is defeated in a fight, his tes-
tosterone level goes down.235 Given the relationship between testosterone
225. Olweus, Mattson, Schalling & Low, supra note 224, at 254.
226. Persky, Smith & Basu, Relation of Psychologic Measures ofAggression and Hostility
to Testosterone Production in Man, 33 PSYCHOSOM. MED. 265, 275 (1971).
227. Bell, Hormone Influences on Human Aggression, 147 IRISH J. MED. ScI. (Supp. 1) 5,
6 (1978); LeMaire, Danish Experience Regarding the Castration of Sexual Offenders, 47 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 294, 297 (1956).
228. Laschet, Antiandrogen in the Treatment ofSex Offenders.- Mode ofAction and Thera-
peutic Outcome, in CONTEMPORARY SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE 1970s 311,
314 (J. Zubin & J. Money eds. 1973).
229. Id. at 317.
230. Rubin, Reinisch & Haskett, supra note 224, at 1320.
231. Aggressiveness and Testosterone, supra note 224, at 269; Hutt, supra note 25, at 73.
232. Joslyn,Androgen-Induced Social Dominance in Infant Female Rhesus Monkeys, 14 J.
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 137 (1973).
233. Id. at 145.
234. Rose, Holaday & Bernstein, Plasma Testosterone, Dominance Rank and Aggressive
Behaviour in Male Rhesus Monkeys, 231 NATURE 366, 367 (1971).
235. Psychological stress has been shown to lower plasma testosterone levels signifi-
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and aggression, it would appear that a drop in testosterone level after de-
feat, with a concomitant decrease in aggressiveness, would be an adaptive
response to the circumstances. Consequently, it can be seen that circulat-
ing hormone levels may be an effect, as well as a cause, of aggressive
behavior.236
2. The Menstrual Cycle and Behavior
Another area in which hormones appear to have a significant effect on
human behavior is in the condition known as premenstrual tension syn-
drome.237 A substantial number of women exhibit irritability, depression,
hopelessness, or other symptoms just prior to or during menstruation. 238
Estimates of the syndrome's prevalence range from twenty-five to ninety
percent of all women of reproductive age. 239 The syndrome has been pos-
tulated to result from estrogen excess, progesterone deficiency, or an al-
tered ratio of estrogen to progesterone. 240
A number of studies have shown a significantly higher suicide rate in
menstrual and premenstrual women.241 Several studies have also shown a
greater propensity toward violent crime among such women. For exam-
ple, women who were menstruating committed eighty-four percent of the
violent crimes committed by women in Paris in one year.242 Another
study revealed that in a New York prison for women, twenty-six of the
forty-two women who had been convicted of violent crimes had committed
them during the premenstrual week. 243 Likewise, a study conducted in an
English boarding school for girls showed that "naughty" girls tended to be
"naughtier" during menstruation, and that older girls who were given dis-
ciplinary power meted out greater punishment during their own menstrua-
tion.2 4 Another study, conducted in a North Carolina correctional facility
for women, demonstrated a higher frequency of aggression during the
cantly. Kreuz, Rose & Jennings, Suppression of Plasma Testosterone Levels and Psychologi-
cal Stress, 26 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 479, 482 (1972).
236. See also Rubin, Reinisch & Haskett, supra note 224, at 1319.
237. Id. at 1320.
238. These symptoms are also observed in the condition known as "postpartum depres-
sion," which results from drastic changes in a woman's hormone levels after she has given
birth. Hamburg, Moos & Yalom, Studies of Distress in the Menstrual Cycle and the Postpar-
tum Period, in ENDOCRINOLOGY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR, supra note 171, at 94. Over 80%
of new mothers are believed to suffer this depression. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, MATER-
NAL-INFANT BONDING 93 (1976).
239. Moyer, supra note 224, at 335; see also J. WILLSON & E. CARRINGTON, OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 107 (6th ed. 1979) (symptoms sufficient to prompt women to seek relief
occur in 10-20% of women).
240. Rubin, Reinisch & Haskett, supra note 224, at 1320.
241. See, e.g., Holding & Minkoff, Parasuicide and the Menstrual Cycle, 17 J.
PSYCHOSOM. RESEARCH 365, 367-68 (1973) (and several other studies referred to therein).
242. Cooke, PresidentialAddress: The D!ierential Psychology of the American Woman. 49
AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 457, 459 (1945).
243. Morton, Additon, Addison, Hunt & Sullivan, 4 Clinical Study of Premenstrual Ten-
sion, 65 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1182, 1189 (1953).
244. Dalton, Schoolgirls'Behaviour and Menstruation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1647, 1648 (1960).
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premenstrual and early menstrual phases of the cycle. 245
3. Hormones and Motherhood
In the period immediately following birth the hormonal levels of the
mother undergo dramatic changes.2 46 Evidence indicates strongly that
these changes facilitate the expression of maternal behavior toward the in-
fant.2 47 During this period complex interactions appear to take place be-
tween the mother and the infant that help cement their relationship.2 48
Some of the clearest evidence of the hormonal basis for what transpires
during this period comes from studies performed on animals. Experimen-
tal studies on rats show that a four-day separation of the infants from the
mother that begins immediately after birth totally disrupts the mother's
maternal response to her pups. 2 49 In goats the critical period of interaction
has been determined to be approximately the first five minutes after
birth.2 50 In one experiment two groups of kids were compared. Kids in
the first group were taken away from their mothers immediately after birth
for a period of one to three hours. Kids in the second group were left with
their mothers for five minutes after birth and then taken away for one to
three hours. When the kids were reintroduced to their mothers only two of
fifteen mothers in the first group allowed their kids to nurse, but fourteen
of fifteen mothers in the second group immediately reaccepted the kids.
The researcher concluded that during the first few minutes after birth
something happens that prepares the mother to attach herself to the kid. If
attachment occurs the mother displays signs of distress on removal of the
kid. If, however, the mother does not attach to the kid, the removal of the
kid has no effect even though the mother may be lactating.25'
An experiment involving the transfusion of blood from newly delivered
mother rats into virgin rats has demonstrated that the mother's hormonal
levels are largely responsible for the critical period. 252 Seven of the eight
virgin rats that received blood from newly delivered mothers exhibited
maternal behavior, but none of the controls, which were virgin rats that
had exchanged blood with other rats, did. 25 3 Blood transfused either
twenty-four hours before or after birth had far less impact on the exhibi-
tion of maternal behavior.2 54 The researchers concluded that only blood
transfused during a very limited period around birth has the capacity to
245. Ellis & Austin, Menstruation and Aggressive Behavior in a Correctional Center for
Women, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 388, 394 (1971).
246. See M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 238, at 51.
247. Id
248. Id.
249. Rosenblatt & Lehrman, in MATERNAL BEHAVIOR IN MAMMALS 39 (H. Rheingold
ed. 1963).
250. Klopfer, Mother Love.- Wat Turns It On?, 59 AM. Sci. 404, 405 (1971).
251. Id at 407.
252. Terkel & Rosenblatt, Humoral Factors Underlying Maternal Behavior at Parturition:
Cross Transfusion Between Freely Moving Rats, 80 J. COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 365, 369 (1972).
253. Id
254. Id. at 366.
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induce maternal behavior. 255
Similar experiments cannot be performed on humans, of course, but cir-
cumstantial evidence suggests that a similar factor is at work. Studies in
humans show that the bond between the mother and the infant can be
disrupted during the immediate post-partum period by separating the
mother and the infant.25 6 The mother's behavior is often disturbed for a
year or more by events that take place within the first twenty-four hours
after the birth of the infant. 2 7 Mothers can still attach to their infants
after an early separation, however, but attachment at this stage is more
difficult.
The strength of the maternal attachment is demonstrated by an accident
that took place in an Israeli hospital. Two mothers were inadvertently
given the wrong babies in the hospital and took them home and cared for
them. 258 Doctors discovered the error at the two-week check-up. The
mothers had become so attached to the babies, however, that they were
reluctant to give them up, while the fathers strongly supported correcting
the error.2
59
Interactions between baby and mother also induce certain physiological
responses in the mother. A study using thermal photography showed that
fifty-four of sixty-three mothers demonstrated significant increases in
blood flowing to their breasts after hearing babies' hunger cries.260 The
cries of infants also stimulate the secretion of the hormone oxytocin in the
mother, which triggers uterine contractions and nipple erection prepara-
tory to nursing.261 The uterine contractions aid in the reduction of post-
partum bleeding. Licking of the mother's nipple also causes an increased
release of oxytocin, as well as release of prolactin.262 Klaus and Kennel
speculate that the secretion of prolactin may act in humans, as it does in
birds, to activate the close attachment between mother and young. 263
The mother's physiological function also has an influence on her baby's
behavior. Researchers have observed that babies respond to a female
voice in preference to a male voice, apparently because of its higher
pitch.264 Mothers, as well as fathers, often speak to infants in a much
higher pitched voice than their normal speaking voice. 265 Also, hearing
255. Id at 370.
256. See, e.g., Rose, Boggs & Alderstein, The Evidencefor a Syndrome of "Mothering
Disability" Consequent to Threats to the Survival of Neonates, 100 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 776,
776 (1960).
257. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 238, at 52-53.
258. Id. at 51.
259. Id.
260. Lind, Vuorenkoski & Wasz-Hickert, Emotional Attitudes toward the Child and Child
Rearing and the Effect of Cry Stimulus on the Temperature of the Lactating Breast, in PSY-
CHOSOMATIC MEDICINE IN OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 284, 285 (N. Morris ed. 1972).
261. Newton & Newton, Psychologic Aspects of Lactation, 277 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1179,
1185 (1967).
262. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 238, at 78-79.
263. Id. at 79.
264. Id. at 73.
265. Id
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the maternal heartbeat appears to have an effect on the newborn. Babies
exposed to the heartbeat become noticeably calmer. This phenomenon is
thought to be causally related to the fact that mothers characteristically
hold infants on their left side near their heart. 266 The side preference
holds true irrespective of the handedness of the mother.267 In a study of
mothers who had been separated from their babies for at least the first
twenty-four hours after birth, first-time mothers showed no side prefer-
ence, while mothers who had given birth previously to children from
whom they had not been separated at birth, showed a left-side preference.
The control group of mothers who were not separated from their infants at
birth showed a marked left-side preference. 268 Studies also reveal that
when presented with their babies for the first time, mothers engage in a
very characteristic sequence of behavior. When nude babies are placed
next to their mothers shortly after birth, most mothers go through a pattern
of behavior that begins with touching the infant with her fingertips and
proceeds in a few minutes to massaging, stroking, and then encompassing
palm contact of the trunk.269
The existence of a special physiological and psychological relationship
between mother and infant does not diminish the importance of a healthy,
loving relationship between father and infant. It does, however, call into
question the assumptions that mothers and fathers are interchangeable and
that the imposition of child-care responsibility on women is merely an ar-
bitrary cultural artifact. In comparing the relative attachments of females
and males to infants, sociologist Alice Rossi noted that attachment in
human males is socially learned. She also concluded that fathering in
human males is learned from females or required by the norms of kinship
systems, 270 rather than being a result of innate predisposition.
III. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SEX DIFFERENCES
A number of criticisms have been raised concerning the studies dealing
with hormones and behavior and their implications. While some of the
points raised are valid, none is devastating to the conclusion that certain
observable average temperamental differences between the sexes reflect
basic biological differences. At one level are the critics who take the posi-
tion that examination of biological foundations of human behavioral sex
differences may not be ethically justifiable. 27' This is essentially an emo-
266. Salk, The Role of the Heartbeat in the Relations Between Mother and Infant, 228 Sci.
AM., May 1973, at 24.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 27.
269. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 238, at 68-69.
270. Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, supra note 95, at 5.
271. See, e.g., Rosoff & Tobach, Prologue to GENES AND GENDER II: PITFALLS IN RE-
SEARCH ON SEX AND GENDER (R. Hubbard & M. Lowe eds. 1979). The authors state:
The research on "sex differences" at the least wastes the time and effort of
people who might be better employed in trying to understand the root causes
of human problems. At worst, it is an attempt to "prove" that "nature" pro-
grams women to be inferior to men through gene action.
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tional reaction that surfaces whenever a biological basis for any human
behavior is suggested.272 Proponents of the position that biological differ-
ences influence behavioral differences are then labelled "biological
determinists.1' 273
Of course, any kind of determinist view is usually an oversimplification.
Appending that label to most researchers is an unfair criticism. Opponents
of a biological explanation set up a straw man by mischaracterizing the
arguments of their opponents and then attack the caricature they have cre-
ated. No serious researcher in the field of sex differences makes the claim
that any behavioral trait is exclusively biologically determined; they all
recognize that social and biological factors interact to produce the pheno-
typic behavior. 274 As fair, and more accurate, would be to call those who
oppose any biological explanation "cultural determinists." This author is
unaware of any researcher who considers biological contributions to be-
havior as critical and at the same time finds cultural contributions irrele-
vant or even unimportant. Feminist writers who take the position that all
observed temperamental differences between the sexes are culturally deter-
mined and that biology is irrelevant are easy to find, however. 275 Other
critics take the position that any inquiry into the nature of sex differences
is motivated by an insidious desire to maintain the oppressive status
quo.
2 7 6
Many feminist writers seem to view the human psyche as a virtual tabula
rasa upon which only the environment may write. The argument here is
not that behavioral sex differences are determined solely by biology; the
environment obviously plays a very large part in the development of any
behavioral trait. The argument is only that certain behaviors are more
readily evoked in members of one sex or the other. How the extreme
Id at 7.
272. See, e.g., M. SAHLINS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY (1976).
273. See J. SAYERS, BIOLOGICAL POLITICS passim (1982); GENES AND GENDER I (E.
Tobach & B. Rosoff eds. 1978).
274. Some of the criticisms are merely bizarre. For example, Rogers and Walsh, in criti-
cizing the "biological determinism" of John Money state: "[T]he writings of Money are con-
fused. At one time he lays emphasis on biological determinants of gender identity and at
another time, when his findings point more heavily towards cultural determinants, he places
an equal emphasis on the latter." Rogers & Walsh, supra note 135, at 270.
We seldom see such a denunciation of scientific objectivity. The authors criticize Money
for being a biological determinist and at the same time denounce him for not being enough
of a doctrinaire biological determinist. Apparently, Money's "calling them as he sees them"
is not a virtue in the eyes of Rogers and Walsh, because it makes it more difficult for them to
attach a pejorative label to him.
275. See Millett, Barnard Alumnae (Spring 1970), quoted in L. HOLLIDAY, THE VIOLENT
SEX: MALE PSYCHOBIOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 10 (1978).
276. P. GREEN, THE PURSUIT OF INEQUALITY 10 (1981) (studies of biological sex differ-
ences implicitly repudiate the tenets of liberal democracy); see also Rogers & Walsh, supra
note 135, at 270 (the work of Money and Ehrhardt is "quite obviously aimed at perpetuating
[male-female] divisions" in our society). Rogers and Walsh also stated: "Those who adopt a
biological determinist position in attempting to explain the behavioral differences between
the sexes serve the status quo by providing explanations that maintain these differences.
This is the main sociopolitical raison d'etre of this practice." Id at 278.
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behaviorists would explain personality differences in infants is hard to im-
agine,277 unless they believe that differences in personality among
newborns are due entirely to differences in the uterine environment.
Those who take the cultural determinist position apparently believe that
human beings have somehow escaped the influences of natural selection.
They apparently assume that during the course of evolving into Homo sa-
piens we somehow cast off the shackles of biology and emerged completely
liberated into a world where the entire key to our perfectability lies in our
environment. If this point of view were true, it would have a dramatic
effect on mankind's ability to evolve behaviorally, because if behavior is
not genetically influenced it cannot be acted upon by natural selection.
Perhaps we have crossed some evolutionary Rubicon and, as if by magic,
our minds and our bodies diverged. Sociobiologist 278 E.O. Wilson, in his
Pulitzer Prize-winning book On Human Nature, observed that "if the ge-
netic components of human nature did not originate by natural selection,
fundamental evolutionary theory is in trouble. ' 279 Similarly, if human na-
ture has no genetic component, evolutionary theory is also in trouble.
Some of the criticism of the view that biological sex differences exist is
merely the result of ignorance of the interaction between the environment
and the genetic constitution of the organism. There is a common miscon-
ception that if a behavioral trait is genetically influenced it would emerge
in all humans in all environments and would be completely insensitive to
environmental changes. 280 This view is pure nonsense. No gene or com-
plex of genes works independently of the environment. As E.O. Wilson
has stated, "innateness refers to the measurable probability that a trait will
develop in a specified set of environments, not to the certainty that the trait
will develop in all environments."'281
The other form of criticism of the studies discussed above is more legiti-
mate, but also ultimately unconvincing. These critics point to the less than
optimal conditions in each particular study and then conclude that the
studies therefore show nothing.282 This kind of criticism can be aimed at
almost any study and certainly at any study of human behavior.
Three possible explanations account for the tendency of different kinds
of studies to show consistent sex differences. First, independent flaws and
biases in methodology that only coincidentally yield consistent results are
277. See A. THOMAS & S. CHESS, TEMPERAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 152 (1977) ("re-
view of the available data suggests an appreciable, but by no means exclusive, genetic role in
the determination of temperamental individuality in the young infant").
278. "Sociobiology" is defined as "the systematic study of the biological basis of all so-
cial behavior." E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 4 (1975).
279. E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 35 (1975).
280. See Lowe, Sociobiology and Sex Differences, 5 SIGNS 544, 544 (1980); see also
Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insur-
ance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 546 (1980) ("The
recency of greater female longevity is inconsistent with claims that the phenomenon is bio-
logical or genetic.").
281. E. WILSON, supra note 279, at 102.




present. Second, a conspiracy to maintain the status quo exists. Third, the
described differences are real. The principle of parsimony favors the third
explanation.
One point raised in criticism of the CAH studies is that the parents know
that their daughters had genital surgery and need to take cortisol to avoid
becoming virilized. Therefore, the argument goes, parents may treat the
girls differently, which could account for the observed behavioral differ-
ences. The possibility may exist, although doubted by the investigators,
that parents do treat fetally androgenized girls differently. The differential
treatment, however, would seem to result in reinforcement of more, rather
than less, feminine behavior,283 because parents who knew that their
daughters had this problem might be less tolerant of cross-sex behavior
than would the parents of normal girls.
By force of circumstance the studies have not been perfect, because con-
trolling for all relevant factors is impossible. Ideally, one would control
for all social and cultural variables and the study would be double-blind,
so that neither the experimenters nor the subjects and their families would
know the identity of the affected subjects. Some conclude, therefore, that
as long as controlling completely for social factors is impossible, trying to
explain behavioral differences in biological terms is useless.284
The criticisms raised by those who believe that a biological component
to human behavior does not exist could be made of most other scientific
disciplines, such as astronomy, as well. Although creating a galaxy or a
star in a laboratory is impossible, astronomers can and do work with what
nature has given them. No one seriously argues that astronomers are
therefore wasting their time. The argument that the study of biological
differences is fruitless without control for all social factors can be turned
around on its proponents. That is, if in the absence of control for biologi-
cal variables it is pointless to study the impact of social factors on behav-
ior, then attempts to study human behavior should not be made at all.
This ignores the dictum of Alexander Pope that "[tlhe proper study of
Mankind is Man. ''285
One must remember that the sex differences described are average dif-
ferences; they are not absolute. Some men are more nurturant than are
some women; some women excel in mathematics; some men exhibit ex-
traordinary verbal fluency. To note that these differences are average dif-
ferences, however, is not to deprecate their importance, although some
critics do make this logical leap. One writer has commented, for example,
283. Ehrhardt & Baker, supra note 193, at 48-49.
284. P. GREEN, supra note 276, at 126; Rogers, supra note 282, passim. Consider, for
example, the commentary in Griffiths & Saraga, Sex Diferences in Cognitive Abilities." A
Sterile Field of Enquiry?, in SEx-ROLE STEREOTYPING 17 (0. Hartnett, G. Boden & M.
Fuller eds. 1979), in which the authors stated: "Questions concerning the origin and nature
of sex differences cannot properly be answered by and in a society that is predicated on their
existence. And in a society not premissed on their existence, we feel it unlikely that these
issues would be a major concern." Id at 36. This statement is merely obscurantism mas-
querading as scientific objectivity.
285. A. POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN, epistle II, at 1 (1733).
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that sex differences in infant behavior are unimportant because one cannot
determine the sex of an infant merely by observing its temperament. 286
That reasoning is akin to saying that sex differences in height are unimpor-
tant because one cannot determine a person's sex by measuring his height.
Another observation that is made to minimize the significance of sex
differences is to note that within-sex differences are greater than between-
sex differences. Apparently, this observation is meant to sound erudite and
to convey to the reader that its author has a firm grasp of the statistical
technique of analysis of variance. The proper rejoinder to the observation,
however, is "so what?," because the observation adds absolutely nothing to
the assessment of the significance of sex differences. A return to the anal-
ogy of height is worthwhile, since height is relatively value-neutral and is
unquestionably a trait in which clear sex differences have been shown.
The average height difference between men and women is between five
and six inches, 287 while the commonly observed range of male heights is
probably from about five feet to six feet six inches. 288 The within-group
difference in males, therefore, is about three times the between-group dif-
ference. This fact remains that average height differences between men
and women are substantial and significant, and in any endeavor in which
there is a premium on height, males will be disproportionately represented.
Many people think that a belief in the existence of sex differences neces-
sarily reflects stereotypic thinking. Many sexual stereotypes derive from
everyday observations of average differences, but this fact is sometimes
forgotten. One psychologist has argued that reported sex differences are a
part of our society's cultural stereotypes and therefore questions the relia-
bility of observations and the soundness of conclusions. 289 This argument
is somewhat puzzling, since experimental results directly contrary to
human experience should be more suspect than results that confirm it. An-
other critic questions the validity of sociobiological conclusions because
the model of human nature constructed by sociobiologists is "not fortui-
tous," but instead bears a striking resemblance to the status quo.290 If,
however, the sociobiologists are correct, one would expect social institu-
tions, the status quo, to conform to human nature. For the theory to pre-
dict a social order entirely different from any that has ever been seen
would be strange indeed. The critic is being disingenuous and is really
rejecting sociobiology by definition: If social institutions that bear a strik-
ing resemblance to the status quo are predicted, then the predictions reflect
the bias of the researcher; if social institutions completely different from
any ever seen are predicted, then the researcher is unbiased, but wrong.
286. Adkins, Genes, Hormones, Sex and Gender, in SOCIOBIOLOGY: BEYOND NA-
TURE/NURTURE? 385, 389 (G. Barlow & J. Silverberg eds. 1980) ("Readers who feel that sex
differences in newborns are truly significant should consider whether they could accurately
identify the sex of diapered infants on the basis of their behavior.").
287. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 10, at 126.
288. Id.
289. Adkins, supra note 286, at 387-88.
290. Miller, Philosophy, Dichotomies, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE
319, 323 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
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The unfairness of sexual stereotypes lies not in their existence, but in the
establishment of the stereotypes as culturally prescribed norms. For exam-
ple, it would be unfair, and contrary to society's interest in utilizing all of
its talent, to bar women from the field of mathematics merely because on
the average women do not perform as well as men in that discipline. Also
contrary to society's interests, however, would be a requirement that fifty
percent of all mathematicians be women merely because women constitute
fifty percent of the population. The latter system would suffer from the
same infirmity as the former, in that neither would lead to maximum use
of the individual talents of society.
The source of the unfairness of sexual stereotypes should not be forgot-
ten. For example, one might assume that a secretary or a nurse is a wo-
man. Such an assumption is commonly labelled sexist. Whether the
assumption is in fact sexist depends upon its foundations. If the assump-
tion simply flows from the empirical observation that most secretaries and
nurses are women, it is not sexist. If the assumption is that secretaries and
nurses ought to be women, then it may actually be sexist. 29'
Suggestions of biological differences trouble many people, because they
apparently believe that equality in some sense is impossible without a be-
lief in the "sameness" of all people. For example, consider the assertion
that the study of biological differences in behavior "repudiate[s] the entire
ethos of liberal democracy. '292 It is a peculiar view of democracy that
requires as its cornerstone biological and behavioral identity. Sociologist
Marvin Bressler has reflected on this issue as follows:
An ideology that tacitly appeals to biological equality as a condition
for human emancipation corrupts the idea of freedom. Moreover, it
encourages decent men to tremble at the prospect of "inconvenient"
findings that may emerge in future scientific research. This unseemly
anti-intellectualism is doubly degrading because it is probably
unnecessary. 293
IV. BIOLOGY AND ETHICS
A recognition that certain behavioral sex differences have their origins
in biology does not in any way answer the question of whether the differ-
ences are good and to be fostered by society, or bad and to be suppressed.
A large gap may exist between the descriptive is and the prescriptive
ought.294
Students of evolutionary biology have drawn differing conclusions from
the scientific data. Herbert Spencer concluded from an analysis of evolu-
291. Wilson, Human Decency is Animal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at
38, 48-50.
292. P. GREEN, supra note 276, at 10.
293. Bressler, Sociology, Biology, and Ideology, in GENETICS 178, 197 (D. Glass ed.
1968); see also Dobzhansky, is Genetic Diversity Compatible with Human Equality?, 20 Soc.
BIOL. 280 (1973) (discussing relationship of biological diversity and social equality).
294. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, in NEW STUDIES IN ETHICS 31-51 (W. Hudson ed. 1967),
reprinted as From Ought to Is, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE 142 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
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tionary theory that society should not interfere with the action of natural
selection. 295 He opposed, therefore, state-sponsored welfare programs and
public education, because he believed that such programs interfered with
the elimination of inferior stocks from society.296 On the other hand, W.K.
Clifford believed that social harmony was a necessary condition for the
evolutionary success of a society, which led him to quite different
conclusions. 297
A variety of lessons can be learned from the empirical observation of sex
differences. Attempts to deduce moral and ethical principles from biology,
however, are not particularly fruitful. Albert Einstein once observed that
"[a]s long as we remain within the realm of science proper, we can never
meet with a sentence of the type: 'Thou shalt not lie.' . . . Scientific state-
ments of facts and relations, indeed, cannot produce ethical directives. '298
Society should suppress some aspects of human nature. Homicide, theft,
and assault are proscribed and punished in all societies. One can at least
argue that every society has a need to deal with these problems because the
nature of some portion of any society is to kill, assault, or steal. Societies
pronounce such actions "bad" irrespective of any link they may have to
human nature. An understanding of human nature is, however, quite rele-
vant in seeking to predict the consequences of the implementation of our
moral judgments. Based on the undesirable activities described above, so-
ciety has developed an elaborate criminal justice system, consisting of po-
lice, courts, and prisons, to deal with those who engage in the proscribed
activities. To the extent that criminal activity results from human nature,
it will be relatively resistant to social change. Thus, the idea that poverty is
the root of crime cannot be entirely correct, and the result of social pro-
grams to combat crime will always be less than complete.
In the same vein, to the extent that social sex differences are a product of
biological differences, constant monitoring will be required to suppress
295. H. SPENCER, II THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS 392-94 (1896). Spencer stated: "The
yearly accumulating appliances for keeping alive those who will not do enough work to keep
themselves alive, continually increase the evil. Each new effort to mitigate the penalties on
improvidence, has the inevitable effect of adding to the number of the improvident." Id. at
393.
Ironically, modem sociobiology, which some consider an atavistic relative of Spencer's
"social Darwinism," provides a biological explanation for altruistic behavior, which is not
ordinarily associated with Spencer. Such behavior directed toward relatives is explained by
the concept of kin selection. See Eberhard, The Evolution of Social Behavior by Kin Selec-
tion, 50 Q. REV. BIOL. 1, 2 (1975). Because an animal shares a certain proportion, depend-
ing upon the degree of relation, of his genes with his kin, its genes may be perpetuated by
the animal's sacrificing himself for some of his kin. Altruistic behavior is also explained by
the concept of reciprocal altruism, which describes behavior that is apparently detrimental
to the one performing the behavior, but is ultimately beneficial because it may be recipro-
cated at a later date. Trivers, The Evolution of ReciqrocalAltruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOL. 35, 45-
47 (1971).
296. H. SPENCER, supra note 295, at 394.
297. Clifford, On the Scientfc Basis of Morals, in LECTURES AND ESSAYS 287 (L. Ste-
phen & F. Pollock eds. 1886) (natural selection has favored those groups whose members
favor the collective good over the individual good).
298. A. EINSTEIN, OUT OF MY LATER YEARS 114 (1950).
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them, and governmental institutions will be required to enforce the new
proscriptions. Some might argue that concern about attempts to change
human nature is unnecessary because the attempts are doomed to fail any-
way. The resistance of human nature to social modification does not
mean, however, that attempted modification will be without effect.
Human behavior is malleable even if human nature is not. Human nature
merely provides a predisposition to behave in particular ways. Social in-
stitutions can be constructed to modify behavior, but before such attempts
are made the nature of the tradeoffs must be assessed.
Attempts to achieve statistical parity by way of affirmative action in the
sex area pose problems significantly more serious than do such attempts in
the area of race. The races are theoretically assimilable, both biologically
and culturally. A theoretical possibility exists that a society could be fash-
ioned in which a person's race would matter as little as his eye color.299 If
this occurred and mating decisions were made completely without regard
to race, racial differences would disappear through interbreeding. Al-
though biological differences between the races do exist, the social differ-
ences between the races are not based upon the particular biological
differences, but are based only upon the fact that observable differences
exist. 300 Consequently, racial affirmative action is theoretically a tempo-
rary phenomenon. Once blacks and other racial minorities become assimi-
lated into the dominant culture, affirmative action could be considered to
have performed its function and might be abandoned.30
The theoretical prospects for terminating affirmative action programs
for women are bleaker. The sexes are neither biologically nor socially as-
similable. After millions of years of breeding between the sexes, two sexes
299. See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment- An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581, 586 (1977).
300. Id. at 586-87.
301. The practical likelihood of ever ending racial affirmative action programs is ques-
tionable, however, even if the programs have by objective measure accomplished their pur-
pose. Any social entitlement program is easier to start than to stop, and the primary
eneficianes of the programs are not likely to view favorably attempts to end them, regard-
less of whether they are still needed.
The incentives under which such governmental institutions as the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission operate ensure
that affirmative action programs will continue, because the very existence of these agencies is
dependent upon a perception that the evil they were created to combat still exists. Thomas
Sowell has pointed out that single-issue agencies tend to push their activities into the area of
negative social returns because they are not structured in such a way that they may gain
returns from other activities. T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 141 (1980). Thus a
corporation that receives a diminished marginal return from each unit of activity will tend to
channel its resources into more profitable activities. Because an agency established to pre-
vent a particular diminishing evil has no mandate to attempt to combat other evils, it must
apply more activity to each residual unit of evil if it is to maintain its level of employment
and appropriations. Antidiscrimination agencies must therefore expand their definitions of
"discrimination" and "minority," with the result that "[u]rgent tasks such [as] securing basic
civil rights for blacks ultimately give way to activities designed to get equal numbers of
cheerleaders for girls' high school athletic teams." Id. Attempts to abolish affirmative ac-
tion may also be considered unfair if the rules are changed to require minorities to compete
on an equal footing after a number of generations are told that mediocrity is all they need to
succeed.
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still exist. The social role of women must at a minimum accommodate the
biological role of women as childbearers, and should accommodate the
prevailing heterosexual ethic of our society as well.30 2 To the extent that
biologically based temperamental sex differences are responsible for social
sex differences, programs to eliminate the social differences must be con-
sidered permanent. Otherwise, reversion to the more "natural" state will
occur as it did in the kibbutz. 30 3
The observation that the greater aggressiveness and physical strength of
males may have been adaptive at one time, but is no longer, is a true state-
ment that misses the point.304 What was once adaptive may become mal-
adaptive through environmental, including cultural, change. That does
not mean, however, that the traits can be legislated away.
Consideration of behavioral sex differences is necessary for accurate
prediction of the magnitude and duration of the tradeoffs that must be
accepted to achieve sexual equality. Accurate estimation is critical since
other important values, such as liberty, efficiency, and fairness, are in-
volved in the tradeoff.305 The more decisionmakers are constrained by an
inability to consider sex when relevant, the more other values must be sac-
rificed for equality. 30 6
V. THE USE OF SEX IN DECISIONMAKING
The proposition that biologically based temperamental sex differences
exist is, without question, controversial in some circles. The remainder of
this Article rests upon the assumption that the proposition is true. As dis-
cussed above, however, the truth of the proposition does not in itself sug-
gest the proper resolution of the question of how society in general, and
the law in particular, should respond. 30 7
A number of responses are possible. Average differences, for example,
might be exaggerated and converted into rigid societal norms. This ap-
proach was prevalent to a large extent in the nineteenth century308 and to a
302. Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199, 206 (1979).
303. For a discussion of the kibbutz, see supra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft.- A Response to Critics of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 199, 203 (1971); Lambert, Biology and Equality. A
Perspective on Sex Differences, 4 SIGNS 97, 98 (1978).
305. For a more detailed discussion of the tradeoffs necessary to achieve equality, see
Browne, Liberty vs. Equality Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 59 DEN. L.J. 417, 442-57 (1982).
306. Many feminists apparently concede that liberty and efficiency must be sacrificed, a
sacrifice they accept. They seem to believe, however, that their position has a monopoly on
fairness and would probably not concede that fairness is involved in the tradeoff.
307. Acceptance of the position that sex differences exist as a result of our evolutionary
past is not incompatible with a radical feminist perspective. See L. HOLLIDAY, THE VIO-
LENT SEX: MALE PSYCHOBIOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1978). Hol-
liday reviewed the data concerning the existence of temperamental sex differences and
concluded that the differences are real. One of the ways she suggested society might deal
with male aggressiveness is to produce fewer male children. Id at 12. She also gives direc-
tions for how to accomplish this. Id at 215.
308. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding state law
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lesser extent in the twentieth. 309 Another method would be to arrange
social institutions so as to minimize the differences and to permit no recog-
nition, at least no public recognition, of them. Those who subscribe to the
philosophy that equality means identity and believe that androgyny is a
socially desirable goal advocate this approach. 310 The third response,
which maximizes both individual freedom and the benefit to society of
utilizing its entire pool of talent, is to recognize that sex differences exist
and, when practical, to allow individuals to deviate from the norm.
A. What Is Wrong with Sex Discrimination?
Two interrelated ideas-the source of unfairness of sex discrimination
and the definition of equality-produce most of the difference of opinion
concerning sex discrimination. The traditional view of sex discrimination
is that it suffers from the same flaws as any other class-based discrimina-
tion because it imputes group characteristics, whether real or imagined, to
each individual member of the group, regardless of whether the individual
actually possesses those characteristics. 31' This is a common justification
for prohibiting an employer's refusal to hire a woman of childbearing age
because of the employer's fear that the woman may soon become pregnant
and leave either temporarily or permanently. 312 As in so many areas of
policy dealing with equality, this rule is then carried a step beyond its ini-
tial justification. Now an employer is not only forbidden from making
group-based choices, but he is also forbidden from making choices based
upon individual characteristics. 313 Thus an employer may not refuse to
hire a woman based upon her current or planned pregnancy, despite his
obvious interest in knowing whether the person he hires has current plans
to leave his employ within a few months.3 14
Why, then, is it considered improper for an employment decision to be
based upon pregnancy? Typical arguments against stereotyping and group
discrimination simply will not support a ban on such action by the em-
ployer; only a peculiar view of equality can justify it. Apparently the rea-
allowing only men to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding
state prohibition of women practicing law).
309. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state law preventing
women, unless wives or daughters of male tavern owners, from holding the job of
bartender).
310. See, e.g., Ferguson, AndrogynyAs an Ideal for Human Development, in FEMINISM
AND PHILOSOPHY 45, 45 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1977) (the most
rational way to increase satisfying social relationships between the sexes is to eliminate sex
roles and develop androgynous beings).
311. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 2
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN'S RIGHTS]; Brown & Freedman, Sex Averaging and the
Equal Rights Amendment, 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP., June 1975, at 35.
312. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitu-
tional Basis]; Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
583, 634.
313. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
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soning is that women are saddled with a biological impediment that does
not burden men. Consequently, to ensure that women are not ultimately
represented in smaller numbers than men, consideration of factors that
will yield a statistically unequal result must be forbidden. This might be
called the "New Affirmative Action": Not only must various groups, such
as employers and men, pay for past wrongful social conduct of others, but
they must also compensate for "biological discrimination," the natural bio-
logical differences between males and females. The New Affirmative Ac-
tion derives from a pernicious view of equality and probably cannot be
successful without considerable coercion by the state.
Ann Scales is a proponent of this New Affirmative Action. 315 She criti-
cized the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gilbert v. General
Electric Co. ,316 which held that omission of pregnancy benefits from pri-
vate benefit plans did not violate title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.317 Scales characterized the decision as a "fundamental failure to rec-
ognize the inequities generated by biological differences. ' '318 She com-
pared unfavorably statements in the Supreme Court opinion with
statements made by the district court. 319 The district court, finding a viola-
tion of title VII, stated that even if inclusion of pregnancy in the benefit
plan would tend to discriminate against men economically, it was still jus-
tifiable.320 In response, the Supreme Court stated that the district court
had wrongly assumed that title VII required an employer to pay greater
economic benefits to one sex based on their role in "the scheme of human
existence." 32'
Scales then referred to the differing views of the two courts as a conflict
of values about a woman's place and substantive equality. 322 Although
this conclusion is undoubtedly correct, the issue is whether in pursuit of
substantive equality the government has, or should have, an obligation to
require compensation for biological differences. Many supporters of wo-
men's rights take a somewhat paradoxical view of this question. On the
one hand, they argue that the ERA will forbid governmental distinctions
on the basis of sex. 323 On the other hand, they expect compensation for
the "inequities" created by biological differences. 324 Ruth Bader Gins-
315. See Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1980-1981).
316. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
318. Scales, supra note 315, at 398.
319. Id at 399-400.
320. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 380-86 (E.D. Va. 1974).
321. 429 U.S. at 139 n.17.
322. Scales, supra note 315, at 400.
323. See Constitutional Basis, supra note 312; Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975). Some commentators apparently believe that the permissibility of
sex discrimination depends on whether males or females are disadvantaged. Consider the
statement: "As a general proposition, I do not quarrel with the [Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)] plurality's willingness to uphold noninvidious classifications,
particularly against males." Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court and Gen-
der Classification Cases. 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. REV. 87, 98 (1981).
324. See Scales, supra note 315, at 398.
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burg, for example, has called for extensive benefits for pregnancy and
childbirth, to be financed through taxation of employers and employees
based on the number of women and men employed by the company. 325 At
the same time, she says that under the ERA the use of gender as a factor
would be prohibited. 326
If the New Affirmative Action were merely based upon the principle
that likes should be treated similarly and unlikes should be treated differ-
ently, there would be little cause for concern. That, however, is not the
rule being applied. Instead, the rule used is that men and women must be
treated alike regardless of their differences, unless a need arises, because of
inherent biological differences, to grant special benefits to women to give
them parity in some sense with men. This equality principle goes far be-
yond the antidiscrimination principle that originally motivated the cause
of women's rights and is probably the primary reason for popular support
for the ERA.
In Equality and the Rights of Women Elizabeth Wolgast observed that
concentration on the concept of equality of rights has actually impaired
the cause of women because of its logical inappropriateness to many of
women's concerns. 327 She noted that the concept of equality has meaning
only where some standard is available by which a comparison might be
made. 328 Thus, one might say that a five-foot plank is not equal to a six-
foot plank, if length is the measure of comparison. Not all that is not
equal, however, is unequal. Many comparisons will yield the conclusion
that the items compared are neither equal nor unequal. Consider, for ex-
ample, a cat and a dog. Descriptions in terms of general equality or ine-
quality have no meaning. The dog and the cat are neither equal nor
unequal; they are simply different.
In order for two things to be unequal, there must be some way they
could be equal. Wolgast argued, therefore, that women have improperly
framed many of the issues. Instead of arguing for equal rights, women
should be arguing for special rights when they seek such things as preg-
nancy benefits. 329 Women deserve benefits not under any principle of sex-
ual equality, but because men and women are different and have different
needs. She recognizes, however, that there may be no single principle by
which to determine whether sex should be a consideration. 330
At least two strategic reasons exist for couching demands for special
rights in terms of equal rights. The first reason is to obtain the support of
mindless egalitarians. Once an issue is phrased in terms of equality it will
325. Ginsburg, supra note 323, at 38.
326. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 175.
327. E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980).
328. Id. at 38.
329. Id at 87-88.
330. Id. at 88. This Article does not attempt to explore the various philosophical concep-
tions of equality, such as equality of opportunity versus equality of result. For the author's
further comments on equality, see Browne, supra note 305. See generally M. ADLER, SIX
GREAT IDEAS (1981) (discussing several dimensions of equality).
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attract supporters who will look no further to determine whether other
considerations, such as personal liberty, efficiency, or fairness, might out-
weigh considerations of equality. 331 These supporters find no need to bal-
ance other considerations since, in their view, the scales are automatically
tipped in favor of equality because equality is the only categorical
imperative.332
The second reason for presenting issues in terms of equal rights is to
enlist the aid of the judiciary, which is the branch of government that has
shown a consistent history of exalting equality over common sense. The
courts have found no mandate in the Constitution for legislating special
rights. Once the word equality is invoked, however, sympathetic courts
may rely on the equal protection clause and cloak their decisions in high-
sounding refrains of "equal protection of the laws."
Many sound reasons for proscribing certain forms of sex discrimination
exist. Much discrimination is unfair and ultimately harmful to society in
general. This general proposition, however, does not lead to the conclu-
sion that all distinctions based upon sex are morally wrong, nor does it
mean that all actions considered by some to be sex discrimination are
invidious.
B. Permissible Versus Impermissible Discrimination
Assuming that average sex differences exist, under what circumstances
should they be considered in making decisions? If no overlap existed be-
tween the two groups in the traits under consideration, this question would
be much easier, although still difficult, to answer. Aside from the physiol-
ogy of reproductive function, however, there are no absolute differences
between males and females. A significant overlap exists between the sexes
in all behavioral traits. 333 Consequently, sex is an imprecise predictor of
behavior even in those areas where the largest sex differences exist. While
men as a group are more aggressive and better at mathematical and visual-
spatial tasks than are women, and women as a group are more nurturant
and better in verbal skills than are men, the skills of an individual cannot
be predicted accurately from his or her sex. 334 Contrary to the conclusion
of some, however, that does not mean that sex is irrelevant information,
only that it is incomplete.
If knowledge of a person's sex reveals only limited information about
that person, the question arises as to whether and in what circumstances
decisions concerning an individual should be made on the basis of sex.
Instances arise in which such decisionmaking should be considered proper.
Anything other than an absolute rule will undoutedly present some diffi-
culties in application. This is one justification given by those supporters of
the ERA who argue that the amendment should be interpreted as an abso-
331. See E. WOLGAST, supra note 327, at 52.
332. But see infra notes 495-500 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 6-33 and accompanying text.
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lute ban on governmental distinctions based on sex. 335 Absolutist posi-
tions are always easier to apply because their application requires no
exercise of discretion or judgment. Ease of application is definitely a fac-
tor to be considered in determining what a rule should be, but it is not in
itself a justification for any rule.
In the absence of an absolute ban some basis for distinguishing between
proper and improper discrimination must be formulated. As abhorrent as
the idea is to some of the more rabid enthusiasts for governmentally man-
dated wholesale equality, concerns of economic efficiency should be per-
mitted to enter into the calculus of the decisionmaking process. 336
Practical considerations of efficiency might seem to have no place in deal-
ing with a moral question such as equality. A justification for killing based
on efficiency, for example, is certainly difficult to imagine. One need only
consider the course of the death penalty in modern America as proof.337
The propriety of an efficiency argument in the area of equality is on an
entirely different footing, however. A major underlying premise of egalita-
rian ideas, which we all share in greater or lesser degree, is the notion that
at least some discrimination between groups, whether they are groups
based upon sex, race, or social class, is irrational. Distinctions between
groups are relevant, the argument goes, only because we choose to attach
significance to them. Efficiency is a valid consideration, although not the
only consideration, because discrimination is rational to the extent that it is
efficient.
Efficiency in this context means a reduction in risk costs associated with
a decision. 33 Risk costs consist of the following two elements: informa-
tion costs, or the cost to the decisionmaker of acquiring information to
reduce the risk of an incorrect decision;339 and the expected value of the
residual risk, or the risk of an incorrect decision that remains because of
incomplete information. 340 As an example of the efficiency analysis, con-
sider the options open to an employer who desires employees able to lift
200 pounds. A far greater number of men than women will be able to lift
that amount of weight. For the sake of the example assume that one out of
ten men can lift it, but only one out of 100 women can. How efficient
would it then be to use sex as a proxy for the desired trait? The informa-
tion costs are quite low, because they consist of merely the negligible cost
of determining one's sex. The value of the residual risk is relatively high,
however, because the use of sex as a decision criterion will yield an incor-
rect result in nine out of ten cases. The employer can more efficiently
reach his decision by giving individual applicants tests to determine the
335. Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 873-74.
336. Not all would agree. Consider the statement that the use of sex as a decision crite-
rion should be barred "whatever the price in efficiency." Id at 891.
337. See generally W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY
OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1979) (tracing the subject of capital punishment).
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amount of weight each can lift. The information costs are slightly higher,
because it costs more to administer a weight-lifting test than to determine
sex. On the other hand, the expected value of the residual risk is essen-
tially zero, because the decision criterion perfectly discloses the informa-
tion sought. Obviously, the second method of decisionmaking is far more
efficient.
The greater efficiency of the second method of decisionmaking does not
mean, however, that a profit-maximizing employer will not consider the
sex of applicants.34' The employer can still increase the efficiency of the
decisionmaking process by screening applicants on the basis of sex and
testing only members of the group having a ten percent chance of passing
the test (males) and not testing those having only a one percent chance of
passing (females). Consequently, if any increase in efficiency, no matter
how small, justified decisions based upon sex, such a course would be en-
tirely proper.
What, if anything, leads to the conclusion that the employer should not
be permitted to make his employment decisions in such a manner? 342 To
answer this question an inquiry must be made into the balance between
the incremental increase in efficiency from using sex as a preliminary deci-
sion criterion and the hardship to the woman occasioned by having her sex
considered. In the example given, the increase in efficiency of the deci-
sionmaking process is quite small, but the hardship to the woman is fairly
substantial because she is completely barred from a job for which she may
be as well qualified as are the men who were hired.
One might observe that the list of factors to be considered is incomplete.
Suppose the hypothetical employer is a law firm seeking to hire new asso-
ciates. Given the balancing test set out above, the firm could maintain a
ratio of ten males to one female by giving the strength test even if the
applicants are not prescreened by sex. Consequently, a third factor needs
to be considered-the legitimacy of the employer's desire for the trait in
question. Unless the law firm is a highly unusual one, the ability to lift 200
pounds is irrelevant to the employer's business.
Good reasons exist, however, for granting a large amount of deference
to an employer's desire for a particular trait. A major factor in the success
of many business enterprises is the ability of an entrepreneur to provide
something different from what his competitors are providing. Judges re-
viewing these decisions, therefore, should not conclude that an employer's
desire for a trait is not legitimate merely because others in the business do
not desire it or because the trait is not central, in the eyes of the judge, to
the employer's business. 343
341. Not all employer behavior is profit-maximizing. Some employers may be willing to
forego some profits in order to indulge a "taste for discrimination." R. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE 360 (1981).
342. This discussion assumes the propriety in the first instance of antidiscrimination
laws, which allow the state to limit the liberty of the employer to hire whom he pleases.
343. See infra notes 467-69 and accompanying text.
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C Decisionmaking and Groups. A Digression on Manhart
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart3 4 a
number of topics considered in this Article, namely decisionmaking,
groups, and the meaning of equality, were discussed. Although Manhart
did not involve sex differences in temperament, which are of primary inter-
est here, it did concern the biological sex difference of longevity. In Man-
hart the Supreme Court held that an employer's pension plan under which
both sexes were to receive equal periodic benefits upon retirement, but fe-
males made higher contributions during employment because of their
longer life expectancy, violated title VII.34 5 Based upon a study of mortal-
ity tables and its own experience, the Department of Water and Power
determined that its 2,000 female employees would, on the average, live a
few years longer than its 10,000 male employees. Consequently, the De-
partment required females to make payments to the fund that were 14.84%
higher than the contributions of otherwise comparable males.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that although women,
as a class, generally live longer than men, not all individuals in the respec-
tive classes share the characteristics of the average class representatives. 346
The Court stated that the purpose of title VII was to preclude "treatment
of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or na-
tional class.' '347 The Court, as well as some commentators, erroneously
viewed the issue as a contest over individual rights versus group rights.348
Some commentators have noted that the Burger dissent 349 in Manhart in-
sisted on group equality in the actuarial context, which conflicted with his
insistence on individual equality in the affirmative action cases.350 Chief
Justice Burger insisted that his view treated women as individually as cir-
cumstances permitted and stated that statistics should be used when deter-
minations on an individual basis are impossible or infeasible. 351  The
Chief Justice's view that individual treatment is impossible is not precisely
correct; however, individual treatment is highly impractical.
The Manhart Court based its decision upon the common misconception
that treating someone as a member of a group is necessarily not treating
him as an individual. The majority considered it morally superior to ig-
nore membership in a sex class and consider only membership in the
human species.352 Yet, the more groups to which a person can be as-
signed, the more he is being treated as an individual. To know that a
person is a forty-year-old, American, female lawyer who smokes cigarettes
344. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
345. Id. at 713.
346. Id. at 704, 708.
347. Id. at 708.
348. Id. at 708-09; see Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 505, 508 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Demographic Analysis].
349. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justice Rehnquist. 435 U.S. at 725.
350. Demographic Analysis, supra note 348, at 509 n.19, 559.
351. 435 U.S. at 708.
352. Id.
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is to know more about that individual than to know only that a person is a
member of the human race. Still, all we know about her is based upon her
membership in age, nationality, sex, occupation, and smoking classifica-
tions. A notion of individuality and equality requiring that this person be
lumped with every other member of her species and that the rest of the
data be ignored in order to treat her as an individual is palpably absurd.
Until we become intimate with someone, in which case the person is then a
member of a class of one, most of what we know about a person is based
upon his membership in groups.
In the context of insurance ratemaking, which is perforce based upon
statistical predictions, the ability to use an individual's membership in
groups is essential. Leaving aside for the moment the specific interpreta-
tion of title VII at issue in Manhart and addressing the question purely as a
moral one, the justification for allowing insurance rates based on age
rather than sex is not readily apparent. In both cases the same principle is
involved. In Manhart Justice Stevens observed: "Many women do not
live as long as the average man and many men outlive the average woman.
The question, therefore, is whether the existence or nonexistence of 'dis-
crimination' is to be determined by comparison of class characteristics or
individual characteristics." 3 53 The principle involved in sex-segregated ta-
bles is as relevant to tables based upon age. Many forty-five-year olds do
not have as many years left to live as the average sixty-year-old and many
sixty-year-olds will outlive the average forty-five-year-old. Must we con-
clude that age-based mortality tables are discriminating against individu-
als in favor of group parity? Certainly, this view of age discrimination
makes as much sense as the conclusion in Manhart. The critical point is
that predictions of the death of individuals will be correct more often if sex
is considered than if sex is ignored.
As Spencer Kimball observed in a thorough analysis of Manhart, the
Supreme Court and many commentators have made the same fundamen-
tal error in their analysis of the discrimination question by using the pay-
ments after retirement as the measure of the benefits. 354 The compensation
to the employee is not the periodic pension check the employee receives
after retirement, but rather the contractual right against the insurance
company that he gets every pay period. Looking solely at retrospective
results leads to some absurd conclusions. If a person purchases a twenty-
year term life insurance policy and lives beyond its expiration, a conclu-
sion that what he received for his premiums was of no economic value is
erroneous, despite the fact that his beneficiary ultimately received no pay-
ment from the insurance company. The purchaser received a promise
from the insurance company that if he died within the term of the policy
353. Id.
354. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination. Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
83, 97; see also Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Bene-
fits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 532-41 (1982) (implications of Manhart
considered).
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his beneficiary would receive the face value of the policy.355 He also re-
ceived the noneconomic, but nonetheless valuable, benefit of the peace of
mind of knowing that if he died his beneficiary would be taken care of. In
fact, he received the same thing that a friend who had the same policy
received, even though his friend died and the friend's widow received the
insurance proceeds. To say that only people who die get their money's
worth from their insurance policies is unrealistic.
One of the justifications proposed by Brilmayer and her colleagues for
barring the use of sex in ratemaking is that sex is an immutable character-
istic. 356 Immutability is, of course, precisely what makes sex an ideal trait
for an insurance company to use. 357 A company need not worry that a
woman will take out a life insurance policy today and become a man to-
morrow, but it must consider that a nonsmoker who takes out a policy
today will become a smoker tomorrow. Sex and birth date are ideal traits
upon which to classify risks because they are both immutable. An insur-
ance company, particularly one providing group insurance, must use only
a few traits that are easy to measure and do not require constant monitor-
ing. This consideration shows the impracticality of using specific traits
sometimes used in individual policies and cited with approval by the
Brilmayer article. 358 Although the use of many traits may increase the
accuracy of mortality predictions, the cost of obtaining, verifying, and
monitoring is likely to outweigh the value of the increase in predictive ac-
curacy. This is particularly true in the group insurance context, where in-
dividuals are continually joining and leaving the group.359
In buttressing its conclusion that sex-segregated mortality tables are im-
proper, the Manhart Court analogized sex to race and stated that "a statute
that was designed to make race irrelevant in the employment market...
could not reasonably be construed to permit a take-home-pay differential
based on a racial classification. '360 The Brilmayer article similarly argues
that in the insurance context sex is more like race than it is like age. 36'
The accuracy of this conclusion is far from clear. Sex is a dichotomous
variable; each person belongs to one of the two sexes, and ordinarily little
difficulty arises in determining which one. Age, though a continuous vari-
able, is similarly easy to determine. Race on the other hand, is quite differ-
ent. Although culturally race is often perceived as a discrete variable,
biologically it is a continuous variable, or, to be precise, a series of vari-
ables, most of which are continuous. 362 A person's racial identity is largely
355. Benston, supra note 354, at 497.
356. Demographic Analysis, supra note 348, at 527.
357. Benston, supra note 354, at 510.
358. For examples of other traits used, see Demographic Analysis, supra note 348, at 533
n.130.
359. Benston, supra note 354, at 500.
360. 435 U.S. at 709.
361. Demographic Analysis, supra note 348, at 536-39.
362. A. BRUES, PEOPLE AND RACES 1 (1977) (A race is "a division of a species which
differs from other divisions by the frequency with which certain hereditary traits appear
among its members.").
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a social phenomenon, rather than a biological one. 363 By any rational
measure a person who is seven-eighths white and one-eighth black would
be considered white. That has not been the case in the United States, how-
ever. The actual practice in the United States, and almost everywhere, is
to ascribe a person of "mixed blood" to the socially inferior race. 364 Fur-
thermore, most, if not all, of the morbidity and mortality differential be-
tween the races appears to be due to environmental factors such as diet
and medical care. 365 These environmental differences are lessening with a
decrease in discrimination against racial minorities and an increase in the
availability of social welfare benefits. 366
The Brilmayer group, in arguing that associations between sex and life
expectancy are spurious, made another mistake that commonly recurs in
the discussion of biological differences. They stated: "The recency of
greater female longevity is inconsistent with claims that the phenomenon is
biological or genetic. In evolutionary terms, a few centuries is an ex-
tremely short time. '367 This is an incorrect view that completely ignores
the interaction of biology and environment. In the context of sex differ-
ences in mortality the argument ignores the important environmental vari-
able of health care. For example, assume a society in which the life
expectancy at birth is fifty years for men and women and a high frequency
of deaths results from childbirth. Introduction of modem medical care
will greatly reduce the frequency of deaths from childbirth, and, all else
being equal, the life expectancy at birth for women will increase. This
means that the life expectancy is different in different environments, not
that a genetic component to sex differences in longevity does not exist.
The real question is whether existing knowledge of the environmental and
genetic causes of sex differences in mortality justifies predictions based
upon mortality tables. Insurance companies, which have the greatest in-
terest in the accuracy of their predictions, believe that the predictions are
justified, or they would not use them. The evidence is strong that the in-
surance companies are correct.368
Efficiency considerations weigh heavily on the side of using sex-segre-
gated mortality tables. The reduction in risk costs is fairly substantial. Us-
ing decision criteria other than sex and age in the group insurance context
would substantially increase information costs. The use of sex-segregated
tables reduces the residual risk, and the burden imposed on people because
sex is considered is only an incremental increase or decrease in premiums.
Finally, the trait about which knowledge is desired-longevity-is obvi-
363. Kimball, supra note 354, at 112.
364. See A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 122-
23 (5th ed. 1974).
365. See Pettigrew & Pettigrew, Race, Disease and Desegregation. A New Look, in II
ETHNIC GROUPS OF AMERICA: THEIR MORBIDITY, MORTALITY AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS
36 (A. Shiloh & I. Selavan eds. 1974).
366. Id
367. Demographic Analysis, supra note 348, at 546.
368. See Benston, supra note 354, at 514; Kimball, supra note 354, at 108.
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ously critical in the business of insurance. 369
VI. DISPARATE TREATMENT
Probably no one would dispute that sex has been used more than neces-
sary as a decision criterion in the past and, to a more limited extent, today.
A flat ban on considering sex, however, is an overreaction to the errors of
the past. Some areas in which consideration of sex might be proper are
discussed in this section. The list is intended to be illustrative, rather than
exhaustive, and the arguments for the use of sex are more compelling for
some illustrations than for others.
A. Women and Combat "'Ancient Canard" or Wisdom of the Ages?
One of the most emotion-laden areas in the debate concerning equal
rights for women involves women's service in combat. Anthropological,
biological, and psychological information can be used to aid in resolving
the combat issue. Arguments against the use of women in combat revolve
around the less aggressive nature of women, their lesser physical strength,
problems of discipline resulting from interactions between male and fe-
male soldiers, and the inability to provide privacy to soldiers in mixed-sex
units.370 Arguments in favor of the use of women in combat include the
right and responsibility of women to share in the benefits and burdens of
military service and the decreased importance of strength and aggressive-
ness resulting from the technological revolution in modern warfare. 37'
No society has ever relied on female warriors. Those who favor the use
of women in combat are thus forced to use such arguments as, "Herodotus
mentions women soldiers who were as bloodthirsty as men, '372 and exam-
ples such as Joan of Arc, 37 3 pioneer women,374 unnamed warrior queens
throughout history,375 and female members of terrorist organizations.
376
The Israeli military is commonly cited as an exception to the universal lack
of a substantial combat role for women. 377 Although Israel at one time
used female combat soldiers, women were never fully assimilated into the
369. The Supreme Court has recently extended the holding of Manhart by deciding that
title VII also "prohibits an employer from offering its employees the option of receiving
retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, all of which pay
a woman a lower monthly benefit than a man who has made the same contributions." Ari-
zona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Nor-
ris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3493, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1236, 1242 (1983).
370. See, e.g., Gilder, The Case Against Women in Combat, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1979,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 29.
371. Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 967-78; Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the
Draft.- A Response to Critics of the Equal Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 199, 207-12
(1971).
372. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 206.
373. Id
374. Dobrofsky, Women's Power and Authority in the Context of War, 3 SEx ROLES 141,
154-55 (1977).
375. Tieger, supra note 6, at 959.
376. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 206.
377. Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 977; Dobrofsky, supra note 374, at 155.
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army and never given primary combat responsibility. A Brookings Insti-
tute study concluded that the conception of the Israeli woman warrior is
more myth than reality and that Israel has been overrated as a model of
equality for women in the military.378
Although cross-cultural universality is not conclusive proof of the wis-
dom of a given practice, it might appropriately be given presumptive
weight, and deviations from a universal pattern should not be lightly un-
dertaken.379 The universality of the male as warrior may well be a product
of adaptive forces that have been reflected in biology. It would be a cruel
twist of fate indeed if the sex that is larger, stronger, and more aggressive
were not the sex from which warriors were drawn. The reasons for the use
of men in combat are varied. Males are much more expendable than are
females in terms of propagation of the species because the number of fe-
males limits the size of a population. 380 A single female can give birth to
only one child (excluding multiple births) every nine months during her
reproductive years; a man can sire vastly more. The greatest number of
children ever born to one woman is sixty-nine, 381 while the greatest
number ever sired by a man is 1056, a record reportedly set by a seven-
teenth-century Moroccan king.382 Requiring the more expendable male to
defend the less expendable female is clearly a sensible arrangement.
Some believe that disputing the evolutionary history of sex differences is
unnecessary because cultural conditions have changed to such an extent
that sex differences are no longer important. Hale and Kanowitz, in refer-
ring to arguments that men are more aggressive than women, have ques-
tioned the need for using military personnel who are more aggressive, in
light of the technical nature of warfare and its destructive potential.383
This reliance on the technological nature of modern warfare is not con-
vincing. Although some potential conflicts are of such a nature, and
human participation may be limited to pushing buttons, the nation's sub-
stantial commitment to conventional military forces demonstrates the de-
sire that not every conflict accelerate into a nuclear conflagration. Heavy
reliance on the highly technical nature of warfare is likely to be a self-
fulfilling prophecy: If we are prepared to fight only nuclear wars, we will
fight only nuclear wars.
Hale and Kanowitz have also stated that "[wle must also consider
whether natural and instinctive behavior is controlling when military per-
sonnel undergo extensive physical and psychological conditioning. '384
378. For conclusions by the Brookings Institution, a policy study institution sympathetic
to many women's causes, on the Israeli military experience for women, see M. BINKIN & S.
BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 131-32 (1977).
379. For a view contrary to this position, see Wasserstrom, supra note 299, at 613.
380. See G. HARRISON, J. WEINER, J. TANNER & N. BARNICOT, HUMAN BIOLOGY 474
(2d ed. 1977).
381. GUINNESS BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS 30 (1978). Twelve children appears to be a
more realistic maximum. D. BARASH, supra note 32, at 47.
382. D. BARASH, supra note 32, at 47.
383. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 203.
384. 1d.
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They conceded that physical standards may need modification, but stated
that modification should be encouraged. 3 5 Some alterations in training
requirements have already been made to accommodate women. For ex-
ample, at the United States Naval Academy women are permitted to carry
lighter rifles in combat exercises and are given additional time to run ob-
stacle courses. 386 A study conducted at West Point showed that, given the
same regimen of physical training, women increase their strength less than
half as much as do men. 387 This effect is undoubtedly due in large part to
the anabolic effect of testosterone. 388 Hale and Kanowitz also claimed that
physical standards are unrealistic because so few military personnel are
assigned to combat units. 389 This statement is itself an unrealistic position,
which would lead to the conclusion that it is wasteful to teach a soldier to
use a rifle unless he is assigned to a combat unit. It is in the nation's inter-
est to have soldiers who can fight and depth in the armed forces sufficient
to allow personnel to be rotated in and out of combat duty. Moreover, a
mechanism must exist by which the number of combat troops can be easily
increased in the event they are needed. 390
As to the suggestion that extensive psychological training 391 would over-
come any sex differences in aggressiveness, it is worth noting that sex dif-
ferences in basic personality are not thought to be due to differences in the
neocortex, the portion of the brain governing higher intellectual functions
and involved in learning. Instead, these differences are thought to be due
to differences in the limbic system and paleocortex, the more primitive
portions of the brain that are not as subject to conscious control as is the
neocortex.392 The importance of the limbic system can be demonstrated
by the surgical removal of the neocortex of the cat. If the limbic system is
left intact, the basic personality of the cat does not change. If the cat is
then stimulated in a way that would ordinarily elicit only mild anger, how-
ever, the animal will react ferociously. 393 The experiment shows the im-
portance of the neocortex in mediating aggressive behavior, but is not
encouraging for the proposition that basic temperament, especially aggres-
385. Id. at 204; see Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 971-72.
386. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1980, at 42, col. 1.
387. See Gilder, supra note 370, at 44.
388. See A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 935, 971 (1976) ("Testoster-
one, the male sex hormone, causes increased deposition of protein in the tissues throughout
the body, including especially an increase in the contractile proteins of the muscles.").
389. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 204.
390. George Gilder pointed out the risk of the obsession with sexual equality in the
armed forces: "While the Soviet Union's nearly all-male armies grow to a size three times
ours and Cuba pursues its prey around the world, it would be unfortunate for American
leaders to give the impression that they regard combat chiefly as an obstacle to women's
rights." Gilder, supra note 370, at 46.
391. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 203.
392. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. See also R. STAGNER, THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF PERSONALITY 443 (4th ed. 1974) (The term "limbic system" describes "various cere-
bral centers just below the cortex, and including pleasure and pain, excitement and
depression, arousal of action and inhibition of action-the kinds of processes we have
treated . . . as basic to personality.").
393. J. PINCUS & G. TUCKER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 66 (2d ed. 1978).
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siveness, is easily modified through learning. Consequently, the extent to
which twelve to sixteen weeks of basic training can be expected to alter
such deeply rooted traits is questionable.
If body strength at the time of induction were the only characteristic
desired in prospective combat soldiers, an efficiency analysis would pro-
vide little support for a policy limiting enlistment of women and barring
them from combat. Everyone could be given a test of strength, and those
who passed would be eligible for combat duty.394 Realistically, however,
probably few oppose the use of women in combat primarily on the ground
of their lesser physical strength; instead, the objection of most is probably
based upon a general intuitive notion that combat and womanhood are
incompatible. This intuitive notion probably derives from observations of
the sex differences in basic personality that have been dealt with previ-
ously-the greater aggressiveness of men and the greater nurturance of
women.395 Because these personality traits are difficult to measure on an
individual basis, and virtually impossible to measure in a mass setting, an
efficiency analysis should permit the use of sex as a proxy for aggressive-
ness. 396 The use of sex as a proxy would greatly decrease information
costs because of the ease of ascertaining sex and the difficulty of measuring
aggressiveness. Although the residual risk is substantially reduced by the
elimination of females, a risk is still present because not all males are tem-
peramentally suited to combat.
The risk of error should be balanced against the harm to individuals
occasioned by having their sex considered. One could argue about
whether military service is a benefit or a burden, but that is not a particu-
larly productive line of inquiry. Military service probably seems like a
burden to those who are participating, but may appear to be a benefit to
those who cannot. 397 Much can be said for the idea that males and fe-
males should have equal citizenship obligations and should both be subject
to a military draft, whether or not women are permitted to serve in com-
bat. This compromise is not entirely satisfactory for women who desire to
make a career of military service, because their inability to serve in combat
inhibits their advancement. 398 Moreover, as long as they are not eligible
for combat, women can fill only a minority of service positions.399
Even taking into account the foregoing arguments, a strong case could
394. One factor that confounds the discussion, however, is the fact that men gain more
strength through training than do women. See supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text.
Therefore, if predictions of post-training strength are needed, the training effect would have
to be taken into account.
395. See supra notes 6-33 and accompanying text.
396. For remarks on the trend toward using standardized tests to measure the intangibles
that make someone a good soldier, see Gilder, supra note 370, at 44.
397. For a discussion of some of the benefits of military service, see Goodman, Women,
War, and Equality.- An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military, 5 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP. 243, 244-49 (1979).
398. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
399. M. BINKIN & S. BACH, supra note 378, at 109 (women cannot exceed 22% of nation's
military force as long as combat restriction is in place).
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still be made that sexually integrated combat units would invite disaster.
Quite apart from the differences between the sexes is the phenomenon that
persons respond to members of the opposite sex differently from the way
they respond to members of their own sex. A man and a woman may form
attachments different in degree and kind from attachments formed by
members of the same sex.400 A man may take risks that are foolish from a
military standpoint to protect a female comrade, when he would not do so
were his comrade a male.
The Brookings study discussed two competing schools of thought re-
garding the integration of women into combat units.40 1 The first is that
men tend to draw together in social groups that exclude women in a phe-
nomenon known as "male bonding. '402 As a corollary, in matters of or-
ganized aggression, males and females tend to reject other females as
potential leaders and defenders, and males reject females as colleagues.40 3
The authors of the Brookings study found this hypothesis difficult to ac-
cept in light of the prominent role of women in some terrorist organiza-
tions.40 4 That the psychological factors at work in the hiding of bombs in
car trunks are the same as those operating on soldiers manning the
trenches is, however, doubtful. The other school cited in the study holds
that the primary ethos of the combat soldier has changed from the social
cohesiveness observed during World War II to one of "every man for him-
self."' 40 5 Consequently, the argument goes, group behavior has lost its sig-
nificance. Whether that ethos has changed is questionable, but even more
questionable is whether such a change is something to be cultivated.
Whether women should serve in combat may be one of the questions
most amenable to resolution using the biological and anthropological evi-
dence, as well as an efficiency analysis. The reasons why women are uni-
versally excluded from combat should be considered. The suggestion that
the demands of motherhood have greatly handicapped women as fight-
ers4° may explain why mothers have not been sent into combat, but it
does not explain the exclusion of nonpregnant women without children.
We should not, of course, assume that merely because something has al-
ways been done in a particular way, that way is necessarily the right way
for all time. On the other hand, we ought not to conclude that conformity
400. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 59 (1980).
401. M. BINKIN & S. BACH, supra note 378, at 89-92.
402. Id. at 90. The study quoted the following passage from Lionel Tiger's book Men in
Groups:
(1) that defence and maintaining the social order are clearly crucial to the
persistence of human social systems; (2) that these behaviors are typically un-
dertaken by males, usually without female full colleagues . . . (3) that on all
occasions defined by a community as vitally important and during which
strong emotion is expressed by community members aware of the overall situ-
ation a male or males will assume the most significant roles.
Id. (quoting L. TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS 84-85 (1969)).
403. L. TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS 85 (1969).
404. M. BINKIN & S. BACH, supra note 378, at 91.
405. Id. at 91-92.
406. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 371, at 203.
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with tradition necessarily reflects the acceptance of an "ancient canard"
about women or that conformity is the result of stereotypic thinking. Even
a practice resulting from stereotypic thinking, of course, is not necessarily
incorrect. The facile assumption that all other societies have been wrong
on this issue and that ours is the first society just enough to divine the
moral answer displays a certain arrogance.
1. A Digression on Rostker v. Goldberg
The decision in Rostker v. Goldberg40 7 is more significant for what it
assumed than for what it expressed. In holding the Military Selective
Service Act constitutional despite its exclusion of females from its draft-
registration requirements, the Supreme Court assumed, without discus-
sion, that the exclusion of women from combat was constitutional. 408
Once the Court cleared-or evaded-the hurdle of the combat exclusion,
the question became fairly simple. Testimony was presented before Con-
gress that in the event of a mobilization the military would need 650,000
draftees in the first six months and that up to 80,000 of these could be
women.40 9 The majority concluded that because of the different need for
men and for women the sexes were not similarly situated. The Court
stated that "[tlhe Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situ-
ated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial
equality. 410
Justice White dissented because he believed that "the number of women
who could be used in the military without sacrificing combat readiness is
not at all small or insubstantial, and administrative convenience has not
been sufficient justification for the kind of outright gender-based discrimi-
nation involved in registering and conscripting men but no women at
all. ' '41 Justice White correctly viewed the decision as one of administra-
tive convenience, but there must be some point at which administrative
convenience is sufficient justification to distinguish between men and wo-
men who are not similarly situated. At least seven times as many men as
women would have to be drafted in a mobilization.41 2 If all women of
draft age were registered, the cost to register a woman who is ultimately
drafted would be seven times the cost to register a man ultimately drafted.
The question then becomes whether Congress should be constitutionally
precluded from choosing between spending the additional money on train-
ing soldiers or on registering women. One suspects that the national secur-
ity would be better served by the former course.
Justice Marshall declared in dissent that "[tihe Court today places its
imprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of 'an-
407. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
408. Id. at 76-77.
409. Id. at 81.
410. Id. at 79.
411. Id. at 85 (White, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 81.
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cient canards about the proper role of women.' ",413 Justice Marshall failed
to define clearly what he believed that ancient canard to be. Since Justice
Marshall noted that the combat exclusion was not challenged, the canard
presumably is not that women should not serve in combat. 414 The remain-
der of the dissent analyzed the evidence showing that the military could
use up to 80,000 women in the event of a major European war and con-
cluded that the exclusion of women was not necessary to meet military
needs or to achieve military flexibility. 41 5 Because efficiency concerns are
hardly canards about women, one is left with the conclusion that either
Justice Marshall was engaging in mere sloganeering or that he believes the
underlying assumption that the combat exclusion is constitutional to be
incorrect.
B. The Maternal Preference
An area where the greater nurturance of females deserves some recogni-
tion is in the "maternal preference" or "tender years" presumption. The
presumption supports granting custody to fit mothers because the mother
is the "natural custodian of her child of tender years." 416 The presumption
is based solely upon the child's rights and not the rights of the parents. 417
One commentator has observed that "[tlhe maternal presumption in di-
vorce proceedings is anathema to most feminists," 418 because feminists
view the presumption as a reinforcement of the enduring stereotype of wo-
men as instinctive childraisers. 419 One court responded to that argument
by concluding that even though the presumption was based on past prac-
tice, the preference given the mother actually comported with fact and was
not unsound or unconstitutional. 420 Another court concluded quite the
opposite and stated that the presumption should be rejected because it is
based on "outdated social stereotypes," not on consideration of the child's
welfare. 42'
Leo Kanowitz has denied the logic of the position that the maternal
preference is just.4 22 He stated that fathers are capable of, and should be
encouraged to develop and maintain, meaningful relationships with their
413. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
414. 453 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
415. Id. at I11.
416. Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 270-71, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1948).
417. McCrcery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1977).
418. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism. The Maternal Presumption Revisited, I
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 108 (1978).
419. Id. Richard Wasserstrom declared, without finding it necessary to cite any author-
ity: "[I]t is sex-role acculturation, not biology, that mistakenly leads many persons to the
view that women are both naturally and necessarily better suited than men to be assigned
the primary responsibilities of child rearing." Wasserstrom, supra note 299, at 611.
420. Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Okla. 1978) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 199 (1976)).
421. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
422. Kanowitz, The ERA. The Task Ahead, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 649 (1979).
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children.423 The question is not, however, whether a father is, or should
be, capable of taking care of his children, but what is in the best interests
of the child. The presumption merely provides that when all tangible fac-
tors are roughly equal, the intangible of maternal nurturance is to be given
some weight.4 24
One feminist writer has argued that the maternal preference should be
retained, but her conclusions seem to be based upon a misunderstanding of
the underlying philosophy of child-custody decisions.425 She stated that
the maternal preference should be relied on unless the father has assumed
the childcare role during marriage.426 Two substantial flaws are implicit in
this short statement. The first is the assumption that the granting or with-
holding of custody is intended to reward or punish parents for past con-
duct, when in fact the decision is based upon the perceived best interests of
the child. 427 The second flaw is measuring each parent's commitment to
the home and children by the amount of time spent at home taking care of
the children. Such an analysis does not take into account the commitment
that may be reflected in the economic support resulting from the father's
employment. It is also directly contrary to the principle that a wife who
does not work outside the home is entitled to some fraction of the property
accumulated during the marriage because of her provision of various kinds
of support for the husband in the home. If the wife benefits the husband
by staying home and taking care of the children while he works, the hus-
band also benefits the wife by going out and earning a living while she
stays home with the children. If the wife is to get credit for the husband's
work, the husband should get credit for the wife's childcare.
The maternal preference is an efficient way of deciding custody matters.
Efficient does not necessarily mean cheap in an economic sense. Cheaper
ways of deciding child-custody questions certainly exist, such as a conclu-
sive presumption that mothers get custody without inquiry into other fac-
tors. When all other things are equal, or in close cases, the use of the
maternal presumption will give a correct answer in more cases than not.
Once all the tangible factors have been considered and they roughly bal-
ance, the decision can be made in only one of two ways. Either some arbi-
trary rule can be imposed, such as that custody goes to the mother, or a
nonarbitrary rule can be imposed, such as a coin toss. Since the overriding
concern is the welfare of the child, the rule that yields the correct result
would seem preferable, unless equality is such a transcendent goal that the
child's welfare should not be balanced against it.
The presumption should possibly be given more weight than being
merely a tie-breaker. The maternal-infant bond is a strong one. Perhaps
even where tangible measures weigh somewhat in favor of the father, the
423. Id.
424. See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
425. Uviller, supra note 418,passim.
426. Id. at 129.
427. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. (1971).
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presumptive strength of that bond should add some weight to the other
side to tip the balance in her favor. As discussed previously, childrearing,
virtually everywhere and in all times known, has been a female occupa-
tion. Females are more nurturant than males from childhood.428 There
seems little reason in logic for the law to ignore reality.
C Drinking Laws: Craig v. Boren
In Craig v. Boren429 the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law
that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty-one and to
females under eighteen.430 In reaching its conclusion, the Court for the
first time articulated the current standard of review for sex classifications
under the equal protection clause. Such classifications, the Court con-
cluded, "must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives." 43'
The State of Oklahoma argued that the objective underlying the statute
was the enhancement of traffic safety, and the Court accepted, at least for
purposes of the opinion, that the objective was an important one.432 The
Court concluded, however, that the sex-based distinction was not substan-
tially related to the achievement of that objective. 433 In support of the
distinction, Oklahoma introduced a variety of statistical surveys to show
that drinking among eighteen- to twenty-year-old males was a greater
problem than drinking among females of the same age. The state demon-
strated that the arrest rate of males for drunkenness was over nine times
the female arrest rate, that youths aged seventeen to twenty-one were over-
represented among casualties of traffic accidents (with males in the pre-
ponderance), and that young males were more inclined to drink and drive.
The most relevant statistic was a survey of arrests of eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds for alcohol-related driving offenses, which demonstrated that
0.18% of females and 2% of males had been arrested for drinking and
driving.
The disparity in arrest rates was not considered persuasive by the
Court.4 34 The Court noted that it had struck down "far more predictive
empirical relationships than this.' '4 35 For example, in Reed v. Reed the
Court struck down an Idaho statute that provided that males must be pre-
ferred over females in determining who should be appointed to administer
the estate of an intestate decedent when several persons were equally enti-
tled to serve.436 The Court in Craig noted that Idaho's presumption that
women lacked experience in formal business matters would have held true
428. See supra text accompanying note 32.
429. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
430. Id. at 190.
431. Id. at 197.
432. Id. at 199-200.
433. Id. at 200.
434. Id. at 202.
435. Id.
436. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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in substantially more than two percent of the cases. 437 The Court also
noted that it had refused to accept statistical defenses in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson4 38 and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,439 two cases involving state stat-
utes that required dependency tests for men, but not for women. Both
statutes were struck down, even though the Court realized that men are not
likely to be dependent upon their wives. 440
A substantial difference exists between the facts in Craig, on the one
hand, and Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld, on the other hand. In the latter
group of cases sex was used as a proxy for relatively easily measured
traits--either ability to administer an estate or dependency on a spouse. In
Reed the court system was already set up to make such determinations
when two potential administrators were of the same sex. Similarly, under
the facts of Frontiero and Wiesenfeld the government could have required
wives as well as husbands to show dependency. The government's deci-
sion not to do so was made purely in the interest of administrative
expediency.
Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig, found that the statutory scheme
insulted all young men of the state because it imposed a restraint on 100%
of the males for the sins of the 2%.4' The overinclusiveness of the statute
really cannot be the basis of his objection, however, unless he would also
be willing to strike down a twenty-one-year-old limit applied uniformly.
Under a uniform rule the analysis would be under the due process clause,
instead of the equal protection clause. Such a statute not only would im-
pose the sins of 2% of the males upon the other 98%, but would inflict the
sins of 0.18% of the females upon the other 99.82%. Understanding how
this would be a more fair result is difficult.
Justice Rehnquist correctly pointed out in dissent that the majority's re-
liance on the 2% "fit" between maleness and drunk-driving arrests miscon-
ceived the nature of the equal protection inquiry.442  The statistical fit
between the class and the trait is not the dispositive factor in the inquiry;
instead, the critical question is "whether there may be a sufficiently higher
incidence of the trait within the included class than in the excluded class to
justify different treatment." 44 3 The question should have been whether an
arrest rate for males that was eleven times as high as the arrest rate for
females justified different treatment of the two groups.
The higher incidence of drunk-driving arrests is almost certainly a re-
437. 429 U.S. at 202 n.13.
438. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal law allowing a serviceman
to claim his wife as a dependent for purposes of obtaining increased benefits, while allowing
a servicewoman to claim her husband as a dependent only if he actually depended upon her
for over one-half his support).
439. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding unconstitutional system under which surviving widows
with children were entitled to death benefits, while surviving widowers with children were
not).
440. 429 U.S. at 202 n.13.
441. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., concurring).
442. Id. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
443. Id. at 225-26.
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suit, at least in part, of the generally wilder nature of young males as com-
pared to young females.44  Although seemingly maladaptive, the
recklessness and general lack of good sense of young males in matters of
personal safety has probably been adaptive in that it accounts for the will-
ingness of young males to take risks in defense of the group. These males
are the most expendable segment of society, both because they are male
and because they are young and have not acquired the wisdom that makes
older members of the group valuable beyond their genetic
contributions. 445
The propensity of males toward recklessness has its costs. For example,
in 1981 males accounted for 87.3% of all arrests for murder and nonnegli-
gent manslaughter. 446 Of the total number of all such homicide arrests,
34.1% were of males eighteen to twenty-four years old.447 Similarly, 92.8%
of all armed robbery arrests were of males, and 42.5% of those total arrests
were of males aged eighteen to twenty-four. 4 8 Of all arrests for drunken-
ness, 92.1% were of males, and 28.9% of the total were males of the eight-
een to twenty-four age group.449
The principle involved in Craig is similar to that involved in Man-
hart.450 Both cases required the prediction of future events that were not
presently measurable. A showing that substantial differences exist between
the groups in the trait under consideration should at least create a pre-
sumption that the classification is legitimate.
The opinion in Craig shows the failure of the members of the majority
to appreciate the tradeoffs involved in striking down "discriminatory" leg-
islation. The majority perceived as somehow unfair the fact that all eight-
een- to twenty-year-old males were prevented from buying alcohol merely
because two percent of the group had been arrested for driving under the
influence.451 A state is perfectly free, however, to apply a twenty-one-year
age limit to both sexes and thereby treat females worse than they were
treated before, despite the fact that their arrest rate is less than ten percent
that of males. Who ever said equality was fair?
D. Female Flight Attendants: The Diaz Case
One of the early cases dealing with the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) exception to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964452 was
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc .4 53 In Diaz the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held impermissible an airline's practice of hiring only
444. See id. at 199-201.
445. D. BARASH, supra note 32, at 73.




450. 435 U.S. 702 (1978); see supra notes 344-69 and accompanying text.
451. 429 U.S. at 199-204.
452. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
453. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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women as flight attendants, despite the existence of rational reasons for the
practice.454
Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am), had hired males as cabin
attendants from the late 1920s until 1965. Early in the airline's history
cabin attendants also acted as baggage handlers and were responsible for
mooring the company's seaplanes at docks in Latin America. At that time
all of the attendants were male. Following World War II, with improve-
ments in Latin American airfields that permitted landings on land instead
of sea, as well as a decline in the use of cabin attendants as baggage han-
dlers, Pan Am began hiring women as well as men for the positions. By
1959 Pan Am had determined that the overall level of service provided by
the women flight attendants was superior to that provided by men. Al-
though the men were as competent as the women in the mechanical func-
tions, such as storing coats and serving food, they were not as good as the
women at the nonmechanical duties, which consisted of providing reassur-
ance to anxious passengers and making the flight as pleasurable as possi-
ble. These nonmechanical duties had by then assumed a position of high
importance to the airline. Pan Am managers had also concluded on the
basis of experience that passengers of both sexes preferred female
attendants.
Following passage of title VII,455 Pan Am conducted a study in order to
ensure that it was not in violation of the statute. The study found that the
overwhelming majority of passengers of both sexes preferred female flight
attendants. In 1965 Pan Am limited the position of flight attendant to
women.
In 1967 Celio Diaz applied to Pan Am for a position as flight attendant,
but was rejected because of the women-only hiring policy. He then filed a
class action suit charging that the airline's policy violated title VII. The
parties stipulated that Pan Am's practice was illegal unless sex constituted
a BFOQ. On that point Pan Am presented expert testimony to justify its
practice. Psychiatrist Eric Berne testified for Pan Am that an airline cabin
is a unique environment that creates three typical emotional states: appre-
hension, boredom, and excitement. Of the three, apprehension is the most
important factor with which the airline must deal. Berne also testified that
passengers of both sexes would respond better to the presence of females
than to males.456 The trial court found the testimony to be persuasive and
stated that it found "not only that under the conditions of modern air
travel most Pan Am passengers do in fact prefer female stewardesses to
male stewards, but also that there are basic psychological reasons which
explain that preference. 457
Pan Am presented testimony concerning the difficulties of determining
in advance whether individual applicants had the personal qualifications
454. Id. at 389.
455. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
456. 311 F. Supp. at 565.
457. Id. at 566.
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conducive to the optimal performance of the flight attendant's function.
An industrial psychologist testified that a high level of job performance
required "sincere interest and motivation in providing for the comfort and
ease of others in the working environment of that position."458 He also
testified that the aggregate of separate personality traits that produces this
interest and motivation constitutes what is commonly described as femi-
ninity. Although some men possess more of these qualities, such as benev-
olence, interest in the comfort of others, and lack of perceived
aggressiveness, than do some women, the psychologist stated that "it
would be quite infrequent to find a man possessing each of these traits to at
least as high a degree as the average woman. '459 The psychologist also
testified that making reliable determinations prior to employment is not
possible using personality tests and that the best available method for de-
termining whether a prospective employee is likely to have the desired
traits is to use the person's sex as a decision criterion. He concluded that
the elimination of sex as a qualification would eliminate the best available
tool for screening out unsatisfactory applicants and would thus reduce the
average performance level.460
The trial court concluded that sex constituted a BFOQ because identifi-
cation during the hiring process of those few men who possessed the de-
sired aggregate of personal characteristics was not "practically
possible."'461 The court of appeals reversed, but accepted the factual find-
ings of the trial court. The court held, however, that as a matter of law Pan
Am's showing could not justify its discriminatory practices. 462 The court
stated that the essence of Pan Am's business was the safe transportation of
passengers from one place to another and that sex discrimination is valid
only when the hiring of both sexes would undermine the essence of the
business operation.463 The court further held that the impracticability of
finding the few males who would perform well could not justify the dis-
crimination unless the abilities that most women possess are necessary to
the business and not merely tangential.464 The court of appeals was also
unimpressed by Pan Am's showing of passenger preference. The court
stated that allowing the validity of sex discrimination to be controlled by
the preferences and prejudices of passengers would be anomalous, 465 since
the purpose of enacting title VII was largely to overcome these very
prejudices. 466
Assuming the correctness of the district court's findings, which the court
of appeals did not declare clearly erroneous, application of an efficiency
analysis would result in a contrary conclusion. The information costs are
458. Id. at 567.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 568.
462. 442 F.2d at 388.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 388-89.
465. Id. at 389.
466. Id.
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considerably lower if sex, rather than any kind of individual personality
test, is used. Moreover, the personality tests available to allow individual
determinations were found to be unreliable. Even with a substantial in-
crease in information costs, therefore, the value of the residual risk is not
decreased; in fact, the value is increased since sex is a more reliable predic-
tor of the existence of the desired traits than is a personality test. The use
of sex as a decision criterion is highly efficient, because it results in not
only lower information costs, but in a lower residual risk as well.
The incremental increase in efficiency of using sex as a decision criterion
must be weighed against the hardship to the man in being barred com-
pletely from the position for which he may be qualified. Under the facts as
given, the probability that he is in fact qualified is fairly low, which means
that the value of moral risk that a qualified person will be rejected is also
low. To the qualified applicant barred from employment, however, it mat-
ters little what the abstract probability is of his being qualified. Still, in
such a case, the substantial gain in efficiency may well be sufficient justifi-
cation for consideration of sex.
The final factor to be considered, which should perhaps logically be a
threshold consideration, is the legitimacy of the desire for the trait sought.
The court of appeals took a very narrow view of Pan Am's business: the
provision of safe transportation. 467 At a time when fares were regulated
by the government, the only way for airlines to compete was in providing
frills. One could argue that almost no qualification of flight attendants is
necessary to the airline's primary function. The fact that the flight attend-
ants ruined the food or had an unpleasant odor would not interfere with
the ability of the airline to provide safe transportation from place to place.
In reality, however, the goal of any business is to make a profit; the goods
or services provided are merely means to that end. The question should be
whether the employer's practice furthers its ability to make a profit, not
whether it advances the employer's primary function as perceived by a
judge.
Whether the court of appeals' decision was actually mandated by the
language of title VII is highly questionable. Under title VII a person's sex
must be reasonably necessary to the business's normal operation to consti-
tute a BFOQ.468 The court apparently read the term "normal operation"
to mean "primary function" and the phrase "reasonably necessary" to
mean "absolutely necessary." Apparently, the court reasoned that if the
primary function of the business could continue without the sex classifica-
tion, then the classification was not acceptable. 469
The court of appeals' view of the BFOQ in Diaz allows insufficient
scope for entrepreneurial creativity. Competition within a particular in-
467. Id. at 388.
468. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
469. 442 F.2d at 388 ("No one has suggested that having male stewards will so seriously
affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize its ability to provide safe
transportation from one place to another.").
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dustry is often in terms of some service associated with, but not essential
to, the primary function of the business, especially in heavily regulated
industries where price competition is not permitted. Pan Am's decision
was not the result of stereotypical thinking about the proper role of the
sexes in our society; Pan Am had used men and found as an empirical fact
that their job performance was inferior to that of women. Given the im-
practicability of individualized determinations and the employer's legiti-
mate interest in maintaining a high level of job performance in its
employees, Pan Am's rational business judgment should have been al-
lowed to stand.
E. Single-Sex Schools
Perhaps one final example of disparate treatment deserves mention-
single-sex schools. The United States has a long tradition of maintaining
single-sex schools. That practice, however, has come under increasing
attack.
The purpose here is not to argue that single-sex schools are desirable
from an educational standpoint; it is sufficient to note that a respectable
body of authority suggests that such schools are advantageous for some
students. For example, a study by the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education reported that women who attend women's colleges have aca-
demic records superior to those of women who attend coeducational
schools. 470 Moreover, both men and women are more likely to drop out of
college if they attend a coeducational institution.47' Achievement after
graduation also seems to be higher for women who attend women's col-
leges, since graduates of women's colleges constitute a disproportionately
large number of entries in Who's Who of American Women .472
One educator provided two arguments for the maintenance of single-sex
schools.473 The first argument is that pedagogical diversity better serves
the variety of student needs. 474 The second argument is that because so-
cialization is different for males and females, full educational development
of women may be fostered by single-sex schools. 475 In a coeducational
setting a young woman must moderate her academic achievements if she is
to be successful in the competition with other young women for the atten-
tion of males. The latter argument may not provide support for the main-
tenance of all-male schools, in addition to all-female schools, but the
former does. The position in favor of single-sex schools is less that males
and females are different from one another than it is that they interact with
470. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 72 (1973).
471. Id.
472. Id. at 73.
473. Letter from David B. Truman to Herma Hill Kay (Dec. 12, 1980) quotedin H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 803-04 (2d ed. 1981) (Dr. Truman was President of Mount
Holyoke College from 1969 to 1978).
474. Id. at 805.
475. Id. at 804.
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one another differently from the way they interact among themselves. 476
The constitutional status of state-run single-sex schools is unsettled. The
Supreme Court has never decided whether the constitutional ban on sepa-
rate-but-equal schools applies to sex as it does to race. In Vorchheimer v.
School District477 the Court was faced with this question, but could not
agree on an answer. The lower court's decision was affirmed by an equally
divided Court without opinion.478 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit had framed the question as follows: "Do the Constitution and laws
of the United States require that every public school, in every public
school system in the Nation, be coeducational? ' 479 The court answered in
the negative.480
The female plaintiff in Vorchheimer challenged the system of public
schools provided by the Philadelphia School District. The school district
provided four kinds of high schools: academic, comprehensive, technical,
and magnet. The academic high schools had high admissions standards
and offered only college preparatory courses. Only two such schools ex-
isted in the city-Central High School for boys and Girls High School for
girls. Central High School refused to admit the plaintiff solely because of
her sex. The schools for boys and girls were comparable in quality, aca-
demic standing, and prestige, and the plaintiff submitted no factual evi-
dence to show that attendance at Girls High would constitute
psychological or other injury. Instead, she merely did not like the impres-
sion the school gave her. The court of appeals characterized the injury as a
deprivation "of the opportunity to attend a specific school, not that of an
opportunity to obtain an education at a school with comparable academic
facilities, faculty and prestige." 481
The court rejected the applicability of the holding of Brown v. Board of
Education4 82 that "separate but equal" is "inherently unequal" and stated
that "[wie are committed to the concept that there is no fundamental dif-
ference between races and therefore, in justice, there can be no dissimilar
treatment. But there are differences between the sexes which may, in lim-
ited circumstances, justify disparity in law."' 483 The court noted that the
special emotional problems of adolescents have prompted some educa-
tional experts to prefer single-sex high schools. 484 The court, quoting from
Williams v. McNair,48 5 concluded that the Constitution does not require
that sexual distinctions conform to educational opinion, but only that "the
discrimination not be wholly wanting in reason. 486
476. A. ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS 232 (1977).
477. 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
478. Id. at 703.
479. 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1975).
480. Id.
481. Id. at 882-83.
482. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
483. 532 F.2d at 886.
484. Id. at 887.
485. 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C. 1970), afl'dnem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
486. 532 F.2d at 887.
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The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement concerning single-sex
schools occurred in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan ,487 in which
the Court considered the question of whether a statute excluding males
from a state-supported professional nursing school violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 488 Although the plaintiff
could have attended two other state-supported schools, the Court held that
the allotment of more openings in state-supported nursing schools to wo-
men violated the fourteenth amendment.4 89 The Court somewhat curi-
ously viewed the practice as discriminating against women rather than
men because it reinforced the view that women should be nurses.490 The
majority noted that in 1980 women received more than ninety-four percent
of the baccalaureate degrees conferred in nursing nationwide. 491 The sug-
gestion that perhaps it would have been permissible for the state to provide
an all-female nursing school if it also provided an all-male nursing school
is absurd. Clearly, to provide the same option to men would not have been
practical, considering the low demand among males for positions in nurs-
ing schools. The majority also rejected the dissent's suggestion that the
system was justified because it served the objective of providing women a
choice of educational environments. 492
The impact of the case is not clear. The majority stated that because
Mississippi maintained no other single-sex public university or college, the
Court was not faced with the question of whether states can provide sepa-
rate but equal undergraduate institutions for males and females. 493 Justice
Powell, on the other hand, found broader implications in the decision and
stated in dissent that the majority had held, in essence, that no state may
provide any institution of higher education that is open only to women
students. 494
1. A Digression on Race and Sex
Much of the debate over separate but equal schooling relies on princi-
ples established in the area of racial discrimination. 495 Attempts to analo-
487. 102 S. Ct. 3331, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1982).
488. Id. at 3334, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1095.
489. Id. at 3339, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1101-02. To some the question of the propriety of
single-sex education appears to be merely a question of whose ox is gored. For example, one
commentator argued: "The Court is to be commended for giving MUW's program a hard
look, but a more deferential posture might be appropriate when considering women's
schools which more effectively advance the best interests of women." Comment, Challenge
to Single-Sex Schools Under Equal Protection: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 174 (1983). She also wrote that "there may be an important role
to play for feminist education which empowers women students by challenging patriarchal
values." Id.
490. 102 S. Ct. at 3339, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1101-02.
491. Id. at 3339 n.14, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1101 n.14.
492. Id. at 3340 n.17, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1103 n.17.
493. Id. at 3334 n.1, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1095 n.l.
494. Id. at 3342, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1105 (Powell, J., dissenting).
495. See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting). For a more extended discussion of the differences between race and sex in
the constitutional context, see Rutherglen, supra note 302, at 205-12.
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gize from race to sex, however, are generally unpersuasive. Those who
make such attempts risk contradiction on the separate-but-equal principle.
In the educational arena, they oppose separate but equal treatment and
argue that such treatment is as invidious with respect to sex as it is with
respect to race. 496 Yet, when opponents of the ERA raise the specter of the
necessity for "unisex" bathrooms to avoid establishing a twentieth-century
counterpart to Plessy v. Ferguson ,497 their concern is treated as trivial, and
they are told that the ERA could coexist with separate public restrooms. 498
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has stated that "[plerhaps Congress found it hard to
conceive of a plaintiff litigating the issue, or of a judge who would find
man or woman harmed by that limited separation. '499 Two comments are
in order concerning Ginsburg's statement. First, in this litigious age the
unavailability of a plaintiff to litigate the issue is difficult to conceive. Sec-
ond, if the harm is viewed as a stigma and a reinforcement of traditional
views that the sexes are different in important ways, the practice may well
be enjoined. 500
A proponent of the ERA has argued that the amendment would have to
be balanced against the constitutional right to privacy, which would act as
a limit on the sexual integration of restrooms.50 1 As Paul Freund has
pointed out, however, why the constitutional right to privacy would serve
as a limit is not clear, when presumably the constitutional right to freedom
of association, which has a longer history of recognition, would not do
so. 50 2 If the constitutional right to privacy is the right not to be viewed in a
496. See Rutherglen, supra note 302, at 205-08.
497. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
498. Ginsburg, supra note 326, at 175.
499. Id.
500. See Wasserstrom, supra note 299, at 594. Some relatively innocuous practices have
been criticized on this basis. For example, one book on the subject of sex discrimination
states, with respect to allowing a BFOQ defense for actors and actresses: "Insisting on same-
sex portrayal merely perpetuates narrow sex role stereotypes and exaggerates [recognizes?]
the differences between the sexes." B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 242 (1974).
Another argument used by some ERA opponents is that the amendment would mandate
recognition of homosexual marriage. This argument is usually somewhat similarly dis-
missed. See Ramey, Book Review, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011 (1982) (reviewing R. LEE,
A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1980)). Only if the differences
between sex and race are recognized, however, is this a weak argument. Although it might
appear that the amendment deals only with sex and not with sexual preference, analogies to
racial discrimination cases suggest that this interpretation is not correct. In Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court struck down a law that forbade whites from
marrying nonwhites. The statute was nondiscriminatory in the sense that it applied alike to
whites and nonwhites, but it was struck down on equal protection grounds. Id. at 11-12. If
the analogy of race and sex is accepted, the same reasoning would apply to homosexual
marriage. As Richard Wasserstrom has observed: "If a nonsexist society is a society in
which one's sex is no more significant than eye color in our society today, then laws which
require the persons who are being married to be of different sexes would clearly be sexist
laws." Wasserstrom, supra note 299, at 606.
501. See Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 225, 229 (1971).
502. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
234, 240 (1971). Freund also questions whether prisoners could be segregated by sex. If
sexual segregation is to protect privacy, he asks, why can't it be waived? Id. at 241.
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state of undress by members of the opposite sex, why would opaque doors
on bathroom stalls not suffice? Moreover, if the right to privacy argument
is accepted, it follows that a state cannot constitutionally provide sexually
integrated restrooms, regardless of whether there is an ERA. The state has
absolutely no flexibility, for it must go to the brink of violating privacy
rights in order to satisfy the strictures of the ERA; the state must go to the
brink of violating rights under the ERA in order to satisfy the strictures of
the constitutional right to privacy. Furthermore, why does one's right to
privacy extend only to protection from being viewed by members of the
opposite sex? Some people may object to sharing bathrooms even with
members of the same sex, just as some object to sharing bathrooms with
those of other races.
The answer is, of course, that race and sex are different.50 3 The analogy
from race to sex is imperfect at best. A prevailing "heterosexual ethic" 504
exists in our society for which there is no equivalent racial purity ethic.
Even where the prevailing sentiment is racist, maintaining the separation
of the races serves a function different from maintaining the separation of
the sexes.
The primary reason that we view racially segregated restrooms as inher-
ently immoral, while most of us have no such sentiment about sexually
segregated restrooms, is that the ideological wellspring of the two practices
is quite different. Richard Wasserstrom has observed that the underlying
reason for racially segregated restrooms was that blacks were "dirty and
impure," and, as a result, whites sought to ensure that blacks did not con-
taminate the bathrooms used by whites.50 5 He concluded, however, that
the premise for sexually segregated bathrooms arose from the importance
of preserving the mystery or forbiddenness relating to the genitalia of the
opposite sex and the other sex's sexuality. 506
This digression on restrooms has not been to predict how the "potty
problem" would be resolved under the ERA. Instead, this discussion is to
show the inappropriateness of an uncritical extension of principles devel-
oped in the field of racial discrimination to the field of sexual discrimina-
tion. Prior to any such extension, the reason that a particular practice is
wrong in the racial area should be determined, and then the applicability
of that rationale in the sexual area should be assessed. Under such an
analysis, a different rule could be applied to racially segregated restrooms
than is applied to sexually segregated restrooms.
How should a rule of sexually separate, but equal, schools fare? First,
one must determine whether sexual segregation is practiced for the same
reasons that racial segregation is. Racially segregated schools were main-
tained because of a belief that blacks were inferior to whites both intellec-
503. Rutherglen, supra note 302, at 211.
504. See id. at 206-07.
505. Wasserstrom, supra note 299, at 592.
506. Id. at 593-94.
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tually and otherwise. 50 7 Although arguably the same kind of belief may
have played some role in the establishment of separate schools for the two
sexes, apparently that is not the case today. Instead, it appears to be a
sincere belief, probably correct, that at least some students will receive
more from their educational experience if they attend single-sex schools-
a reason that seems morally superior to the reason for racially segregated
schools.508
One must remember, of course, that separate but equal has two compo-
nents: separate and equal. A system that is separate and substantially un-
equal cannot be justified. Substantial equality should be required, but
practical considerations require that identity not be required. Thus, the
court in Kirstein P. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia509 cor-
rectly held that Virginia improperly limited the premier state university to
males and provided no comparable alternative for females. 510
Imposition of a rule that the state is not permitted to maintain single-sex
schools costs much in liberty and returns little in equality. This is particu-
larly true when a state provides coeducational as well as single-sex schools,
and each person has a choice of the kind of institution to attend. Those
who desire single-sex schools are deprived of that option. Those who do
not desire them would have been allowed to attend coeducational institu-
tions anyway. Those who oppose single-sex schools under such circum-
stances are not challenging the way the state is making them live their own
lives; they are challenging the way the state is permitting others to live
theirs. A constitutional requirement of such conformity is an embarrass-
ment to those who view the Constitution as a protector of liberty.511
VII. STATISTICAL PARITY AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
A recognition of inherent differences between the sexes is critical in as-
sessing attempts to achieve proportional representation, either by disparate
impact analysis under title VI 512 or by affirmative action programs. 513 In
both cases the goal is statistical parity, and in both cases the desire for such
parity is the result of the assumption that the sexes are not different in any
significant respect. Many believe that deviations from proportional repre-
sentation are necessarily the result of sex discrimination. 514 If 250 chief
507. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1954).
508. See supra note 470 and accompanying text.
509. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
510. Id. at 187.
511. Another threat to single-sex schools is presented by the case of Bob Jones University
v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 74 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held
that a school was not entitled to tax-exempt status unless it advanced the public policy of the
United States. Consequently, the Court upheld an IRS decision stripping the school of its
tax-exempt status because of its policy forbidding interracial dating and marriage. Id. at
2036, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 182. Presumably, the IRS is free to define single-sex schools as viola-
tive of public policy and deny them tax exemptions also.
512. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
513. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 492 (1981).
514. See F. MORRIS, CURRENT TRENDS IN THE USE (AND MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 21-28 (2d ed. 1978).
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
executive officers of the Fortune 500 companies are not female, that is con-
sidered a reflection of sex discrimination. Such reasoning is erroneous,
however. Disproportionate representation only indicates that selection has
not been random with respect to sex, but it demonstrates nothing else. 515
Many courts have been somewhat reluctant, and rightly so, to conclude
that mere deviations from proportional representation reflect discrimina-
tory practices, because they recognize that other variables must be consid-
ered. 16 In this respect, much of the political discussion, including that
surrounding the ERA debate, has been far less rigorous. If the sex differ-
ences described previously do exist, then even in the absence of any selec-
tion based upon sex an equilibrium sex ratio that may not be one-to-one
would be expected in many occupations. For example, given male superi-
ority in mathematics, the likelihood that fifty percent of mathematicians
will be females is small. Also, attempts to reach a one-to-one proportion
are as immoral as attempts to make mathematics a completely male
profession.
Even though we recognize sex differences, we must retain tolerance for
"cross-sex" achievement. Sex differences in achievement can be self-per-
petuating in a rather insidious manner. Assume, for example, that the
equilibrium ratio of male-to-female mathematicians is 80:20. That means
that four male mathematicians will exist for every female mathematician.
One could easily predict that mathematics would be perceived as a male
profession and girls would tend to gravitate away from the occupation,
even in the absence of steering by guidance counselors or pressure from
friends and family. This result would be unfortunate both for girls whose
major talent lies in that area and for society in general, which would fail to
benefit from the girls' talent. Equally unfortunate, however, would be
viewing a deviation from a 50:50 ratio as an affront to one of the sexes and
imposing pressures on university mathematics departments to achieve such
proportions. Mandating a 50:50 ratio based upon one misconceived view
of reality is as wrong as mandating a 100:0 ratio based upon another such
view.
In addition to differences in innate ability, differences in temperament
will likewise have an impact on the distribution of the sexes in various
occupations. The greater drive and aggressiveness, as well as differences in
interest, of males will continue to result in a greater proportion of men in
positions of political and economic power. The lesson of the kibbutz sug-
gests that this will be so regardless of any sexually egalitarian philosophy
we might adopt.517 Even in the absence of discrimination, and independ-
ent of any notions about the proper role of the sexes, this disproportional-
515. See generally Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment Dis-
crimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33 (discussing statistical methods of proof of employment
discrimination).
516. Id. at 47-72.
517. See supra text accompanying notes 96-126.
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ity will occur as it has in every known society, unless we are willing to
allow the state to stifle these differences in the name of equality.
Conversely, because of the greater nurturance of women, women will
probably continue to be the primary childrearers. We need not require
this to be the case, but we need not require that it not be the case either.
More women than men are willing to be full-time homemakers; more wo-
men than men are willing to work only part time. Women should be al-
lowed to do so without any social opprobrium being attached to their
being "just a housewife and mother." On the other hand, if the husband
and wife choose to reverse the traditional roles and have the husband stay
home with the children while the wife works, no reason exists not to toler-
ate that. That such a situation will be common, however, is unlikely be-
cause the pressure for the man to be the breadwinner is deep-rooted. A
woman who goes out and earns a living is not considered "less of a wo-
man," but a man who voluntarily stays home with the children throughout
their school years might be considered "less of a man."
We should be no less tolerant of same-sex behavior than we are of cross-
sex behavior, however. Society seems to have reached the point when a
woman mathematician need not apologize for her station in life, but a
housewife must. The freedom we accord members of society must extend
as well to their choice of sex roles. In our zeal to become tolerant of what
might at one time have been considered aberrant behavior, we must not
look with scorn on more "normal" behavior. Freedom of choice entails
the freedom to choose not to be "modern."
VIII. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The Equal Rights Amendment is of central concern to the theme of this
Article because it would constitute a constitutional proscription of the rec-
ognition of actual biologically based differences between men and wo-
men. 518 The amendment reflects an elevation of a particular conception of
equality to a position where that conception is the fundamental goal.
Whenever any value becomes so idolized that other values need not be
considered in the making of policy, we should consider whether we are
proceeding along the proper course. 519
518. Section 1 of the ERA provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." S.J. Res. 8, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
519. As will become apparent, this author does not share Professor Leo Kanowitz's view
that opponents of the ERA are either closed-minded or stupid. Kanowitz has written:
These, then, are the bases for some of the principal substantive objections to
the Amendment. Whether the objections are based on major or minor consid-
erations, there are, as I have tried to demonstrate, principled, logical, and dis-
positive answers that can be and often have been brought to bear by the
Amendment's supporters. Those answers, unfortunately, have not always
been communicated, partly because many ERA opponents have refused "to
be confused by the facts." Others, though willing to listen, have often found it
hard to understand because of the complexities and legal technicalities that
are unavoidably involved in those answers.
Kanowitz, The ERA: The Task Ahead, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 651 (1979).
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A. Of What Use Is the ERA?
Proponents of the ERA tend to be vague on the question of what the
amendment will achieve that cannot be, or has not already been, achieved
under existing interpretations of the fourteenth amendment. 520 Published
works on the subject seem to devote as much ink to ridiculing nineteenth
century cases that have long since been overruled, or to taking Blackstone
to task for his description of the unity of the husband and wife, as they do
to discussing issues of current concern.521 Many writers support passage of
the ERA as a necessary symbol of sexual equality.5 22 One might question,
however, whether the fundamental charter of our nation should be altered
to provide a pat on the back to any segment of society, however large. 523
One book has described the amendment as "an invitation for new values
to enter the social arena."52 4 The Constitution should not be amended,
however, to invite new values; rather, it should be amended only to reflect
new values. The authors who wish to invite these new values also appear
to view the ERA as a tool of consciousness raising.5 25 They have stated
that "[t]here is a multitude [of women] only vaguely aware of discrimina-
tion who would, if queried, question the legitimacy of the demand for
equality. A constitutional amendment based on the fact of discrimination
gives credibility to the need for equality and legitimacy to the demand. 526
Yet, a constitutional amendment cannot be justified as a pedagogical tool
to convince the masses that they are oppressed. If women are oppressed to
such an extent that they need constitutional protection, one would think
that they would already know of the oppression even in the absence of a
constitutional amendment to prove it to them.
A report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights is illustrative
of the claims of the proponents of the ERA 5 27 The Commission has
claimed that women continue to be discriminated against in the labor force
and that the ERA will "close loopholes in antidiscrimination laws."' 528 In
support of this proposition, the report runs through the obligatory litany of
520. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
521. See, e.g., Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment is the Way, I HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 19, 21 (1978).
522. See, e.g., Ramey, supra note 500, at 1024 ("never was a symbol of the nation's com-
mitment to women's equality more sorely needed than it is now").
523. Thomas Sowell has observed:
One of the real problems in talking about the Equal Rights Amendment in
any rational way is that to many it appears as a sort of referendum on the
ultimate worth of women. I think that is unfortunate because it is hard
enough to formulate social decisions with which society can live without also
treating this decision as some sort of measure of the ultimate worth of one-half
of the human race.
Sowell, Status Versus Behavior, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 179, 188.
524. WOMEN's RIGHTS, supra note 311, at 10.
525. Id. at 11.
526. Id.
527. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: GUARANTEE-
ING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1981) [hereinafter cited as
GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS].
528. Id. at 6.
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oppressive laws of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 529 There-
after, it proceeds to report on presently existing discriminatory state stat-
utes, such as an Ohio statute that prohibits women from being, inter alia,
gas or electric meter readers, bellhops, and bowling alley pinsetters. 530
Such examples of antiquated, and no doubt unenforced, statutes are in no
sense persuasive on, or even relevant to, the question of the need for the
ERA. The above-described Ohio statute is undoubtedly unconstitutional
under present interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the
same Ohio legislature that ratified the ERA53' could repeal the statute; the
need for a constitutional amendment is unclear.
The central question in determining the need for the ERA is: What
laws, constitutional under present standards, would be unconstitutional
under the ERA? Proponents of the ERA can point to few. A subsidiary
question is: Which laws identified under the first question are not amena-
ble to legislative change? The Civil Rights Commission report identified
what its authors perceived to be flaws in the social security system and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).532 The Commission
did not explain why Congress, which approved the ERA by the constitu-
tionally necessary two-thirds majority and extended the ratification dead-
line, could not simply amend the legislation that supposedly violates the
amendment that it favors. How the failure of the state legislatures to ratify
the ERA in any way restricts Congress's ability to get its own house in
order is difficult to understand.
The report also pointed to the fact, which has become a mindless slogan,
that employed women receive, on the average, only fifty-nine cents for
every dollar earned by a man.533 The report fails to reveal, however, how
the ERA will do more than title VI 534 or the Equal Pay Act 535 to remedy
this situation. Moreover, the ERA would affect only government employ-
ees since, it restricts only governmental action. The only real, substantive
change predicted in this area is the unavailability to a governmental em-
ployer of the BFOQ defense under title VII.536 The desirability of this
goal is highly questionable, but, in any event, given the narrow interpreta-
tion of the defense by the courts, the elimination of the defense would have
529. Id. at 6-7.
530. Id. at 7 n.41.
531. Ohio ratified the Equal Rights Amendment on Feb. 7, 1974. Const. amends. 14 to
end U.S.C.A. note at 520 (West Supp. 1983).
532. GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS, supra note 527, at 14-17.
533. Id. at 7. The disparity between the wages of men and women is not solely, or prob-
ably even primarily, a result of sex discrimination. Women between the ages of twenty-five
and fifty-nine are eleven times more likely than men to leave the job market. G. GILDER,
WEALTH AND POVERTY 130 (1981). Moreover, the average woman spends only eight
months at a particular job, while the average man spends three years. Id. In an age when
an increasing number of housewives are entering the job market for the first time, one would
expect a decrease in the ratio of female wages to male wages, which is precisely what is
observed.
534. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
535. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
536. GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS, supra note 527, at 9.
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only a very limited effect. 537
The Commission's report also described antiquated laws reflecting dis-
criminatory common law concepts about ownership, possession, and con-
trol of marital property.53 8 Again, virtually all the laws described have
either been struck down already or clearly would be invalidated under ex-
isting precedents. The report also discussed the economic plight of dis-
placed homemakers, including the failure of the social security system to
recognize the value of work in the home. 539 No explanation of how the
ERA would change this state of affairs is given, other than to suggest that
it would "provide a constitutional basis for urging recognition of the value
of the homemaker's contribution to a marriage."5 40 The report failed to
explain why a constitutional basis is required to enable Congress to act in
an area in which it is already constitutionally empowered to act.
That the ERA would result in few changes that would legitimately ad-
vance the position of women is sufficient reason to oppose it. A more com-
pelling reason is that the amendment would probably lead to results that
are affirmatively harmful. Three areas where the ERA is likely to produce
unfortunate consequences have been discussed earlier in this Article: wo-
men in combat, 54 1 sex-segregated schools, 542 and the maternal
preference. 543
A tendency for advocates of the ERA to "waffle" on the question of its
applicability to the military has been noted.544 A more appropriate word
would be "obfuscate." For example, both Martha Griffiths545 and Birch
Bayh 546 have stated that once in the military women, as well as men,
would go where they were ordered. Such statements are disingenuous, to
say the least, and do not address the real question: Would a policy prohib-
iting the assignment of women to combat positions pass constitutional
muster? The bulk of the commentary, including that of both opponents
and proponents of the ERA, suggests that such a policy would be inva-
lid. 547 To many the answer to this one question is sufficient reason to op-
pose the amendment.
Sex-segregated public schools would almost certainly not survive the
ERA, if indeed they can survive under current constitutional interpreta-
537. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("the bfoq exception was in
fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sex").
538. GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS, supra note 527, at 9.
539. Id. at 12-14.
540. Id. at 16.
541. See supra notes 370-415 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 470-511 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 416-28 and accompanying text.
544. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra note 500, at 166.
545. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972) (statement of Sen. Griffiths).
546. 118 CONG. REC. S4390 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
547. See R. LEE, supra note 400, at 55; SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra note
500, at 163; WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 311, at 2; Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and
the Military, 82 YALE L. 1533, 1537 (1973).
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tion.548 It is unfortunate that this aspect of educational diversity must be
crushed beneath the jackboots of a blind conformity.
The maternal preference may survive, although it may be driven under-
ground. In most jurisdictions the preference is not statutory, but is applied
by courts to serve the best interests of the child.549 Because of the number
of intangible factors involved in awarding custody, judges could, and
probably would, continue to apply the preference, even if only subcon-
sciously. Even under the ERA common-sense intuition may die hard.
A recurrent theme of ERA proponents is that the uncertainty occasioned
by its passage is not a cause for concern, because courts are responsible
enough to interpret it flexibly. 550 William Van Alstyne has argued that
state legislators who are reasonably familiar with the Supreme Court's
flexible interpretations of other constitutional amendments should not be
concerned that the ERA would be interpreted more rigidly and without
common sense.55' At the time of that writing, Professor Van Alstyne did
not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doe,552 which held
that the equal protection clause prevented a state from withholding a free
public education from illegal aliens. 553
The ERA is not the panacea for all of society's ills that some believe it to
be. The ERA will redress few instances of genuine sex discrimination.
Life without the ERA may not be perfect, but life with the ERA will be
more imperfect. Many of the benefits claimed for the amendment will not
occur; many of the changes will be affirmatively harmful. Perhaps there is
no more fitting way to end this section than with a fairy tale by Professor
Leo Kanowitz about what the world will look like after the ratification of
the ERA:
[W]e can look forward with some confidence to the creation of a truly
sex-neutral society in our country that will inspire the rest of the
world; a society in which the original promise of America's greatness
will have come much closer to fulfillment; a society in which, because
of the demonstrated relationship between rigid sex role stratification
and the tendency toward human aggression, family relations will be
improved, crime and delinquency diminished, and violent solutions to
disputes between nations less likely to be sought.554
And we will live happily ever after.
548. See supra notes 470-51 1 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 416-28 and accompanying text.
550. Ginsburg, supra note 521, at 22.
551. Van Alstyne, The Proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment. A Brief Supportive Com-
ment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 189, 203.
552. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
553. Id. at 230.
554. Kanowitz, supra note 519, at 662 (footnote omitted); see also W. SHAKESPEARE, THE
TEMPEST (Act V, scene i, lines 181-84):
O wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is!
0 brave new world,
That has such people in't.
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B. The Standard of Review Under the ERA
Four standards of judicial review of sex classifications are potentially
applicable under the ERA.5 55 The first, and least likely, is that the stan-
dard of review will remain the same as it is today. Under the current stan-
dard a sex classification is permissible if the state meets its burden of
showing that the classification is substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental interest. 556 The next possible level of scrutiny is "strict scru-
tiny"-the same standard that is now applied to racial classifications. 557
The effect of this standard would be to declare sex a "suspect class," so that
for a sex classification to survive the state would have to show that it fur-
thers a compelling state interest. The third possible standard is the
oxymoronic "qualified absolute," under which only two kinds of classifica-
tions may survive: classifications necessary to safeguard other constitu-
tional rights, such as the right to privacy; and classifications relating to
physical characteristics unique to one sex, such as laws regulating wet
nurses and sperm donors.558 The final possible standard of review might
be called the "absolute absolute"-that is, no classification based upon sex
may ever survive. The difference between the third and fourth standards is
insignificant, because every constitutional guarantee must be viewed in the
context of the rest of the Constitution, and whether laws regulating wet
nurses and sperm donors are really sex classifications is questionable. 559
Almost all the commentary on the ERA predicts the adoption of the
qualified absolute standard.560 This prognosis may, however, be viewed as
an attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If enough commentators
predict the qualified-absolute standard, that cannot help but have an im-
pact on later interpretation. The qualified absolute standard is Draconian.
Under that standard, "[tlhe issue . . . cannot be different but equal, rea-
sonable or unreasonable classification, suspect classification, fundamental
interest, or the demands of administrative expediency. Equality of rights
means that sex is not a factor. '561 In other words, sex classifications should
always be regarded as unreasonable, "except where the law pertains to a
unique physical characteristic of one sex."'562
The single-mindedness of the most vocal proponents of the ERA is illus-
555. See R. LEE, supra note 400, at 40.
556. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
557. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978).
558. See WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 311, at 15-16.
559. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy bene-
fits from state disability insurance system was not "based upon gender as such").
560. See generally CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE EFFECT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT ON STATE LAWS AND INSTITU-
TIONS 4-21 (1975) (discussing standards of review).
561. Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 892. Not surprisingly, however, affirmative
action will survive: "As in racial desegregation cases, such decrees could provide remedies
for past denial of equal rights which take into account sex factors and give special treatment
to the group discriminated against." Id. at 904.
562. Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
225, 229 (1971).
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trated by what has been called "the leading commentary ' 563 on the
amendment. The authors argued that the strict scrutiny test is inadequate
because it permits some sex-based classifications to survive, since the gov-
ernment may justify even a suspect classification by showing a compelling
state interest.564 To allow countervailing interests to limit the amend-
ment's reach would, they asserted, "contradict its basic premises.' '565
The elevation of sexual equality to a position where no other values are
to be balanced against it bodes ill for our society. When equality becomes
a categorical imperative, thus presenting an action "as of itself objectively
necessary, without regard to any other end, '' 566 then it must be pursued no
matter what the price in liberty, justice, or efficiency. Are we, as a society,
really willing to declare that we value nothing so highly that it may not be
sacrificed at the altar of sexual equality?
Michael Novak has observed that the spiritual core of a genuinely plu-
ralistic society is left empty by design. 567 Individual members are there-
fore free to seek what they wish, and the diversity of desires ensures that
no single central value is socially imposed. If we desire a society in which
different ideals and values may coexist, we must not declare any one idea
primary. Unrestrained egalitarianism can lead only to totalitarianism, just
as unrestrained libertarianism can lead only to anarchy.
Isaiah Berlin has pointed out that only in a world where ends collide
and there is no total acceptance of any one end is political philosophy even
possible.568 Where one goal is supreme, debate is possible only over
means and not ends. Berlin warns eloquently that the apotheosis of any
single value presents significant dangers because it leads to the conclusion
that all positive values must be compatible, or even entail one another. 569
The world in which we live, however, presents us with choices between
equally ultimate, but conflicting, ends, and precisely for that reason we
accord such importance to freedom of choice. We must not be swept away
by the appealing notion that because some amount of equality is good, a
greater amount is necessarily better. We must not be captured by the be-
lief that we should purchase equality at any price. We must, however,
hold fast to the idea that equality is a value to be pursued, while at the
same time recognizing that it is but one of many positive ideals whose
realization we seek.
The tradeoffs presented by the ERA are seldom mentioned and perhaps
seldom recognized. One can easily fall into the trap of viewing any imped-
iment to the exercise of governmental power as inherently good and, there-
563. Ginsburg, supra note 326, at 173.
564. Constitutional Basis, supra note 312, at 880.
565. Id. at 890-91.
566. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (1969).
567. M. NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 53 (1982).
568. Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 143, 143-
72 (H. Hardy ed. 1979).
569. See Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
167-68 (1969).
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fore, as something to be sought. The ERA is thus often viewed as a boon
to personal liberty.5 70 The amendment is not the benefit that some imag-
ine, however. It would severely restrict the power of government to class-
ify on the basis of sex, but it would not inevitably enhance personal liberty.
The amendment would prevent a majority of the population from seeking
the realization of its views as to what constitutes wise policy in favor of the
views of a minority. This result is not necessarily bad, but it is not neces-
sarily good, either. "Discrete and insular minorities" often need just such
protection from the oppression of the majority, but a group that constitutes
fifty-one percent of the population is hardly such a minority.5 7 1
The ERA would prevent a majority of the population, acting through its
elected representatives, from deciding to provide the option of single-sex
public schools, so that students would be permitted to choose whether to
attend a coeducational or a single-sex school. Prohibition of such a system
serves no easily identifiable liberty interest. A majority, which may desire
such a system, is frustrated; students who desire single-sex schools are de-
nied that option; those who did not want to attend single-sex schools
would have had the option of attending coeducational institutions in any
event. Benefits accrue only to the intolerant-those who believe that their
views should be the standard by which others live their lives. The tradeoff
is, therefore, one of liberty for a particular conception of equality. In a
given instance the tradeoff may be deemed acceptable, but under a consti-
tutional amendment the tradeoff is not one that may be accepted or re-
jected on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the tradeoff is established in
advance, before the individual question is even raised. As Rex Lee has
observed, "[a] constitutional amendment, very simply, is not a fine-tuning
instrument. It has more the qualities of a sledge hammer. '572
The notion that scrutiny of sex classifications should be more intense
than, or even as intense as, racial classifications is counter to intuition and
to reason. Racial classifications should be presumptively more, rather than
less, suspect, as there are few, if any, racial traits upon which governmental
decisions might legitimately be based. Moreover, such classifications often
should not stand even if justified by an efficiency analysis, because of the
significant likelihood of perpetuating the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion. An adequate answer has yet to be provided to the question of why
sex classifications are more immoral than race classifications; why sexually
570. See, e.g., WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 311, at 10 ("The matter of simple justice, the
matter of equal rights, the matter of individual freedom take precedence over all other social
values because they are so basic.") That statement illustrates Berlin's description of the
belief that all positive values are compatible or even entail one another. See Berlin, supra
note 569, at 168.
571. As of 1980 females constituted 51.4% of the population of the United States. STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 10, at 26.
572. R. LEE, supra note 400, at 85. Thomas Sowell makes the same point as follows:
"Another of the consequences of this system is that social issues are dealt with not in terms
of policies that are adjustable incrementally according to situations, but according to rights;
that is, rigidities that apply categorically over very broad areas, regardless of the individual
circumstances." Sowell, supra note 523, at 182.
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segregated public schools are less moral than racially segregated public
schools; why it is more moral to have a racially segregated military than a
sexually segregated military. Even if the reader is not convinced that in-
nate differences between the sexes exist, he must conclude that the jury is
still out, because a very large and respectable body of evidence suggests
that those differences do exist. One might then question whether an ap-
propriate solution is to foreclose by a constitutional amendment the ulti-
mate resolution of that question in favor of the answer that such
differences do exist and the government may recognize them.
C The Appropriate Standardfor Sex Classifications
As unexciting as the position may seem, the standard used by the courts
to decide questions of sex classifications is probably correct, even if the
results they reach in particular cases are not. A rational basis standard,
under which a classification will survive scrutiny if it is rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest, is too permissive. Few statutes, even
those struck down under a rational basis standard, actually have no ra-
tional basis. For example, the statute invalidated in Reed v. Reed,57 3 under
which a husband had an absolute preference over the wife to be adminis-
trator of a deceased child's estate, was not irrational. More men than wo-
men have experience in business matters. Even if that were not so, a rule
that men have an absolute preference, or that women have an absolute
preference, or even that persons with the most letters in their middle
names have an absolute preference, is not irrational, though it may be ar-
bitrary. Such a statute is rational because it obviates the necessity of hold-
ing a hearing on the issue of who becomes administrator. The Supreme
Court was correct in striking down the law, but not because the law was
irrational; the statute deserved to be struck down because the incremental
saving to the government was not sufficient to justify denying women as a
class the opportunity to be administrators.5 7 4
The current test properly imposes the burden on the state to justify a
challenged classification. 575 Such a burden is necessary to ensure that sex
classifications are the product of thought and not merely habit. A pre-
sumption against sex classifications is needed to avoid an easy reliance on
sex as a proxy for other traits. The states must be prepared to show that
sex classifications are in fact better than other classifications that could be
made. The author parts company with others on this issue and would
allow considerations of efficiency and administrative convenience to be in-
cluded in the decisionmaking calculus. Where strong enough, these con-
siderations should be determinative.
Justice Rehnquist correctly noted in his dissent in Craig v. Boren that the
standard's "substantial relationship" and "important state interest" termi-
nology leaves much room for a judge's personal preferences to determine
573. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
574. Id. at 77.
575. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
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the outcome of a particular challenge.5 76 That insoluble problem can be
avoided only by an absolute rule that sex classifications are either per se
reasonable or per se unreasonable. What is lost in certainty and objectiv-
ity is gained in flexibility.
IX. ANDROGYNY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY
The extent to which some modern liberals are willing to sacrifice liberal
values for the cause of equality is often surprising. A completely equal
society can be achieved, if at all, only at tremendous social cost, and an
unchecked egalitarianism can lead only to a common misery. Some may
be willing to pay that price, but many do not realize that the price will be
exacted.
Americans are proud of their liberal tradition of protecting freedom of
expression, yet many appear willing to sacrifice even this value to achieve
equality. For example, one commentator suggests that the Federal Com-
munications Commission should include an evaluation of a television sta-
tion's treatment of women in product advertising in its decision to renew a
broadcast license.577 He argues that the solution to the problem of sex-role
stereotyping can be supplied only by regulations that will "change the im-
age of women in television commercials rather than air a controversy over
what that image should be."' 578 Consequently, he concludes that the appli-
cation of the fairness doctrine is not enough because that results in mere
debate, rather than the government's imposition of the author's values. 579
In a similar censorial vein, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights has published a pamphlet that questions the ideological purity of
some school textbooks.580 Among other things, the publication describes a
history textbook that states that Asians "helped build the transcontinental
railroads. They also worked as household servants or as waiters and laun-
derers. ' 581 Of course, the report did not, and could not dispute the truth of
the statement. The point intended could only be that history should some-
how be revised to reflect more modern values and ignore unpleasant or
unfashionable realities. The report also described a pattern called "boot-
strap," in which the impression is given that blacks can always succeed if
576. Id. at 221 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
577. Note, Ring Around the Collar-Chain Around the Neck.- A Proposal to Monitor Sex
Role Stereotyping in Television Advertising, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 149, 177 (1976).
578. Id. at 177; see also Ladimeji, Flew and the Revival of Social Darwinism, 49 PHILOSO-
PHY 97, 97 (1974) (freedom of speech "does not entail the freedom to proclaim on insuffi-
cient evidence the discovery of traits of racial inferiority in a social context of rising racial
tension").
579. Freedom of association seems likewise in danger. See Bums, The Exclusion of Wo-
men from Influential Men's Clubs.- The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 324 (1983); Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club.- Sex Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 237 (1982).
580. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHARACTERS IN TEXTBOOKS: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE (1980) (hereinafter cited as CHARACTERS IN TEXTBOOKS).
581. Id. at 9 (quoting COUNCIL ON INTERRACIAL BOOKS FOR CHILDREN, How Books
Distort the Asian American Image, 7 CIBC BULL. 1, 3 (1976)).
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only they are properly motivated and help themselves to get ahead. 58 2 The
black characters were "told to work hard and maintain their ambitions in
spite of prejudice. '58 3 Major characters were shown to have overcome
their problems through sheer perseverance. The message of the report ap-
pears to be that it would be preferable to impress upon minorities the per-
vasiveness of prejudice and the impossibility of their ever succeeding in
this imperfect world. Surely, a more effective method of keeping minori-
ties in a socially inferior position is difficult to imagine. 584
The Civil Rights Commission pamphlet also reported that girls were
usually shown as more passive and boys as more active. 58 5 Furthermore,
most scientists in the books were men.58 6 These observations highlight the
difficulty of attempting to purify textbooks, because the question immedi-
ately arises of what the proper portrayal should be. Should it be an accu-
rate portrayal of the current status of the depicted group, or should the
book show what their status would be if they were proportionately repre-
sented in all aspects of life? The criticism of the former alternative is that
it reinforces the results of past discrimination. The latter alternative is
subject to the criticism that it inaccurately portrays reality and thus must
reflect someone's subjective value judgment concerning the ideal situation.
For example, what percentage of physicists should be portrayed as wo-
men? In 1980, 756 of 818 (92.4%) doctoral degrees in physics went to
men. 58 7 In textbooks should that percentage of physicists be men, or
should only half of them be men? Or, should it be somewhere in between?
Given sex differences in spatial and mathematical ability, 588 half of all
physicists will probably never be female, yet an underlying assumption of
insisting on a 50:50 sex ratio in physicists depicted in textbooks is that in
the absence of discrimination that ratio would obtain.
The call for reallocation of responsibility for childraising also inevitably
presents tradeoffs that are not generally acknowledged. This call has two
aspects: requiring greater participation by men and requiring greater par-
ticipation by society-that is, government. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has writ-
ten that "man must join woman at the center of family life, and
government must step in to assist both of them during the years when they
have small children."' 58 9 She complains that the burden of caring for the
very young is imposed only upon parents, who are a relatively small part
582. CHARACTERS IN TEXTBOOKS, supra note 580, at 7.
583. Id.
584. Thomas Sowell has pointed out that the path to success of various ethnic groups has
been through hard work. T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 282-87 (1981). Similarly, George
Gilder states: "The first principle is that in order to move up, the poor must not only work,
they must work harder than the classes above them." G. GILDER, supra note 533, at 68.
One would think that a person who desired an elevation of the social status of blacks would
encourage industry instead of despair.
585. CHARACTERS IN TEXTBOOKS, supra note 580, at 10.
586. Id. at 11.
587. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 10, at 167.
588. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
589. Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1975).
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of society.5 90 Consequently, Ginsburg desires a more even distribution of
childrearing burdens among parents, their employers, and taxpayers.5 '
She does not acknowledge, however, that increased governmental partici-
pation will undoubtedly be accompanied by increased governmental regu-
lation, nor does she reveal how men are to be compelled to do the "right
thing."
Another writer has stated that "[t]he abdication of fatherly responsibility
on any level can no longer be tolerated" and cited with approval the Cu-
ban Family Code.592 That code requires a father's participation in all as-
pects of family life, including childcare and housework. 593 The father's
duties are not abrogated by the fact that he may be the family's sole finan-
cial support. The writer did not analyze the status of civil liberties in
Cuba.
Those who call for a reallocation of childrearing responsibilities are cor-
rect about one thing: freeing women from childrearing is a necessary con-
dition for the kind of equality they seek. Where they err, however, is in
assuming that such relief is a sufficient condition for emancipation. That
position does not take into account the real differences between men and
women and does not consider that the current allocation of childcare "bur-
dens" may not be arbitrary.594
Alice Rossi has observed that attempts to reallocate childrearing respon-
sibilities are inadequate because they neglect human characteristics that
stem from our biological heritage.5 95 A program of sexual equality in
marriage and the workplace cannot succeed unless these biosocial factors
are acknowledged, and, if desired, compensated for. Unless these factors
are confronted, the press for sexual equality will go the way of so many
other failed social experiments. In a similar vein, Elizabeth Wolgast has
argued that the ideal of equality can be achieved only through massive
efforts at social conditioning aimed at producing androgynous creatures
with similar roles and personalities.5 96 The assimilationist society that re-
sults will necessarily value uniformity over freedom and autonomy.
An egalitarian androgynous society is hardly in the interests of women,
particularly if it retains a competitive capitalistic economy. Philosopher
J.R. Lucas has insightfully observed that if we accept the proposition that
men and women are biologically identical, then in most cases women,
judged by male standards, will not be considered as good as their male
rivals, and the results will be the depersonalization of both sexes. 597 The
obvious rejoinder is thit the standards by which people are judged, if they
590. Id. at 40.
591. Id.
592. Scales, supra note 315, at 441 & n.341 (citing CUBAN LAW No. 1289, arts. 26-27, 83,
85 (1975)).
593. Id.
594. See supra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
595. Rossi, A Biological Perspective on Parenting, supra note 95, at 2.
596. E. WOLGAST, supra note 327, at 32.
597. Lucas, Because You are a Woman, 48 PHILOSOPHY 161, 171 (1973).
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are to be judged at all, ought not to be male standards. Yet a complex
capitalistic society in which drive and aggressiveness would not be re-
warded is difficult to imagine. That does not mean that feminine traits are
less important. No reason exists to believe that the aggressiveness of males
has been any more important to mankind than the nurturance of females.
Both became established in the species because they were adaptive. More-
over, no absolute standard is available to determine the value to be placed
upon the two traits: Aggressiveness is superior in some contexts, and nur-
turance is in others. Female traits have been useful in the domestic sphere,
and male traits have been useful in the extradomestic sphere. As a result,
to the extent that male traits are still advantageous in the extradomestic
sphere and that one's merit is assessed on the basis of achievement in that
sphere, men will tend to continue to occupy positions of higher status.
An androgynous society is almost by definition not a free society. Some
method by which to enforce the androgynous lifestyle must emerge. 598
Unless ruthlessly suppressed, sex differences will continue to rear their
(ugly?) heads. Many social institutions would be forced to change. For
example, one author has advocated a radical change in athletics to elevate
the status of female athletes. 599 She recommends a change from a tradi-
tional model of sports that focuses on competition to one that emphasizes
the joy of participation. The author therefore suggests a shift to such
sports as "inner tube water polo," where the novelty of the inner tube cre-
ates a handicap to equalize the players' abilities. 6°°
What should be done about sports whose results are influenced by traits
in which the sexes differ? We are told "[w]e must shift our attention from
what is different between men and women to what is similar. Where gen-
eral differences between the sexes are still perceived, the valuing of these
differences must be changed."' 60 1 In other words, the importance of any
trait in which the sexes differ must be diminished, not because of any in-
herent lack of value of the trait, but because attaching any significance to
the trait will lead to inequality. For those who enjoy gymnastics, this must
be seen as unfortunate. Men's gymnastics, emphasizing strength, and wo-
men's gymnastics, emphasizing grace, are two very different sports. One
598. E. WOLGAST, supra note 327, at 95. The author stated:
Speaking of him or her as if the sexes are the same will not convince us that
they are. And if institutions and laws are made for a sexless species, they will
obviously not fit the two-sexed one we belong to. Can we then insist that
people accommodate their lives so that the difference of sex willbecome negli-
gible? But that certainly is a Procrustean bed. To some the price of this
"equality" will seem absurdly high.
Id. (emphasis in original).
599. Comment, Women and Athletics." Toward a Physicality Perspective, 5 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 121, 121 (1982).
600. This proposal is reminiscent of Kurt Vonnegut's story, Harrison Bergeron, in which
strong people were forced to carry weights to make them equal to weaker people, and
"mental handicap radios," which gave off periodic bursts of sound, were worn in the ears of
the intelligent to prevent them from taking "unfair advantage of their brains." This equality
was enforced by agents of the United States Handicapper General. Vonnegut, Harrison Ber-
geron, in K. VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (1968).
601. Comment, supra note 599, at 133.
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
cannot be terribly optimistic about what "androgynous gymnastics" will
look like.
Not surprisingly, the fate of football is in serious question. The author
advocating coed athletics acknowledged that there are biological obstacles
to female achievement in sports such as football, which place a premium
on physical strength.602 She argues that these obstacles cast doubts on the
merits of the game of football rather than on the athletic potential of wo-
men.60 3 This argument implies discriminatory impact analysis with a ven-
geance-a sport in which free competition between the sexes would lead to
one sex's continually winning is foolish and should be abolished.
This rather ridiculous example is not uncharacteristic and is only one of
many changes in the social fabric that would be required to achieve an
assimilationist androgynous society. As long as equality is defined as
"identity," stifling all real differences between the sexes will be necessary.
As long as equality is viewed as the fundamental categorical imperative,
no countervailing considerations will be permitted to counterbalance the
egalitarian drive. We must recognize that equality has a certain value, but
we must not forget that there are other values, equally fundamental, that
should be considered. A society in which people are permitted to be differ-
ent seems far superior to one in which they are compelled to be the same.
An androgynous society may be achievable, but it will cost us tremen-
dously in values we hold dear.
X. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has not been to answer definitively the ques-
tions raised. Tens of thousands of pages have been devoted to the question
of sex differences, and the precise contours of these differences are not yet
known. Moreover, an acceptance of these differences leaves difficult legal
and policy questions. The debate should continue over precisely what
kinds of distinctions between the sexes are to be accepted and what kinds
are not, but it should be an informed debate, rather than one that starts
from the mistaken assumption that men and women are alike in all signifi-
cant respects.
Those who favor the most expansive view of sexual equality have at-
tempted to co-opt the fairness issue, and for the most part they have been
successful. The moral high ground should not be ceded so readily. In
many instances moral arguments can be made to counter those of the most
ardent egalitarians. In policy questions involving equality, morality is sel-
dom found exclusively on one side. An intelligent policy of sexual equal-
ity must take into account the natural differences between the sexes. The
law, to be both fair and effective, cannot be based upon an erroneous view
of human nature.
602. Id. at 133 n.47.
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